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Abstract 
Smallholder farmers have been at the center of the development discourse 
not only because they represent a significant portion of the world’s extreme poor 
but because of their potential role in food security, climate change and gender 
equality. Smallholders account for 70% of global food production but most of 
them in the developing world operate in the informal markets.  Market 
formalization is accelerating even in the least developed countries, however, and 
formal market channels are gradually displacing informal ones.  Global value 
chain based formal markets may also offer opportunities for smallholders to tap 
into fast growing international markets for high value agricultural products. 
  One of the key challenges policymakers, the development community 
and agribusinesses face, however, is smallholders’ limited formal organization 
(“producer organizations”) that aggregate their production and demand for 
goods and services in order to enable more effective market participation 
(“aggregation”).  Only 5-10% of farmers globally are estimated to participate in 
formal producer organizations.  This is despite the fact that such organizations 
have been supported by both policymakers and the development field as a way 
of tackling poverty and addressing market failures.   
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The shift towards food production being organized based on global value 
chains and production networks and the fast dissemination of supermarkets and 
other modern food retail outlets around the world is creating increased need for 
smallholders to partake in some form of aggregation mechanism in order to 
become contributors to the global food system. 
Agribusinesses that buy agricultural products have therefore also been 
encouraging producer organizations as a way to improve their ability to source 
from smallholders.  Nonetheless, of the producer organizations that do exist in 
emerging economies, only a negligible portion have been able to achieve stable 
access to the growing global market of high value agricultural products. 
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of 
this paradox and to identify factors that may improve the likelihood and 
effectiveness of aggregation.  The structure of this work is as follows: first the 
research problem and the gap in the literature (Chapter 1) will be defined, 
followed by the review of existing scholarship on smallholder agricultural 
producers, the globalization of agribusiness and global value chains as well as 
the literature on the aggregation of smallholder production, producer 
organizations and their access to global and modern value chains (Chapter 2).   
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Next a conceptual framework will be proposed based on which a model 
for smallholder global-value-chain-relevant aggregation (Chapter 3) will be 
developed that takes into account the producer organization types, the services 
offered by the producer organizations, producer organizations’ access to 
financing and the requirements of global value chains.  
The model will be tested first using the population of Hungarian producer 
organizations, and then a sample of Central American and Peruvian producer 
organizations (Chapter 4), utilizing the following hypotheses: 
1.    “Collective identity narratives”, manifesting themselves in Collective 
Identity Activities, play an important role in facilitating the growth and 
competitiveness of POs. 
2. Services, including access to financing for farmers, provided by POs 
play an important role in facilitating scaling. 
3. Cooperatives are at a disadvantage compared to other producer 
organization (PO) forms in achieving the conditions of global value 
chain access. 
 
The empirical analysis has five main findings. First, because trust is so 
important in enabling farmer participation in collectives, shared narratives that 
establish collective identity may play a role in ensuring not only farmer loyalty 
but also may help improve producer organizations’ performance, particularly as 
organizations grow.   Second, organizations that offer more services to farmers 
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are more likely to scale and hence achieve global value chain access.  However, 
this study found that considerable variation among services, some having much 
more significant relationship to the ability to scale than others. Third, 
cooperatives, the producer organization form most often supported by 
policymakers and the development field, on average were found less effective 
than other forms of producer organizations in their ability to connect farmers to 
global value chains.  Having said that, it is important to highlight that the study 
also identified several cooperatives and some common patterns among them that 
outperformed both their cooperative and non-cooperative peers. Fourth, while 
this study adds to the evidence that smaller farmers within the smallholder 
group are at a disadvantage when it comes to PO participation and may, 
therefore, require differentiated support when it comes to interventions, it also 
identified several POs that work with some of the smallest farmers and still 
outperform their peers.   Fifth, the study found that POs’ access to financing is 
important for modern market access, in addition to meeting quantity and quality 
requirements. 
The policy implications of these findings are considerable and 
recommendations for interventions conclude the paper (Chapter 6) after the 
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discussion of this study’s limitations (Chapter 5).  The key policy findings 
include that cooperatives are not the panacea for development and policymakers 
should also consider other forms of producer organizations for support.  
Importantly, policymakers should rather consider linking their support to certain 
aggregator characteristics and activities, including services offered since some 
services appear to have stronger relationships than others with POs’ ability to 
succeed.   Among these services access to finance for farmers as well as research 
and development and innovation play crucial role and therefore deserve 
heightened attention from policymakers while access to finance at the PO level 
has also been found to be important.   In addition, PO activities that help build 
collective identity are associated with POs’ productivity and ability to scale. 
In terms of the arguable trade-off between sustainability and smallholder 
inclusion, a finding of the present work is that smallholders have the potential to 
achieve significantly higher productivity than their larger counterparts and their 
POs can successfully access modern markets as long as they are provided with 
the necessary support related to sustainable intensification of their production 
and access to capital for making the necessary investments. 
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Dedication 
As a child I observed my grandmother organizing about a hundred 
women into a cooperative to knit baby hats and sweaters in a small Hungarian 
village.  Groups of women would gather for hours in my grandmother’s veranda 
learning new patterns from her, exchanging experiences, testing new yarns or 
just simply sharing stories.  They all took great pride in the quality of the 
products and sewing little “made in Hungary” labels on the finished pieces and 
care instructions in several languages.  For most of them this was their only 
source of independent income not to mention the sole source of formal income 
that made them eligible for pension and other benefits later in life.  These 
experiences were an inspiration for some of my own work as a practitioner and 
my choice of dissertation topic.  
Organizing the women in my grandmother’s village into a group that 
allowed them access to input, information, skills, resources and ultimately a 
market to sell their products, is what I will refer to as “aggregation” in this 
paper.  Aggregation helps small producers overcome the disadvantages of their 
small size and, often, remote location.   Traditionally aggregation has taken place 
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mainly via cooperatives. Many in the international development field, where I 
myself have spent twenty years of my career, hold great hopes for such 
cooperatives.  But can such cooperatives connect small producers to markets and 
improve their livelihoods in our highly globalized world?  How can successful 
aggregation of small producers be achieved in the era of globalization and global 
value chains? In particular in the agri-food sector, which experienced 
unprecedented changes over the past 20 years? This paper attempts to shed some 
light to these questions.   
Narrowing down my interest in this topic into testable research questions 
and staying the course was a considerable challenge for me and I would like to 
thank first and foremost Fritz Mayer for not giving up on me and guiding me 
through this journey with such dedication.  His intellect and infallible logic kept 
bringing me back to the focus I needed.  His recent book “Narrative Politics: 
Stories and Collective Action” also helped me recognize some of the less tangible 
dynamics observed among the organizations I studied and helped conceptualize 
them in this dissertation. 
I am also very thankful to my other committee members. Gary Gereffi’s 
novel global value chain framework changed forever how I approach 
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development problems and is a pillar of this dissertation.  I am honored to have 
him advise my work and his guidance has been invaluable.  Phyllis Pomerantz’s 
wisdom and compassion helped me through some of the lowest points of this 
journey.  An international development executive throughout her successful 
career, her guidance has been instrumental in keeping this work grounded to not 
lose sight of the real world problems.  Anirudh Krishna’s work on social capital 
has been a model for me in its humanitarian application of social science and 
academic rigor. I am very grateful to Greg Dees for inspiring me to come to Duke 
and for being a mentor and guide all along.  The notes from my discussions with 
him miraculously helped guide my work even after he so unexpectedly left us 
last December. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to James Scriven and Ajay 
Narayanan at IFC for giving me the opportunity to lead several projects on 
sustainable agri-food value chains and value chain finance over the last four 
years, which was not only a rewarding experience professionally but also 
allowed me exposures and insights that helped enrich this work. 
I met some of the most interesting people and had some of the most 
thought provoking conversations of my life in the process of working on this 
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dissertation.  I am indebted to all the people, too many to name, who agreed to 
talk to me and offer their thoughts and insights and those who read my various 
drafts and offered comments.   I am very grateful to the leaders of the producer 
organizations and farmers who agreed to take time off from their busy lives to be 
interviewed as part of this work.  I am especially thankful to Jozsef Csurke, Janos 
Szabo, Marianna Molnar, Noemi Perez, Jozsefne Mate, Peter Szucs, Helga 
Takacs, Imre Gulyas, Zsuzsanna Toth Nyulne, Dr. Miklos Csikai and Pal Hodi 
for their help and input. 
This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, without whose help I could 
have never completed this work, to my husband Karl, whose optimism and faith 
in me kept me going, to my children, Kristof and Katrina, who took on 
responsibilities and made sacrifices to allow me the time and space for writing, 
and to the memory of my grandmother.  
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Dr. Miklos Csikai1: “In the globalized world our only chance 
is cooperation.” 
 
                                                     
1 Quote from interview with Dr. Miklos Csikai, CEO of Arpad Zrt, largest member of DelKertesz Producer 
Organization. 
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1. Research Problem and Gap in the Literature 
 
Smallholder farmers are gaining attention in the development policy 
debate because of their importance in poverty alleviation, food production, food 
security, women’s empowerment, conservation and climate change.  Effectively 
reaching large numbers of smallholders has been a major challenge for the 
public, private and not-for-profit sectors alike.  Producer organizations are 
considered to be an important part of the solution to this challenge by helping 
integrate smallholders into the global economy and are therefore widely 
supported by policymakers. Nevertheless only 5-10% of farmers are estimated to 
participate in formal producer organizations. Furthermore of the producer 
organizations that do exist in emerging economies only a small portion has 
achieved sustained integration into the growing global market of high value 
agricultural products.  The objective of this research is to contribute to the 
understanding of this paradox. 
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Smallholder agriculture is at the center of policymakers’ attention both at 
the local and international level.1  There is no example of mass poverty reduction 
in recent history without significant productivity and income gains for small 
farmers (Lipton 2005).  Agriculture is a major employer and driver of economic 
growth, and it is agriculture where growth has the most poverty-reducing 
impact (Ravillion et.al, 1996).  Agriculture is also major user of natural resources 
– such as land, soil and water – and a provider of a variety of ecosystem services. 
It is a significant contributor to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, yet it 
has great potential for carbon sequestration.  Climate change is introducing new 
urgency for small-farmer-related policy intervention as climate change induced 
extreme natural events pose a disproportionate threat to some of the least 
developed countries where smallholder farmers are the most vulnerable to such 
events with no access to means of mitigating these risks (Fan et.al. 2013).  
 
 
                                                     
1 “In the coming years, agriculture will require profound changes to fulfill its multiple 
functions against harsher environmental conditions and demographic and market 
transformations.  Smallholder family agriculture, or smallholder agriculture, will be at the center 
of these changes.” (IFAD, 2013)   
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In least developed countries where working age men migrate to cities and 
abroad in the hope of finding better livelihood opportunities, smallholder 
agriculture is becoming increasingly feminized (IFAD Rural Poverty report 
2011).  The feminization of smallholder agriculture creates a new challenge for 
policymakers as women have traditionally been at a disadvantage when it comes 
to access to education, technology, and financing, as well as the ability 
participate in collective action and producer organizations (FAO 2010: Producer 
Organisations: Reclaiming Opportunities for Development). 
Finally, global food security and nutrition depends on smallholder 
agriculture.  Small farms currently are estimated to produce four-fifths of the 
developing world’s food. Moreover they have the potential for significant 
productivity increase and waste reduction (IFPRI From Subsistence to Profit, 
2013), which will be essential to meet the estimated 70% increase in food demand 
by 20502. 
Agriculture is a sector with a history of strong government involvement 
including subsidies in various forms, trade protection, and, in many countries, 
                                                     
2 Source: FAO How to Feed the World 2050 (2009). 
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state ownership, usually driven by social and food security concerns (Dicken 
2007). In the spirit of the neoliberal economic policies of the past decades, 
however, government involvement has been gradually declining (P Hazell et.al., 
2007) with emphasis shifting towards market-oriented solutions for social 
problems.  Promoting smallholders’ global and modern market access has 
become a central objective of market-oriented development policies. Farmers 
may indeed have the possibility to considerably improve their incomes by 
connecting to modern3 and global value chains as potential gains associated with 
increased trade and easier movement of goods and services are becoming 
increasingly clear (GHI, 2013). For example in Peru, quinoa, which used to be 
produced almost exclusively for domestic consumption and its production is 
dominated by smallholder farmers4, has become a significant export product 
contributing to improved producer income and livelihood (GHI, 2013). 
These trends are greatly influenced by the decline in nation-states’ ability 
to lead and enforce in the increasingly globalized economy with their activities 
                                                     
3 Modern markets operate based on global value chain (GVC) standards and 
specifications but they don’t necessarily involve cross-border trade.  Modern markets and global 
value chains will be used interchangeably in this paper unless otherwise stated. 
4 http://www.fao.org/family-farming-2014/news/news/details-press-room/en/c/223319/ 
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limited to within national boundaries while social and environmental challenges 
have become increasingly transnational, leading to a “governance deficit” 
(Gereffi and Mayer, 2004).  Therefore society has been demanding new forms of 
controls (Barrientos, et.al. 2011) leading to the need for new modes of governance 
and policy innovations (Mayer 2010).   
The cross-border private governance of the global agri-food sector takes 
place primarily in the form of coordination among firms within global value 
chains (GVCs) through the use of voluntary standards.  
However, modern value chains impose considerable entry barriers 
through standards and other prerequisites imposed on suppliers such as 
minimum quantity and various specifications.  The minimum quantities that 
modern buyers require from a single supplier are generally much larger than 
smallholders can produce.  Quality, attribute, food safety and other unobservable 
credence characteristics required represent additional challenges for 
smallholders.  
Therefore farmer producer organizations (POs) that bulk or aggregate 
farmers’ production are considered to be critical for farmers’ market access and 
thus have been supported by international organizations, NGOs and 
 6 
 
policymaker around the world.  The importance of POs goes hand in hand with 
the increasing role of value chains connecting farmers with consumers (Bijman, 
Ton 2008).  In many countries farmer producer organizations offer the sole 
possibility for farmers to access fast-growing modern agri-food markets.  
Nonetheless, successful farmer organizations are rare in less-developed 
countries. Significant public funds have been invested in promoting farmer 
organizations with mixed results both in terms of the number of beneficiaries 
and the sustainability of those organizations (Hellin et.al. 2007). 
 
According to Hazell, et. al (2007), smallholders are yet to find a replicable 
institutional solution that helps them meet the demands of modern markets.  
Empirical evidence is limited, however, on the relationship between types of 
producer organizations and their ability to link farmers to modern markets.  
Therefore the first intention of this work is to explore if the form of the 
aggregator, in particular whether if it is organized as a cooperative, makes a 
difference in aggregators’ ability to access modern markets.  For this purpose this 
study differentiates cooperatives, investor owned firms and hybrids of these two 
forms.  Cooperatives are autonomous membership organizations jointly owned 
 7 
 
and democratically controlled by farmers (one vote per farmer regardless of 
farmer’s size or other production characteristics), aiming to maximize the benefit 
incurred to members (which can be economic, social or cultural, or any 
combination thereof).  In contrast, investor owned firms are controlled by their 
shareholders/owners pro rata with their ownership of the company.  Hybrids of 
the two forms are also being discussed.  Policy support has generally been 
targeted at the cooperative form of aggregation 
The existing literature on PO participation focuses on the formation of 
farmer groups and farmer decisions about joining. Case studies and farmer 
surveys shed light to farmer attitudes regarding PO participation.  Some of those 
studies offer evidence that services provided by POs positively influence 
farmers’ decisions to participate in POs.  However, we know very little about 
which PO services may be most helpful in enabling POs to achieve sufficient 
scale and to meet other GVC requirements, an important question considering 
limited PO resources. This is a key policy question since it is common for 
governments, development organizations and NGOs to support POs’ service 
provision. The second intention of the present work is to add to our 
 8 
 
understanding of what PO services and activities may be most useful in helping 
POs grow and achieve modern market access.   
A third objective of this paper is to consider the role of trust, especially as 
organizations scale, and whether nonmaterial factors such as identity may be 
playing a role. In particular, this study will explore whether “collective identity 
narratives” and related activities may have a connection to farmers’ participation 
in aggregators and aggregators’ performance.  
Finally, a fourth objective is to gain insights whether there is evidence that 
very small farms can be viable and whether differentiated support may be 
necessary to support their ability to join aggregators and access modern value 
chains. 
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2. Literature Review 
This literature review will first (2.1-2.4) provide a background on the key 
topics that motivate this research: smallholder agricultural producers, the 
globalization of agribusiness, global value chains and modern markets and the 
public policy implications of those issues. This will be followed by a more in-
depth review of the literature on the aggregation of smallholder production, 
producer organizations and producer organizations’ participation in global value 
chains and modern markets.   
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2.1 Smallholder Agricultural Producers 
 
Despite considerable progress in reducing poverty during recent decades, 
there are still about 1.2 billion extremely poor people in the world surviving on 
less than US$1.25 a day.  About two-thirds of those people live in rural areas and 
largely depend on small-scale agriculture.1 Smallholder farms2 are typically 
family owned enterprises producing crops and/or livestock on less than two 
hectares (5 acres)3.  Family members provide most of the needed labor and derive 
their primary means of livelihood from the farm.  According to this definition, 
approx. 525 million smallholder farms exist worldwide, representing 85% of the 
world’s farmers (IFC, 2013), and thought to support a population of approx. 2.2 
billion (Murphy 2012).  
                                                     
1 IFAD website 
2 The terms “smallholder”, “family”, “subsistence” or “resource poor” farms are 
frequently used interchangeably.  Small farmers fall into two main categories: farmers who grow 
food mainly for their own consumption only and rarely have surplus to sell (subsistence) and 
farmers who produce both for their own consumption as well as for sale (semi commercial).  See 
more detailed segmentation of farmers in Appendices A and B. 
3 There are various ways of defining smallholders, based on land size, employment 
patterns, etc.  Land size of two hectares or less is most commonly used in the development 
literature and is also consistent with the World Bank’s Rural Development Strategy.  Since there 
is no universal definition of “smallholder” farmer, the above paragraph is meant only to illustrate 
the scale of the problem.   
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Small farms play an important role in world agriculture (J Braun 2008) 
accounting for 70 percent of global food production (ETC 2011).  With global 
population on the rise, demand for food is expected to double by 2030 and the 
agri-food industry will need to feed 9 million people by 2050 (World Bank, 2008). 
In the meantime arable land available per capita has been declining: from 0.53 
hectares per capita available in 1953 to 0.25 in 2000 and an expected 0.18 in 2050. 
(PWC 2012)  To meet demand, therefore, either there must be an increase in land 
devoted to farming or an increase in efficiency.  Globally 1.5 billion hectares of 
land is used for crop production with another 1.4 billion theoretically available. 
In practice, however, the areas theoretically available for agricultural production 
expansion are concentrated in 7 developing countries (4 of them in Sub-Saharan 
Africa), many of them inaccessible or with terrain unfavorable for agricultural 
production. (IFC 2012) Alternatively, given current inefficiencies, there are 
opportunities for improving smallholder productivity by as much as tenfold, 
through better farming practices and with the use of irrigation, basic 
technologies and better seeds and inputs.   
While the small farm vs. big farm debate is ongoing, evidence is growing 
about smallholders’ competitive advantage in some subsectors (Hazell, et.al. 
 12 
 
2014), the nonlinear relationship between land size and productivity (S.M. 
Helfand, et.al. 2007), and other advantages that small-scale production can offer 
such as more reliance on labor than capital, working with the existing knowledge 
and skill base, and public goods like controlling out-migration to cities and 
improving food security in disadvantaged areas (S. Murphy, 2012).  
The importance of agriculture and small producers in particular is also 
emphasized in the development field. The World Development Report 2008 
called for “a new agriculture” of high-value products as an instrument for 
sustainable development and poverty reduction.   The report highlights the 
importance of “counteracting rapidly mounting anti-smallholder biases in value 
chains”, emphasizing the rise of vertical integration, economies of scale in 
financing and standards and the importance of supporting smallholders’ 
competitiveness while pointing to aggregation as an important part of the 
solution  (World Bank, 2008).  
Unskilled labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture have shown to have 
the largest contribution to poverty alleviation (Loayza, Raddatz, 2009) with 
strong evidence that agricultural growth leads to both lower poverty and 
inequality (Ravallion 2010).  In fact agricultural growth leads to income growth 
 13 
 
in the lowest three income deciles in developing countries and is typically the 
primary source of poverty reduction (Cleaver, K. 2012). 
Supporting smallholders and agricultural growth therefore has risen to 
high priority in the development agenda in the last few years after decades of 
neglect. The United Nations declared 2014 to be the Year of Family Farms to 
draw attention to their importance in poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development.  The European Commission has been actively supporting small 
and family farms across the EU for years and is considering even more 
supportive policies under the current EU presidency.  FAO, World Bank, UNDP, 
UDAID and numerous NGOs, just to mention a few, all have ongoing initiatives 
in support of smallholders and their inclusion in modern and global value 
chains.  The challenges of linking small producers to international markets are 
widely documented in the literature and aggregation, in particular cooperatives, 
is considered as a key solution (FAO 2013). 
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2.2 Globalization of Agribusiness  
 
Agriculture has gone through two major transformations in the last half 
century.  First, the mainly public-sector-governed green revolution and food 
system transformation between the 1950s and 80s (Reardon, et.al. 2007) brought 
about drastic changes in many countries by creating access to agricultural 
innovations and technology and thus facilitating a productivity boom while 
reducing the need for labor.  Second, globalization, “the process of intensification 
of cross-area and cross-border social relations between actors from very distant 
locations, and of growing transnational interdependence of economic and social 
activities” (Scherer, 2009), reorganized the agri-food sector in fundamental ways 
since the 1980s.  This second transformation involved an unprecedented degree 
of international division of labor, consolidation and dissemination of 
innovations, facilitated by the economic policies of this period.  Perhaps the 
greatest innovation was how transnational corporations (“TNCs”) linked 
production into cross-border value adding networks while reducing their direct 
involvement and engagement in primary production and processing. (Gereffi 
1994).   
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While the concept of supply chain reflects material transfer alone related 
to a product, value chain track the value created.  Value chain “describes the full 
range of activities that firms and workers perform to bring a product from its 
conception to end use and beyond. This includes activities such as design, 
production, marketing, distribution and support to the final consumer. The 
activities that comprise a value chain can be contained within a single firm or 
divided among different firms.” (globalvaluechains.org, 2011) According to 
Sturgeon (2010), value chains represent a subset of production networks, the 
latter being a “much more complex and dynamic set of activities” encompassed 
by the entire network involved in the process of creating a product. 
 
2.2.1 Global Value Chains 
The global agrifood business has become increasingly dominated by 
global value chains (GVCs)4.  GVCs account for 80% of global trade and 
                                                     
4 Agribusiness value chain is defined by UNCTAD as “the suppliers of inputs (seeds, 
chemicals and machinery), farmers and other agricultural producers and service providers, 
processors of agricultural goods (such as manufacturers of foods and beverages), trading 
companies dealing with agricultural commodities, and retailers (such as supermarket chains).”  
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developing countries’ share in global value-added trade have been increasing; 
from 20% in 1990 to over 40% today (UNCTAD, 2013).  
 In GVCs TNC lead firms5 exercise high degree of coordination 
(Humphrey et.al. 2006) without direct financial exposure or ownership in 
production, processing, logistics and other key activities in the agrifood value 
chain.  In parallel, TNCs’ focus has shifted towards marketing and brand 
management.  
GVCs have a direct economic impact on economic growth, jobs and 
income. Domestic value added can be considerable in comparison with the size 
of the domestic economy and can be an important source of economic growth 
with positive correlation between participation in GVCs and growth rates of 
GDP per capita  (UNCTAD, 2013).  GVCs can also offer an important avenue for 
developing countries to build productive capacity, including through technology 
dissemination and skill building.   However the terms of conditions under which 
                                                     
5 Lead firm is a company with critical marketing, technological, or financial advantage 
that permits the company to set the standards or specifications for other GVC participants to 
follow. (Gereffi, Christensen, 2009) 
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developing country firms connect to GVCs will greatly influence the extent to 
which their supports poverty alleviation (K. Fernandez-Stark, 2011). 
World trade in agricultural products increased more than three-fold 
between 1985 and 2005 (FAO).   This growth is mainly demand-driven fueled by 
affluent consumers and retail chains (J Braun 2008) and the move towards year-
around demand for horticultural products.  A generic agri-food value chain is 
presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Agri-food value chain 
                                                  Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2009 
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This generic agri-food value illustrates the tightly linked activities and 
processes in making food products available to consumers.  It also highlights the 
typically predominant position of TNCs both upstream, in making agricultural 
inputs available, and downstream, in trading/logistics, processing and retailing.  
Developing countries and their enterprises play a role in the value chain mainly 
in the primary production stage (farming) and in basic processing that typically 
happens near the production site. 
Increasing demand has also been supported by fast urbanization and 
rising income levels in developing countries.  With the liberalization of cross-
country investment flows, international retailers have been playing an increasing 
role in less developed countries, especially with the rapid diffusion of 
supermarkets6, often at the expense of traditional markets  (Reardon, et. al. 2007, 
Csaki 2007).  (See more about supermarket diffusion in Section 2.3 on Modern 
Markets.) 
The structure of world trade in agricultural goods has changed 
considerably since the 1980s through a shift away from traditional tropical 
                                                     
6 For example in Central Eastern Europe, the market share of supermarkets increased 
from 5 to 50% in less than ten years. (Csaki 2007) 
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products (coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar, spices, nuts) towards nontraditional 
agricultural products, especially horticulture (fruits, vegetables and flowers) and 
seafood (Humphrey, Memedovic, 2006).  Developing countries have 
disproportionately taken advantage of this increasing global demand, with 
agriculture’s share within the economies of many emerging economies 
increasing (Braun 2008).  However, most small farmers have been excluded from 
these opportunities while the primary beneficiaries have been large agri-food 
producers and processors strengthened through considerable consolidation in 
the last 15 years (Reardon et.al. 2008).   
While primary agriculture’s share in the overall global economy has been 
declining, it remains significant for many of the least developed countries with 
agriculture’s value added representing between 18-49% of GDP7.  Once upstream 
agribusiness and food industries are also considered together these agri-food 
sectors can account for as much as a third of many even advanced economies 
(Townsend 2008) with the upstream growth and development benefitting mostly 
                                                     
7 Source: World Bank Data (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS) 
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the advanced industrialized countries of the Northern hemisphere.  Packaged 
foods alone is a $1.4 trillion global industry (ETC 2011).   
The key changes that characterize the agri-food sector’s past quarter 
century have been the increasing concentration in the sector, the evolution of 
buyer-driven value chains and the emergence of standards and specifications to 
facilitate long distance food trade (Gereffi, et.al. 2005).  The following sections 
will discuss those changes. 
 
2.2.2 Concentration  
During the past two decades increasing concentration has been a key 
characteristic of agribusiness value chains. Post-1970 economic policies, 
including deregulation and free trade, created a favorable environment for 
corporate consolidation, which was further supported by the opening of 
emerging markets.  As a result, in 2000, 51 of the world largest economic entities 
were corporations and only 49 were countries.8  In other words 51 TNCs 
exceeded the economic power of three quarters of all countries globally. 
                                                     
8 http://www.corporations.org/system/top100.html 
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According to the latest figures (2011), 737 firms account for 80% of the value 
associated with all transnational corporations (TNCs), linked together in an 
entangled web of control (ETC Group, 2011).  Seventy five percent of these TNCs 
are financial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies (ETC Group 
2011), leaving less than 200 TNCs in control of the bulk of real sector activities in 
the global economy. 
In the agrifood sector, the top 7 agrochemical companies accounted for 
90%, the top 10 animal pharmaceutical companies accounted for 76% and the top 
3 seed companies accounted for 53% of global sales (ETC Group 2011), with some 
of the key agrochemical companies also holding major interests in seed 
companies, reflecting a general trend towards combined interests in seeds, 
agrochemicals and pharmaceuticals9 (Humphrey 2006).  Innovation has also 
become concentrated, for example, in the case of “climate ready” seeds intended 
to withstand environmental stresses associated with climate change six TNCs 
and their biotech partners control 77% of issued patents and patent applications 
(ETC Group 2011).  
                                                     
9 For example Monsanto, the largest seed company in the world, is also the fourth largest 
pesticide company and controls more than 27% of the global seed market.  (ETC 2011) 
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Concentration in processing shows a similar picture partly as a result of a 
wave of mergers and acquisitions in the last few years.10 While companies 
headquartered in the United States were responsible for most of the M&A 
activities, Brazil followed as a close second and most of the acquisitions occurred 
in emerging markets.  As a result, the three largest grain trader/processors and 
the ten largest animal feed producers in the world account for more than half of 
their respective markets.  The top 100 food and beverage firms accounted for 77% 
of the global packaged food market, with the top 3 companies, Nestle, PepsiCo 
and Kraft, representing 17% of that figure in 2009  (ETC 2011).  
Consumer outlets have been playing an instrumental role in driving 
concentration. Grocery retail spending amounted to US$7.18 trillion globally in 
2009, exceeding even the size of the global energy sector (ETC 2011).  Retail 
concentration is linked with the fast diffusion of supermarkets around the world, 
the increasing market shares of super- and hypermarkets as well as the 
increasing internationalization of large retailers, including mergers and 
acquisitions in emerging markets (Dicken 2007).  An example of the 
                                                     
10 Year 2009 alone had over a 1,000 mergers in the food and beverage sector valued at $43 
billion.  (ETC 2011) 
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concentration effect is reflected in Figure 2.  Note that in this example11 there are 
only 85 “buying desks”, a category that includes the major supermarket groups 
and distributors sourcing agrifood products, vis-à-vis 1.7 million producers and 
278 million consumers.  Some in the literature refers to this phenomenon as 
“choke point”, referring to the significant concentration of market power, which 
further enhanced by the concentration of ownership and market share among the 
relatively few buying desks.  
 
                Figure 2. Concentration effect in agri-food value chains  
                       Source: Gereffi, Lee 2012  
                                                     
11 Figure 2 reflects data from seven Western European countries. 
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2.2.3 Governance  
In the increasingly concentrated agri-food GVCs, lead firms influence the 
behavior of other value chain actors through their market power, without direct 
control or ownership in those firms.  This is achieved through value chain 
governance that can take one of several forms: market, modular, relational, 
captive or hierarchical (Gereffi, et. al. 2005).  Market governance involves 
relatively simple products and transactions and minimal coordination or input 
from the buyer with price being the main governance mechanism. Modular 
governance occurs when production takes place to the buyer’s specification and 
codified requirements or standards become the mechanism of efficient 
coordination.  Relational governance involves frequent interactions and 
information that is not easily transmitted, giving importance to mutual trust and 
social ties.  Captive governance involves many small suppliers that heavily 
depend on one or few buyers and the operations of the suppliers are heavily 
influenced by the requirements of the buyers.  Hierarchical governance refers to 
vertical integration, i.e. the lead firm producing in-house (Gereffi, 2005).  These 
GVC governance types are illustrated in Figure 3.  It is important to note the 
differences among the power asymmetry of these governance types that will 
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determine the negotiating power of value chain actors and ultimately the 
distribution of rent along the value chain as Milberg (2003) found that profit 
tends to gravitate to points of concentration in the value chain.  
Market and hierarchical governance are the most frequently emphasized 
in cross-border economic activities the former referring to buying goods from 
abroad while the latter involving offshore investment in production.  However 
Gereffi’s framework highlights the increasing prevalence of “network” type 
governance structure with considerably less obvious power relations.  Network 
type governance can take the forms of modular, relational and captive. In the 
modular structure products are usually produced according to a costumer’s 
specifications but producers take full responsibility for the production process 
and knowledge is internalized in the various production modules, ensuring 
some degree of power symmetry.  Relational governance also has network 
characteristics but it is based on trust and mutual dependence between the lead 
firm and the producers and therefore the cost of switching partners tends to be 
high which helps preserve some power balance.  Under the captive governance 
structure producers have to follow strict requirements and specifications and are 
under careful monitoring and control by the lead firms due to lead firm concern 
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regarding producer competency.  Switching cost tends to be high for the 
producers and thus the producers’ relationship with the lead firm is 
characterized by considerably higher power asymmetry than in the other 
network forms.12  Captive governance is common in agrifood value chains, in 
particular when small producers are involved. 
                     
Figure 3. GVC governance types 
                                                   Source: Gereffi et. al. 2005 
 
 
                                                     
12 http://www.globalvaluechains.org/concepts.html 
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2.2.4  Private standards and certifications  
The requirements and specifications imposed by lead firms are frequently 
codified in the form of standards and compliance with such standards is 
documented through certifications.  While the use of standards and certifications 
reduces the transaction cost of regulatory compliance and risk management for 
lead firms, they can represent a significant barrier to smallholders’ GVC 
participation, especially given the considerable up-front cost involved that 
disadvantage smaller size producers due to the economies of scale involved. 
 TNCs have increasingly been focusing their attention on marketing and 
brand management, as opposed to primary production and processing.  It is 
through their purchasing power and the use of standards and codes of conduct 
that they govern their value chains and influence the behavior of other entities.  
Private standards have proliferated along with the transformation of the global 
agrifood system.  These standards are developed by retailers and manufacturers 
partly for compliance with tightened public food regulations as well as to reduce 
the costs and risks of increasingly complex value chains (Lee, et.al 2011). 
Consumer anxiety about food safety also elevated the issue of traceability.   
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Private standards are also used by lead firms to differentiate themselves 
and their products.  In general, retailers’ use of standards tends to be motivated 
by risk management objectives while manufacturers’ use by the aim of 
differentiation.  Both are driven by cost reduction objectives. In addition to lead 
firms’ own standards, several international private standards have also emerged.  
GlobalGAP13, for example, set by 13 European retailers, is the leading 
international voluntary private standard that helps link developing country 
farmers to international retailers. Accredited certification bodies also certify 
compliant producers. 
Such standards and codes used to be mainly focused on quality, safety 
and product attributes as well as requirements for suppliers to be in compliance 
with applicable local laws.  In general, the less product specific (as opposed to 
process specific) the requirements, the less their reach is due to limitations for 
                                                     
13 Initiated in 1997 by European retailers (EUREPGAP), establishing a code for good 
agricultural practices’ (GAP) which has seen been adopted in over 100 countries around the 
World (GlobalGap website) and was rename GlobalGAP in 2007. Producers have to fulfil a list of 
technical, handling and managerial practices to guarantee quality, consistency, hygiene and 
safety. “Through regular inspections and the use of bar codes, a system of tight coordination is 
installed that enables entire supply channel information and control. Local producers have to 
make substantial investments for complying with these rules...” (R. Ruben, et.al. 2006) 
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monitoring.  For example the size and color of a cucumber is easy to regulate 
throughout the entire value chain as monitoring is reasonably easy at all stages.   
Regulating permitted pesticides and other credence characteristics that cannot be 
easily examined becomes more challenging and monitoring will generally 
involve auditing and/or certification.  This led to a shift toward process based 
standards in global agrifood value chains (Humphrey et.al. 2006).  Certification is 
an instrument that signals compliance with standards.   
 
Figure 4 summarizes how the move towards higher level modern markets 
lead to more stringent market requirements and necessitates upgrades at the 
production level.  While upgrading into higher value added activities is often a 
key component of policy strategies to support smallholders, it is clear that 
standards impose increasing requirements at higher levels of upgrades. 
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Figure 4. Regulatory and market requirements 
                                                     Source: Jaffee 2012 
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2.3 Modern markets   
Through standards, GVCs increasingly influence local market dynamics in 
emerging economies.  With foreign ownership of processors and retail outlets in 
many emerging economies, and with increasing cross-border trade and multi-
country distribution practices, local sourcing practices increasingly reflect GVC 
standards and requirements.  Increasingly, too, farmers need to meet those 
requirements not only if they are trying to export but also if they want to supply 
domestic modern markets.   
The impact of GVCs has been multifaceted when it comes to local 
markets.  Private governance mechanisms used in GVCs have infiltrate into local 
markets via trade relationships whereby lead firms requirements are being 
passed on through the supply chain. Local retailers and processors with foreign 
ownership often adopt standards similar to their parent company, which in turn 
may be adopted by locally owned firms under competitive and other pressures.  
For example in Ukraine, producers who wish to sell their products in traditional 
open air markets are required to obtain a food quality and safety certificate. 
Such requirements represent disproportionate burden on small producers.  
Therefore even though transnational food retailers source an increasing part of 
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fresh produce from developing countries, a declining percentage of that trade is 
associated with smaller scale producers (Gibbon, P. 2003).   
Supermarkets have experienced rapid growth in emerging markets over 
the last twenty years, displacing more traditional forms of food retail in many 
countries.  As Table 1 illustrates, in most of East Asia (other than China), 
Northern-Central Europe and South America supermarkets started spreading in 
the early 1990s and handled most of food retail by the mid-2000s.  The 
dissemination started slightly later in Mexico, Central America and much of 
Southeast Asia and Southern-Central Europe but supermarkets nonetheless 
achieved significant market share by the mid 2000s.  Supermarkets are fast 
gaining market share even in countries in the third wave of the supermarket 
revolution such as India, China, Vietnam and Russia.   
For example in India, despite restrictions on foreign direct investments, 
the top modern chains had 140-fold sales growth between 2004 and 2012, albeit 
from a very low level.  The rapid growth of modern retail outlets is expected to 
continue fueled by urbanization, rising incomes, women increasingly working 
outside the home.  In the third wave countries procurement system 
modernization and the use of standards have become an integral part of 
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domestic modern retail much faster than observed in the prior waves of 
supermarket diffusion.   The growth of the modern retail sector in these countries 
have also been supported by considerable domestic investment, especially in 
India, and by indigenous innovations that allowed supermarkets’ penetration 
into fresh produce markets and rural areas. 
Sub-Saharan Africa remains the only region in the world where 
supermarket diffusion is still limited. 
 
Table 1. Waves of supermarket diffusion 
Period  Countries/regions  Growth of supermarket 
market share 
First wave started in early 
1990s 
Much of South America, East Asia 
(outside China), Northern-Central 
Europe and South Africa. 
From about 10 percent around 
1990 to about 50–60 percent by 
the mid-2000s 
Second wave started in mid- 
to late 1990s 
Mexico, Central America, much of 
Southeast Asia and Southern-Central 
Europe 
From 5–10 percent in 1990 to 30–
50 percent by the mid-2000s 
Third wave started in late 
1990s and early 2000s 
Central and Southern America 
(Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia) China, India, 
Russia,  Vietnam 
Reached about 2–20 percent by 
mid-2000s; supermarket sales 
growing at 30–50 percent a year 
Late third wave Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe Share of supermarkets in 
large/medium cities is 10-20%, 
share of produce around 5%, rate 
of growth is uncertain 
Anticipated fourth wave Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Angola FDI is just starting 
Source: recreated based on Reardon et.al. 2008, revised based on Reardon et.al. 2009 
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The fast dissemination of supermarkets and supermarkets’ emphasis on 
standards highlights the challenges faced, or soon to be faced, by many 
smallholders even in their domestic markets.  
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2.4 Public Policy  
Smallholder agriculture is gaining importance in the policy debate for its 
importance in poverty alleviation, food security, women empowerment, 
conservation, climate change mitigation and adaptation, among others.  
However a key challenge for policymakers is designing and implementing 
effective interventions in these areas.  This is especially challenging considering 
the large number of small farmers that need to be reached in remote areas on one 
hand and the cross-border interconnectedness of the agri-food sector and global 
character of many of its influential participants on the other. 
According to IFAD (2013), agriculture will require profound changes in 
the coming years “to fulfill its multiple functions against harsher environmental 
conditions and demographic and market transformations, … and smallholder 
agriculture will be at the center of these changes.”  These anticipated changes 
position smallholder agriculture at the center of policymakers attention both at 
the local and international level.  
Agriculture is a sector with a history of strong government involvement 
(including  ownership in many countries), subsidies and protectionism, fueled by 
social and food security concerns (Dicken 2007). In the spirit of the neoliberal 
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economic policies of the past decades, however, government involvement has 
been gradually declining (P Hazell et.al., 2007).  Even in countries where 
governments tried to slow the retail market reorganization through regulation, 
studies have shown that such interventions had neutral or negative impact on 
the relationship between producers and retailers (Juhasz et al. 2008).  
Furthermore, shrinking public resources and competing priorities have reduced 
government ability to directly support disadvantaged social groups.  As a result, 
governments are increasingly seeking market-oriented solutions to social 
problems.  The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
demonstrates well the change in policy approach; large scale subsidies are 
largely a thing of the past and the emphasis is increasingly on enabling 
producers to survive in the world markets, reducing CAP’s share in the EU 
budget from near 70% in the 1970s to 34% over the 2007-2013 period.   
These trends are greatly affected by the decline in nation states’ ability to 
lead and enforce in the increasingly globalized economy with its activities 
limited to within national boundaries.  This is occurring while social and 
environmental challenges have become increasingly transnational, leading to 
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what Gereffi and Mayer (2004) calls “governance14 deficit”.  The global agri-food 
sector is governed cross-border, through private governance, via coordination 
among firms within GVCs and through the use of voluntary standards.  With a 
growing share of the global economy organized into GVCs, the public and 
private governance institutions that used to promote social upgrading and 
regulated downgrading have been facing challenges which led to increasing state 
and societal demand for new governance mechanisms (Barrientos, et.al. 2011).  
As markets disembed themselves from one set of social control, the state and 
society try to re-embed them through new modes of governance (Mayer, et.al. 
2010), which has led to significant governance innovations of all kind over the 
last two decades (Barrientos, et.al. 2011).  Examples of this phenomenon include 
government initiated public private partnerships with lead firms that promote 
social upgrading in GVCs15 or lead firm initiated environmental and labor 
                                                     
14 Governance is defined by Mayer and Pickles (2008) as “societal institutions that 
constrain or enable market actor behavior whether these are at the level of the state, civil society 
actors, or industrial and business groups involved in changing their supply chain dynamics.” 
 
15 Such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) facilitated National Platform for the 
Responsible Production and Trade of Pineapple in Costa Rica.  UNDP facilitates such multi-
stakeholder efforts, centered around the lead firms of key global value chains, at the request of, 
and in close coordination with, the member government. 
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requirements in supplier codes of conduct in excess of local government 
requirements. 
While public governance has weakened, there are limits to the 
effectiveness of private governance efforts.  Most corporate codes of conduct are 
vague and most companies do not comply with the standards of third sector or 
international organizations (Mayer et.al. 2010).  Mayer et al. proposed that 
private governance effectiveness depends on the structure of the GVC involved, 
the degree to which brand identity is important for a firm’s products, the 
possibilities for collective action to exert pressure on the producer; and the extent 
to which the lead firm’s commercial interest is aligned with social or 
environmental concerns (Mayer et.al. 2010).  Furthermore, Mayer et al predicted 
increasing role for government, in particular in the form of multi-stakeholder 
institutions, such as the Costa Rican example mentioned in footnote 19. 
It is in the midst of this shift in global governance that national 
governments, development organizations and NGOs are trying to tackle the 
problems of rural poverty, effecting billions of people in mostly remote areas.  
Policymakers and the development community face the critical question of how 
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to address the changes faced by small farmers whose already fragile livelihoods 
are being further jeopardized due to changes in agri-food markets.    
Policymakers and development organizations such as national 
governments, OECD, UNDP, ILO, World Bank, USAID as well as NGOs have 
identified supporting the formation of producer organizations (POs) as central to 
the strategy for improving the lives of small farmers (WIR 2009). The emphasis 
by these organizations has been mainly on promoting “marketing cooperatives” 
to enhance farmers’ negotiating power with both suppliers of input as well as 
buyers and allows the sharing of transaction costs.16   Such policy initiatives 
focusing on “making markets work for the poor” involve a shift from 
government playing a direct role as buyer or seller in markets to providing rules 
for the creation of effective institutions (Ton, 2008).  
Outlining recommended public policy interventions with the goal of 
promoting farmer collective action for market access, Markelova et al. (2009) of 
                                                     
16 The UN suggests (UN 2012) that one solution to the decades of neglect of the rural 
economy is to “encourage farmers to mobilize collectively in agricultural and marketing 
cooperatives that engage in the production, processing and marketing of agricultural products 
and give them access to markets”. 
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CGIAR CAPRi17 emphasize that farmers need rural infrastructure, extension 
services, credit markets accessible for the poor and access to relevant information 
in order to compete. In addition, Markelova et al. (2009) recommends that 
governments create incentives for farmer collective marketing cooperation along 
with technical and human capacity building programs. Another 
recommendation was to involve an “enabling facilitator” that facilitates collective 
action around marketing through the provision of information, technical 
assistance and capacity building. The enabling facilitator may be the state, NGOs 
or the private sector as long as it can effectively facilitate farmers’ access to 
services.   
Neven, Woolverton and Okello (2012) provided a helpful categorization of 
the public role in farmer collective action by differentiating the “pull” and 
“push” models.  The traditional role played by governments and donors is 
referred to as the “push” model, whereby government or donors drive the 
formation of producer groups and provide most of the management, operational, 
strategy and marketing guidance, with strong reliance on subsidies and grants 
                                                     
17 Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Systemwide Program on 
Collective Action and Property Rights. 
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and fixed projects terms. The “push” model’s underlying philosophy is to use 
public resources to demonstrate to farmers the value of producer organization 
and they will eventually adopt it as their own.   
Neven, Woolverton and Okello’s “pull” model involves donor or 
government as facilitator between producers and agribusiness, whereby the 
donor provides basic support like training which may change over time 
according to the evolving needs of the farmers.  It is primarily the producers and 
agribusiness (offtakers) that shape the collective action model. 
With the above outlined shift in policy towards more market-based 
solutions as opposed to direct interventions, the challenge is how to improve the 
workings of the markets for outputs, inputs and financial and other services to 
address market failures (Hazell et.al. 2010).  According to Hazell et al. this 
challenge calls for more innovation in institutions and in multi-stakeholder 
collaboration among farmers, the private sector, NGOs and the public sector. 
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2.5  Aggregation and Producer Organizations: Definitions 
There is considerable inconsistency in the literature when it comes to 
definitions and typology of aggregation and key related concepts.  This chapter  
summarizes those ambiguities and outlines the definitions that will be used in 
this work. 
Schmidt et.al. (2011) define aggregation as “aggregating products from 
multiple farms.”  According to Ashoka18, as small farmers  often struggle to 
sustain income because they lack scale and knowledge, the solutions lie in 
developing strategies that aggregate information, knowledge, and products in 
ways that better equip farmers to compete in a fast-changing marketplace. 
Aggregation for some means producer initiated producer organizations, for 
others buyer driven contract farming (IFC 2013) and again for others both 
(Monitor 2012, KIT 2012).   
Vorley, et.al. (2012) takes the latter comprehensive  approach (See Table 2), 
focusing on the smallholder aggregation aspect regardless of what value chain 
entity drives the aggregation.  Vorley’s typology distinguishes among producer, 
buyer and intermediary driven aggregation. The predominant form of producer 
                                                     
18 Ashoka Aggregation Platform Website: http://farming.ashoka.org/aggregation-1. 
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driven aggregation is cooperatives but Vorley et al. also includes other forms of 
democratic farmer driven and owned organizations such as informal associations 
and clusters around lead farms (or “nucleus farms” as later referred to in this 
paper).  Intermediaries can be market actors like traders and wholesalers or 
support entities like NGOs or government in his typology.  While distinguishing 
intermediary driven aggregation efforts is helpful, it is important to highlight 
that those usually occur in close collaboration with either the producers or the 
buyers and therefore intermediary driven aggregation does not exist in a pure 
form.19  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
19 For example state mechanisms, depending on the design of the intervention, can be 
either related to buyer-driven or producer driven.  For example Cocobod, Ghana’s state-owned 
marketing monopoly for cocoa or the Kenya Tea Development Agency which by law integrates 
smallholders, is an example of the state stepping in in a buyer capacity.  In the case of the Indian 
dairy cooperative Amul, the state intervened on the producer side, organizing a multi-tier 
producer cooperative.  
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Table 2. Typology of smallholder aggregators acccording to Vorlet, et.al.                  
 
                                      Source: Vorlet, et. al. 2012 
 
Another classification used in the literature involves cooperatives vs. 
“investor owned firms” or “IOFs”.  Buyer driven aggregation tends to happen 
via IOFs and producer driven aggregation traditionally has been mostly through 
cooperatives (or similar producer driven democratic organizations) and therefore 
the cooperative-IOF typology used to align well with the producer driven-buyer 
driven dichotomy.   
However, examples of IOFs becoming more common among producer-
driven models, including as a result of cooperatives changing their legal 
structure to IOFs, the IOF-cooperative typology offers an additional lens for 
analyzing aggregators.   Conversions from cooperative to IOF have been 
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increasingly common over the past 20 years (Kispal-Vitai, 2013) coinciding with 
the era of globalization and increased concentration in the agrifood sector. Some 
of the existing scholarship focuses on the examination of the financial 
performance of cooperatives vs. IOFs mostly in industrialized countries, findings 
showing a mixed picture (PWC, 2012, Fulton et.al. 2001, Lerman et.al. 1990)20  
However important to highlight that the studies that concluded superior, or at 
least not inferior cooperative performance, were based on data from the 1970 and 
80s.  More recent studies found superior IOF performance. 
Some in the literature (IFC 2012) uses “aggregation” synonymously with 
contract farming and buyer-driven efforts of sourcing from smallholders in 
general (buyer-driven efforts almost always take the form of contract farming).  
This reflects the increasing attention on the role that buyers can play through 
inclusive sourcing.  However, the need to achieve higher level of farmer 
organization through farmer groups is one of the key constraints frequently 
highlighted in this context (IFC 2012).  This is the case in general for contract 
farming; contract farming favors larger suppliers or already organized 
                                                     
20 Author found one study that examined something other than financial performance for 
cooperatives vs. IOFs/buyer driven aggregator; Basurto et.al. (2013) finds cooperatives to be more 
conducive to conservation behavior among small scale fisheries. 
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smallholders (more on that in Section 2.8.1) Nonetheless, if and when buyer-
driven aggregation of smallholders occurs, it usually takes the form of contract 
farming. 
Another key concept for this paper, “producer organization” (PO), also 
has considerable definitional ambiguity in the literature.  
Most in the literature consider POs to be a key form of aggregation.  
However, there is inconsistence when it comes to the meaning of POs. 
According to the FAO (2007), POs are non-governmental, membership-
based rural organizations of smallholders, family farmers, pastoralists, artisanal 
fishers and other small entrepreneurs that range from formal groups, such as 
cooperatives, to looser self-help groupings and associations. This definition 
represents a subset of Vorlet’s “producer driven” category and falls under 
cooperatives in the cooperative-IOF dichotomy. FAO’s definition with its focus 
on “membership based” organizations and cooperatives is also echoed by many 
NGOs and other intermediary organizations active in supporting the formation 
of POs, and often the terms PO and cooperative are used synonymously.   
In contrast, the European Commission (EC 2011) defines POs as 
organizations formed at the initiative of producers but can take any legal form.  
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Therefore the European Commission PO definition is synonymous with Vorlet’s 
“producer-driven” category irrespective of whether POs take the form of 
cooperatives or IOFs. 
This paper build on both Vorlet’s typology as well as on a modified 
version of the cooperative-IOF distinction, proposing a third, “hybrid” category 
in addition to cooperatives and IOFs later in this paper.  This work will use the 
European Commission’s definition of POs, which permit any legal form as long 
the organization is producer initiated.  This paper considers contract farming a 
key mechanism in buyer-driven smallholder engagements and one that can help 
create an incentive for smallholder organization due to the market security it 
offers, but not necessarily an aggregation mechanism in and of itself.  Both 
cooperatives and contract farming are discussed in depth in sections 2.8.1 and 
2.8.2. 
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2.6 Global Value Chain Actors and Their Motivation for 
Engaging with Smallholders  
What is the motivation for value chain actors to source from smallholders 
and their aggregators?  The objective with this section is to illustrate that there is 
considerable benefit for GVCs to engage smallholders but lack of smallholder 
aggregation is a key barrier. 
Different stakeholders involved in the agri-food value chain have different 
considerations for wanting or not wanting to engage with smallholder.  The 
structure of a value chain, in particular the degree of concentration along the 
chain and the governance characteristics, determine the general conditions faced 
by smallholders (Lee, Gereffi 2012).  In addition, key value chain actors have 
some motivational considerations that will influence their approach towards 
smallholder inclusion in the value chain. 
Table 3 summarizes the key value chain actors and their considerations for 
and against sourcing from smallholders’.  Consumers, at the bottom of the value 
chain, are increasingly conscious of ethical consumption and demand inclusive21 
value chain management from brands and retailers. (Poulton et.al. 2010)  
                                                     
21 “Inclusive” value chain refers to being inclusive of smallholders. 
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Therefore retailers, processors and manufacturers alike are increasingly looking 
for ways to achieve inclusive value chain recognition at least on some products 
and those are used extensively for the purposes of enhancing brand reputation. 
These are the value chain actors that drive changes via their influence in the 
value chain governance structures, including shifts in sourcing from 
smallholders, even though they rarely source from smallholders directly.  
Finally, traders and wholesalers, the value chain actors that directly enter into 
transactions with smallholders and their aggregators and therefore bear most of 
the associated transaction cost and supply chain risk, may be motivated by a 
number of factors.  Smallholders and their aggregators often have more limited 
marketing options and therefore may be in weaker negotiating position against 
traders and wholesalers than their competitors. At times smallholders and their 
aggregators may offer the opportunity for diversification away from other 
suppliers.  In other cases the primary production is dominated by smallholders 
(such as coffee, cocoa and milk in some countries) and wholesalers and traders 
have no other option but to find a way to purchase from them.  The rest of this 
section will provide a more in-depth analysis of the value chains actors who 
create the demand for smallholders and their POs. 
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Table 3. Summary of motivations for working with smallholders 
  IN FAVOR OF  AGAINST 
TRADER/WHOLESALER Higher rent due to information 
asymmetry and limited 
farmer/aggregator marketing 
channels, diversification, no 
alternative, community 
considerations 
Transaction cost 
PROCESSOR/ 
MANUFACTURER 
Brand image, reputation, product 
differentiation, diversification of 
sourcing 
Transaction cost, supply 
chain risk 
RETAILER Brand image, reputation, product 
differentiation, public pressure 
Transaction cost, supply 
chain risk 
CONSUMER Increasing ethical consumption, 
“feel-good” effect 
Higher price tag, 
traceability 
   
 
 
2.6.1 Consumers  
Consumers, especially in the global North, have been attaching increasing 
importance to quality and safety, accompanied by greater willingness to pay for 
those attributes (Poulton, et.al. 2010). Food safety standards have become 
increasingly important in global agri-food value chains, progressively pervading 
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both domestic and international trade, putting smallholders at a competitive 
disadvantage22 (Henson, et. al. 2009). 
Globalization has unleashed social pressures that demand greater and 
more effective governance (Gereffi, Mayer 2004) and most of the progress in 
global retailers’ and brands’ move towards more socially responsible behavior 
has come as a response to, or in anticipation of, social pressures (Mayer, Gereffi, 
2010).  On one hand this trend manifests itself in increasing demand for 
sustainably produced and fair trade goods23 and consumers are holding large 
brand names (including retailers) responsible for environmental and social 
problems in their value chain.  On the other hand increasing social interest and 
demand for fair trade (and other certified “sustainable” products) also led to 
cooptation by corporations with considerable economic interest in the increasing 
demand (Jaffee, 2009).  The widespread use of cell phones and social media both 
                                                     
22 The smallholder disadvantage is two-fold: first, the “cost of maintaining the integrity of 
its controls” is higher in value chains involving smallholders and second, some of the costs are 
imposed on the producers whereby smallholders are at a disadvantage absorbing such cost due 
to their size. (Henson, et. al. 2009) 
 
23 Fair trade market averaged growth of over 40% (Jaffee et.al., 2009) 
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in the global North and South have created strong momentum for consumer 
advocacy and activism for smallholders.  
 
2.6.2 Lead firms: Retailers/processors  
From the perspective of lead firms in GVCs, sourcing from smallholders 
involves increased transaction costs and supply chain risks arising from their 
small size and the challenges and cost of monitoring compliance with certain 
requirements.  At the same time sourcing from smallholders can have 
considerable benefits both in terms of sourcing diversification and brand 
reputation.  POs and their services are critical both for reducing transaction cost 
and mitigating supply chain risks. 
Lead firms in GVCs tend to “prefer fewer, larger and more modern 
suppliers” (Swinnen 2009).  Reflecting this trend is the observed “scale-dualism”.  
This involves the exclusion of small farmers in case companies have the option of 
sourcing from large farmers, a phenomenon that has been documented in several 
case studies (Reardon et.al. 2009). Small farmers are at a disadvantage because of 
transaction cost constraints, limited access to information (USDA, 2008) and 
concerns over noncompliance and contract enforceability (Regoverning Markets 
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2008, Bakucs et.al. 2007).   As an example, the World Bank’s “Facilitating the 
Access of Small-scale Producers to High-Value Market” research program, which 
included a survey of fruit and vegetable exporters who together accounted for 
about 88% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade (outside South Africa), revealed that the 
number of smallholders that directly supplied the respondent firms significantly 
declined during the period reviewed (2002-2007).   
Nonetheless, many lead firms are increasingly looking for ways to at least 
partially source from smallholders.  For example the above World Bank study 
found that many exporters refined their procurement system to better 
accommodate direct sourcing from smallholders, in particular for highly labor-
intensive crops  (Jaffee, et.al. 2012). 
One consideration in favor of sourcing from smallholders is that large 
producers tend to have several market options and therefore have stronger 
negotiating position and can pursue alternative sales channels more easily, as 
case studies found with the tomato value chain in Chile and dairy value chain in 
Poland.  Another consideration is smallholders’ competitive advantage with 
highly labor-intensive crops, which can offset the risks and transactions costs of 
sourcing from smallholders.  This advantage has been illustrated by several case 
 54 
 
studies on large Guatemalan exporters who switched from their own production 
to contract farming with smallholders (Reardon et.al. 2009). 
The findings of a survey of modern retailers in Hungary (Kerteszet 
8/30/11) illustrate this dichotomy of sourcing from smallholders.  The survey 
found that in the buyer driven fresh fruit and vegetable value chain direct 
sourcing from small producers24 by multinational retailers represented less than 
5% with a single exception of 15%.  Domestic retailers’ sourcing rate from small 
producers was only slightly higher with one outlier at 40%.  The survey also 
revealed that retailers only source directly from small producers when (i) crop 
involved is of small quantity and value (for example herbs); (ii) crop involved is 
highly labor intensive and can be best produced on family farms (for example 
raspberries, mushrooms and salads); (iii) product targets special niche (regional 
specialties, for example); (iv) there is fragile produce involved where freshness is 
key.  The survey found that retailers’ needs were not satisfied in these areas 
because they could not find enough suppliers who met their requirements.  The 
survey also revealed that retailers try to encourage small producers to join 
                                                     
24 Direct supplying small producer was defined by retailers as those supplying a value of 
less than 100,000 Ft (approx. $5,000) per day or less than 10 mio Ft (approx. $200,000) per year. 
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producer organizations as a way of improving the efficiency of the market and 
their ability to source from smaller producers via aggregators. 
 
Overall, lead firms have several considerations to evaluate when it comes 
to the inclusion of smallholders in their supply chain.   
With increasingly stringent food security rules and policies, agri-food lead 
firms need to be able to trace the movement of products in their entire supply 
chain and need to have systems in place to ensure compliance with rules and 
policies at every stage of the supply chain. While many of the traceability related 
obligations are pushed up the value chain by lead firms, lead firms need to be 
able to monitor compliance.  Small farmer often lack the resources and expertise 
to implement the necessary systems and the more small farmers are involved in 
the value chain, the more challenging and expensive such monitoring can be. In 
addition, the cycle of negotiations, contracting, accepting of deliveries, record 
keeping and book keeping with smaller suppliers adds to the transaction cost of 
lead firms that is why many avoid direct relationship with smallholders.   
Smallholders in the value chain can represent supply chain risks.  Due to 
their small size and often lesser sophistication than their larger counterparts, the 
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risk of their noncompliance with relevant rules or failure to deliver expected 
quantities and quality is considered higher than their larger counterparts.  
Smallholders’ size and the inherent diversification within a pool of smallholders 
suppliers can mitigate some of that risk, however.  Relevant PO services can play 
an important role in institutionalizing that diversification, reducing the above 
transaction costs and mitigating the supply chain risks. 
Sourcing strategy and reputational considerations can further offset the 
costs of working with smallholders.  
With global demand for food increasing, some TNCs face significant 
constraints when needing to source increasing quantities. Increasing sourcing 
from smallholders is an obvious strategic option for many TNCs: it helps 
increase the supply base while achieving even greater increase over time through 
significant opportunities for smallholder productivity improvement while 
supporting the diversification of the supply.  Danone, for example, recognizing 
that 80% of the global dairy production is in the hands of smallholders with the 
potential to increase capacity several-fold with the appropriate animal 
husbandry techniques, was one of the early movers in the area of proactively 
developing a smallholder supplier base.  Danone’s greatest challenge is that over 
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90% of dairy farmers in less developed countries are not organized into 
aggregators.  Through the Danone Ecosystem Fund, Danone is seeking to 
support dairy production and to improve living conditions and incomes of small 
dairy farmers.  Danone Ukraine partnered with Heifer (NGO specialized in rural 
community development) with the aim of creating 20 dairy cooperatives in order 
to strengthen small dairy producers in regions close to Danone production site.  
(Danone Ecosystem Fund website). As this example illustrates smallholders can 
play an important role in some TNCs strategies’ for meeting their long term 
sourcing needs and therefore they are willing to invest in smallholder 
aggregation and capacity development. 25  
                                                     
25 While it is the TNCs’ motivation to purchase the smallholders’ production in the long 
run, it can take years before the smallholders are able to produce the quality and attributes 
required by TNCs. TNCs’ usually needs to secure alternative offtake in the interim in order to 
ensure sufficient incentive for farmers to carry through with their commitment.  A good example 
is the Pepsico supported chickpea production in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is one of the world’ leading 
chickpea producer and Pepsico was looking to secure new supplies for it hummus brand, Sabra. 
Ethiopian chickpea production is predominantly smallholder based whose production is both 
highly inefficient and unpredictable.  Therefore Pepsico set up a program to help improve the 
productivity and quality with the aim of sourcing from Ethiopia in the medium term.  In the 
meantime, however, Pepsico Foundation partnered with the World Food Program (WFP) and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to set up a factory for manufacture 
nutrition biscuits for the WFP using chickpeas produced by farmers in the Pepsico initiative.  
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In addition to the supply strategy and diversification benefits of 
smallholder engagement, such inclusive value chain strategies are increasingly 
desired by consumers and are often part of firms’ corporate social responsibility 
strategy and benefit their brand image.  Fueled by growing recognition of the 
slow progress made in the area of rural poverty alleviation, the increasingly 
difficult conditions faced by smallholder farmers who represent a significant 
portion of the global poor, and assisted by the fast development in 
telecommunication technology and social media as well as NGO strategies 
attempting to raise awareness, TNC agri-food brands and retailers have found 
themselves at the center of the rural poverty discourse.   For example, Oxfam 
America decided to focus on some of the largest agrifood TNCs after the 2008 
food crisis, to explore what impact these companies’ supply chains had on 
farmers who own less than 2 hectares of land.  The report (Oxfam, 2013) also 
investigated the social and environmental policies of the ten largest food and 
beverage companies and stated in a press release that these companies are 
“failing millions of people in developing countries who supply land, labor, water 
and commodities needed to make their products”; not because of exploitation 
but because of their exclusion.  The ratings of the Oxfam report are summarized 
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in Annex E along with the latest ratings available on the Oxfam website to 
promote heightened consumers awareness around these issues.26  
Information technology and social media together with increasing 
consumer awareness have enhanced brands’ reputation risk just as brands have 
become TNCs’ most valuable assets.   In addition, reputation risk may also lead 
to legal risk as informed and activist consumers especially in the global north 
may pursue legal cases against lead firms and brands as the case of Whole Foods 
Market Inc. illustrates (see footnote27).  
Aggregation remains a key constraint for lead firms to take advantage of 
the opportunities offered by smallholder engagement since sourcing from 
farmers organized into groups carried considerably lower transaction cost and 
                                                     
26 Noteworthy is Oxfam’s announcement at the time of the report’s release in February 
2013 to focus its first campaign on the cocoa value chain and the treatment of female workers, 
and the subsequently improved performance of Nestle, Mars and Mondelez (owner of Cadbury) 
on their “Women” score.  
 
27 In 2011 a judge in Florida allowed a lawsuit by nonprofit Southeast Consumer Alliance 
to proceed claiming deceptive trade practices based on Whole Foods’ sale of organic frozen 
vegetables from China.  The vegetables were grown by a Chinese state owned company that 
employed prison labor in a highly polluted region where polluted surface water was used for 
irrigation, while the organic certification was issued by another Chinese state entity.   
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supply chain risk then sourcing directly from tens if not hundreds of thousands 
of smallholders. 
 
2.6.3 Traders/Wholesalers  
Local traders and wholesalers often take advantage of information asymmetry, 
smallholders’ lack of transportation and lack of access to capital when buying 
smallholders’ products at the lowest possible prices, leading to trader margins as 
high as 50% in some markets.  Most traders and wholesalers are less concerned 
about CSR and reputational benefits of smallholder engagement for their own 
behalf but rather at the demand of lead firms.  However, some GVCs such as 
coffee and cocoa (where smallholders are responsible for the majority of global 
production and therefore buyers have few alternatives for sourcing) have been 
working closely with smallholders in a manner similar to brands and retailers, in 
order to help secure stable long-term supply.28 Mujawamarija et.al. (2013) 
                                                     
28 Cacao trees grow in a limited geographical zone, of approximately 20 degrees to the 
north and south of the Equator. (Wikipedia)  Ghana and Ivory Coast together account for 60 per 
cent of the world’s cocoa supplies.  However, poor returns for farmers and declining productivity 
due to aging cocoa trees and climate change are threatening cocoa supply whereby the industry 
is predicting a 1 million tons “cocoa deficit” in 2020 while demand is increasing due to growing 
global demand for chocolate. (FT) Armajaro, an international cocoa trader, is working with other 
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observed preference among coffee farmers in Rwanda to sell to local traders 
rather than cooperatives based on established relationships after repeated 
transactions of credit and basic consumption items with the traders.  Interviews 
carried out for this work also revealed strong social ties between smallholders 
and traders that belong to the same community. 
 
 
                                                     
 
stakeholders with the help of the Gates Foundation to promote farmer aggregation, capacity 
building and tree rehabilitation. ECOM, a major international coffee trader, has been managing 
similar programs with the help of capacity building NGO, Hivos.  Similarly, ECOM embarked on 
the Voice of the Coffee Farmer project with the aim of better understanding farmer behavior and 
preferences and how ECOM can increase volume, improve quality and reduce volatility in its 
supply chain.   
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2.7 Smallholder Participation in GVCs, Barriers and Benefits of 
Participation 
GVC participation can have considerable benefits but smallholder farmers 
face significant barriers when it comes to supplying modern markets.   
Modern market participation can increase smallholder income in several 
ways.  Participation in high-quality supply chains increases the potential for 
surplus to be generated for the producers.  Another form of premium may 
benefit farmers that buyers may agree to pay in order to prevent side-selling 
especially when contracts are difficult to enforce.29  Endogenous technology 
transfer in value chains make productivity improving solutions available to 
farmers and in turn help increase income.  Finally, vertical coordination can help 
overcome smallholders’ constrained access to inputs and better quality inputs 
lead to better risk management, improved productivity and higher profitability 
(Swinnen, et.al. 2009).  Therefore linking smallholders to modern value chains 
                                                     
29 In general potential surplus refers to the premium potential of more affluent modern 
markets and export oriented crops in comparison with crops produced for local and traditional 
markets. An alternative form of premium relates to what buyers may incorporate in contracts in 
order to secure the loyalty of producers and prevent side-selling (see Section ? for more detail.)     
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can be an important element of building their resistance to shocks and improving 
their productivity and livelihoods (Fan et.al. 2013).  
Although small farmers often enjoy quality and productivity advantages, 
mainly attributed to motivated and flexible family labor (IFC 2012), they are at a 
disadvantage in most other areas important to meet the needs of modern 
markets.  As Table 4 illustrates, smaller farms are at a disadvantage when it 
comes to transaction costs related to skilled labor, market and technical 
knowledge, input purchases, obtaining finance and capital, accessing output 
markets, compliance with product traceability and quality assurance 
requirements and risk management. 
 
Table 4. Transaction cost advantages of small vs. large farms 
 
 Source: Poulton, et.al. 2010 
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Unless smallholders can satisfy these modern market requirements they 
will be excluded from expanding market opportunities, both domestic and 
international (Kaplinsky, et.al, 2008).  The fixed costs of adopting and 
maintaining compliance with modern market requirements and the related risks 
can be considerable and thus can disadvantage smaller producers (Ellis and 
Keane 2008).   
When it comes to the barriers to modern market access, the limited 
existing literature puts primary importance on privately held assets (such as 
livestock, soil quality, productive technologies, etc.) ahead of institutional and 
infrastructure deficiencies (Barrett 2008, Boughton et al., in press; Cadot et 
al.,2006; Minten and Barrett, submitted for publication).  Farmers need various 
forms of technology and inputs to meet modern market requirements such as  
relevant information, agricultural production technology, information 
technology, irrigation,  fertilizers, herbicides, management, technological and 
administrative skills.  In addition, because selling to these global value chains 
often does not result in immediate payment, unlike traditional wholesale 
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markets, access to credit and the ability to manage credit and financial flows 
become important parts of farming (WIR 2009).   
These requirements are challenging for individual smallholders to meet.  
Compliance with standards usually requires information, financial investment 
and access to networks (Lee et.al. 2012).  The adoption of standards has 
economies of scale that puts smallholders and a disadvantage.  Some studies 
found that the introduction of standards can discourage smallholders’ GVC 
participation.  For example the decline of smallholder participation in the 
Kenyan green bean industry from 60 to 40% of output is attributed to the 
introduction of stringent food safety standards (Narrod et.al. 2009).   
Some argue that certification, especially for smallholders and their POs, 
can offer the opportunity for value chain inclusion, which is why many 
development programs focus on certification (Jaffee et.al. 2012).  However 
certification is often a considerable economic task for smallholders and can be 
challenging to maintain without external support (Jaffee et,al 2012).  In fact the 
cost of certification can outweigh the benefits for smallholders because auditing 
and certification have strong economies of scale (IFPRI, 2008).   
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Modern markets also frequently specify the types of inputs farmers have 
to use (seeds, fertilizers, etc.) reducing the bargaining power of farmers with 
their suppliers.  Therefore the “danger is that the requirements of global value 
chain will undermine the cost advantage enjoyed by small farmers and require 
capabilities that they cannot offer.” (Humphrey 2006).    
There is considerable variation, however, in the requirements of various 
value chains, which can significantly influence the benefits of participation for 
smallholders.  Lee and Gereffi (2012) helped make sense of the variations 
through a classification of different value chain structures, which apply both to 
global and local value chains. They showed how differences in lead firm and 
market concentration characteristics lead to different requirements, incentives 
and implementation capacity and thus variations in outcomes for smallholders.  
They distinguished between concentrated and fragmented chains on two 
dimensions – food retail and food production – to create a two-by-two 
classification as shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Structure of the agri-food value chain (Source: Lee, et. al. 2012) 
 
Supported by case study evidence, Lee et.al. concluded that buyer driven 
chains and producer driven chains offer distinct opportunities for smallholders 
while bilateral oligopolies are the least beneficial to small farmers because of the 
strict requirements and direct control involved.  Traditional markets offer 
smallholders the greatest autonomy but also the least support for upgrading and 
improving profitability according to the authors. 
Compared to traditional markets, GVC participation generally involves 
contracts that usually lower market risk but the bargaining position of small 
farmers tends to be weak considering the large, often multinational, buyers 
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involved.  Accordingly, the share of retail revenues passed down to producers 
has been declining in many agricultural sectors.  For example coffee growers 
have seen their share of the retail price shrink from about a third in the early 
1990s to 10% in 2002, despite a doubling of sales during the same period (WIR 
2009).  
Contracts, however, do not always reduce market risk.  Case study 
evidence suggests (which was also confirmed by interviews carried out as part of 
the present work) that in some value chains TNCs breach contracts frequently, 
especially related to pricing (Regoverning markets, 2008).  Prices in those cases 
are either not set until a few days before delivery (or even past the delivery date) 
or the price set in the contract is unilaterally modified by the buyers.  On the 
other side, modern market contracts can also be challenging to enforce against 
smallholders.  This is a particularly important problem because of the prevalence 
of “side-selling” among smallholders.   
Side-selling involves the farmer selling crops to a third party in violation 
of a preexisting contractual obligation with the buyer.  Motivation for side-
selling typically involves either a market price that is more favorable than the 
pre-set price or more favorable payment terms, such as immediate payment as 
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opposed to delayed payment that characterize most modern contracts (Fischer 
et.al. 2011).  Side-selling involves a two-fold problem for buyers.  First, it 
undermines quantity commitments and ability to plan for the buyer to meet its 
own obligations.  Second, side-selling typically involves the highest quality 
product (that’s where farmer can get highest premium compared to contracted 
price), which in turn deteriorates the average quality of the products sold to the 
buyer (G. Mujawamariya, et.al. 2013). 
 
Even if opportunities for directly supplying modern markets may arise, 
meeting modern market buyers’ quantity, quality (standards) and product 
specifications (asset specificity) requirements pose considerable costs and 
challenges to small farmers (Reardon, et.al. 2005).  As a result many small 
farmers find it difficult not only to become but also to remain suppliers of 
modern value chains (Poulton et.al. 2010, Reardon, et.al. 2005, Maertens, et.al. 
2007).   
 Due to the above entry barriers, lead firm driven strategies to link large 
number of smallholders to standards based markets have been more successful 
than producer initiated bottom-up efforts, as evidenced by a survey of fruit and 
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vegetable exporters who accounted for 88% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s fresh 
horticulture trade30 (Jaffee et.al. 2012).  Lead firm initiated approaches are driven 
by the needs of those lead firms and are typically in the form of contract farming 
schemes.   
Another conclusion drawn by the same study was that producer exclusion 
from some standards driven value chains may be preferable to the high financial 
risk that accompanies inclusion in those value chains primarily due to the higher 
investments required. 
To overcome some of the challenges associated with modern market 
access, smallholders may participate in some form of aggregation.  In fact 
production organized based on GVCs and production networks, governed in 
part through the use of standards, has increased the need for farmers to be 
organized in order to be included in modern market trade. 
 
 
 
                                                     
30 Part of the “Facilitating the Access of Small-scale Producers to High-Value Markets” World Bank 
study. 
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2.8 Key Aggregation Mechanisms for Smallholder Modern 
Market Access: Cooperatives vs. Other Forms of Aggregation 
 
Aggregating the production of smallholders can help achieve economies 
of scale, meet the standards and requirements of modern markets and address 
other barriers of modern market access (IFAD 2009).  It is often encouraged by 
value chain lead firms for whom the lack of smallholder organization is a key 
barrier to sourcing from smallholders31. 
Aggregation can take various forms as discussed in Section 2.4.  
Cooperatives have represented the predominant form of producer driven 
aggregation and are most widely supported by policymakers. Contract farming, 
while not necessarily an aggregation mechanism due to its favoring of larger 
producers and organized smallholders, is the key form of buyer-driven 
smallholder engagement and thus the mechanism used by Investor Owned 
Firms (IOFs).  
This section of the literature review will focus on contract farming, as the 
main means of smallholder value chain integration by IOFs, and cooperatives, 
                                                     
31 Hungarian retail survey results (Kerteszet 8/30/11), conference remarks by Armajaro and ECOM 
(cocoa and coffee traders) at Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Value Chain Roundtable (2012). 
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the most common form of producer and third party initiated form of 
aggregation.  The literature on the role of cooperatives vs. IOFs aggregators in 
smallholder modern market access is very limited. The author could identify 
only a single work that looks at hybrids of cooperatives and IOFs.  Ortmann et.al. 
2006 concluded based on evidence from 2 case studies in South Africa that both 
IOF and cooperative forms of aggregation have considerable strengths and 
weaknesses and some hybrid form of the two is best positioned to enable 
smallholders’ modern market access32.   
 
2.8.1 Contract Farming 
Contract farming can be defined as a system for the production and supply of 
agricultural products by producers under advance contracts, the essence of such 
arrangements being a commitment to provide an agricultural commodity of a type 
(quality/variety), at a specified time, price, and in specified quantity to a known 
buyer. The contracts could be of various types ranging from procurement contracts 
under which only sale/purchase conditions are specified to contracts under which 
                                                     
32 Other studies comparing IOFs with cooperatives focus mainly on governance and some on productivity 
considerations. 
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the contracting firm supplies and manages all the inputs for the farm (including 
extension services and financing) and the farmer becomes just a supplier of land and 
labor (Bijman, 2008). 
Production based on advance contracts and specifications is becoming 
increasingly common under GVC conditions.  Even the well-established Dutch 
agricultural auction system is in decline with the shift towards advanced contract 
based transactions (Sandor, et.al. 2011). Contract farming is also playing an 
increasing role in many developing countries due to the desire of retailers and 
manufacturers to establish vertical coordination for control and risk 
management.  While the welfare impact of contract farming continues to be 
highly contested, multiple studies have demonstrated the positive impact effect 
of contract farming for smallholders.  Bellemare (2012) found 10-16% increase in 
income and 15% decrease in income volatility among smallholders that 
participated in contract farming in Madagascar. Wainaina (2012) found a 27% 
income increase among Kenyan poultry smallholders participating in contract 
farming. Others have documented welfare gain from participation in contract 
farming as a result of risk reduction and transaction cost savings (Hennessy 1996; 
Martin 1997; Gray and Boehlje 2005; Key 2013).   
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 On the negative side, the challenges of contract enforcement and unequal 
bargaining power between producers and buyers is also widely documented 
(Kherallah, 2001).  
Barrett et.al. (2010) contributed to a more nuanced understanding on the 
subject by demonstrating the importance of geographic placement effects. They 
pointed out that farmers might exit or turn down seemingly advantageous 
contract farming arrangements when they perceive that participating won’t 
resolve or might even aggravate preexisting market failures or introduce new 
risks.  A Nicaraguan example of horticultural producers was documented by 
Barett et.al. In this example farmers exited their contract farming arrangement 
with a supermarket while still retaining the income effects of participation thanks 
to investments in irrigation and other productive technologies and new market 
relationships. 
On one end of the spectrum, the potential power asymmetry combined 
with the potential for misalignment of incentives increases the risk of farmer 
exploitation, in addition to the risk of indebtedness in case production problems 
occur and loss of autonomy (and diversification).  On the other end of the 
spectrum, however, farmers may benefit from stable and long term off-take 
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arrangements based on solid contracts, as well as access to input financing and 
technical assistance through contract farming relationships.  While smallholders 
can greatly benefit from some of these structures, especially if it provides access 
to markets, inputs, technical assistance and financing, “smallholder inclusion in 
such arrangements is not obvious” (Bijman, 2008) because buyers have been 
found to prefer contracting with larger producers for transaction cost 
considerations (Ket, et.al. 1999). 
 Therefore even though some consider contract farming to be a key form 
of smallholder aggregation (IFC 2013), and in some cases it certainly may be 
when it involves sourcing directly from small scale producers, buyers in general 
tend to favor larger and fewer suppliers and in such cases another form of 
aggregation becomes necessary in order for smallholders to get access to 
particular market channels. Bijman (2008) refers to this as the “intermediary 
model” of contract farming. (A common example would be contract farming via 
a cooperative.) 
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2.8.2 Agricultural cooperatives 
Cooperatives are the most common form of aggregation in agriculture and are 
widely supported by domestic and international policy, but they have had mixed 
track record especially in emerging economies.  Agricultural cooperatives33 have 
existed since the middle of the 19th century and count as many as 400 million 
members today.  Cooperatives are member-owned businesses that generally 
operate according to seven international principles with roots in the 19th century 
and as adopted by the International Co-operative Alliance: (i) voluntary and 
open membership, (ii) democratic member control, (iii) members' economic 
participation, (iv) autonomy and independence, (v) education, training and 
information, (vi) cooperation among cooperatives, (vii) 
concern for community (Birchall 2004). 
Cooperatives have played an important role historically in organizing 
smallholder farmers and are widely held in great hope to help end poverty, 
achieve the Millenium Development Goals (UN Background Paper on 
                                                     
33 This chapter focuses on agricultural cooperatives as opposed to some of the other 
common forms such as consumer and financial cooperatives. Agricultural cooperatives have 
three broad categories: marketing (focused on market access on better terms), supply (focused on 
obtaining inputs on better terms) or service (provides transports, storage, etc. services) 
cooperatives (Ortmann, et.al. 2007).  
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Cooperatives, 2012), and as a “key to feeding the world” (FAO).   However, 
while 20-80% of small farmers, depending on the country, are organized into 
some form of village or self-help group, only 5% of smallholders globally are 
organized into formal producer organizations, mostly cooperatives (IFC 2013).  
  The first cooperatives were established in Europe in the 18th and 19th 
century (see Appendix F for the history of cooperatives and distinct regional 
characteristics.)  However there is evidence that the top 40 non-cooperative34 
agri-food companies in the world have been growing faster than their 
cooperative counterparts during the period of 2007-2011 while cooperatives also 
had weaker financial results on average (PWC, 2012). There are one hundred 
agricultural cooperatives on the list of 300 largest cooperatives globally.  Most of 
these were established over fifty years ago most around the turn of the 20th 
century.  Most are based in Western Europe and the United States, with the 
exception of one cooperative in China and one in India. 
Cooperatives have not always been successful at serving the needs of their 
members (Kherallah, 2001).  In fact despite considerable government and other 
                                                     
34 Companies organized in legal forms other than cooperatives. 
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forms of support, cooperatives have not been successful in most less developed 
countries and cooperatives remain a movement of the advanced countries where 
most successful cooperatives operate (Frederico, 2005).  Under the current 
globalized agri-food market conditions, most of the cooperatives in less 
developed countries are not “GVC relevant”; they are unable to do business with 
the global value chains and local modern chains that increasingly handle global 
and local food trade because they are too small and/or cannot meet the GVC 
requirements. 
Cooperative principals and how they manifest themselves in practice are 
important for a better understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of 
cooperatives as aggregators of smallholders and vehicles of their modern market 
access favored by many policymakers.  
Autonomy and independence.  One of the key principles of cooperatives is 
autonomy.  While public assistance of different forms may be needed and 
welcome on many occasions, as well as governments may be genuinely inclined 
to support cooperatives as part of social policy, government involvement should 
be temporary otherwise it can undermine the operation and effectiveness of the 
cooperative entity or sector it is trying to support (Svendsen and Svendsen).  
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Nonetheless, motivated by social objectives or the perception of political threat 
associated with the organizing of the poor segments of society, government 
intervention remains a reality in many especially developing countries. 
Non-governmental third party involvement can also undermine the 
independence of cooperatives.  Such outside promotion of cooperatives common 
and those outside promoters tend to ascribe their own motives to the members of 
the cooperative (Harper and Roy, 2000).  Gugerty and Kremer (2000) found, in 
their study of Kenyan community organizations, that developmental assistance 
may change the social capital dynamics of these organizations.  According to 
Oxfam (2007) cooperatives set up as a result of external involvement are often 
perceived by the members as means of accessing external support rather than 
their own initiative, thus altogether undermining the reasons for the 
cooperative’s existence.  Therefore ILO’s 2002 recommendation on cooperatives 
highlights the importance of not using cooperatives as “tools” of development in 
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a top-down approach, but rather support the autonomous bottom-up 
development of cooperatives through direct support to the members.35   
 
Economic participation vs. concern for community.  It is common for cooperatives to 
have a combination of economic and social objectives which needs to be carefully 
balanced else it can lead to conflict and negatively influence trust and cohesion. 
Harper and Roy (2000) in their study of Indian cooperatives found that the 
majority of cooperative members they surveyed were primarily interested in 
improving their income.  Only 6 of the 21 cooperatives surveyed had the 
majority of their members expressing the desire to have their cooperative do 
more for the group than just increase income.  In the case of the rest of the 
cooperatives, the majority wanted the cooperative to focus only on financial 
benefits.  Harper and Roy also found that the more poor the members were, the 
less they were interested in nonfinancial benefits from the cooperative. Vorley 
et.al (2012) had similar findings and quotes a representative of Peru’s Junta 
                                                     
35 The (ILO) recommendations for the promotion of cooperatives (2002) are based on 
guidelines issued by the United Nations in 2001 and call for a supportive policy framework for 
cooperative development while also emphasizing the importance of cooperative autonomy and 
advocating against governmental intervention. 
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Nacional de Café saying “No one delivers the product simply for love of the 
cooperative; we deliver the product to the extent that the cooperative can give a 
better value proposition to the member in terms of prices and additional 
services”. 
Even though “many would be organizers of co-operatives attributed their 
failure to the peasants’ stubborn refusal to understand the great advantages to 
cooperation ……. and to the lack of mutual trust” (Frederico 2005), the classic 
case study of Irish butter cooperatives by O’Grada illustrated  that the decline of 
those cooperatives had more to do with farmers’ assessment of profitability and 
economic conditions as opposed to their “individualism and conservatism” as 
previously thought (Frederico 2005). 
Farmer income improvement may be associated with various cooperative 
activities, including shared equipment use, training and services. For different 
value chains the potential for income enhancing cooperative activities as well as 
the relative value added of activities may differ.  For example dairy cooperatives 
have done reasonable well compared to others due to the opportunity to share 
costly equipment necessary for preserving the quality of the milk and for higher 
value added activities.  In fact the first cooperative ever was a dairy cooperative 
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in Denmark that made butter (Frederico, 2005) and several cooperative success 
stories are in the dairy sector, including Amul in India and Heifer International’s 
more recent efforts (see more details later).   
Harper and Roy (2000) nonetheless found that “both income only and 
broader motivation can be associated with success.”  In fact all the 5 cooperatives 
which failed in their sample were mainly income oriented.  The authors 
concluded that “it may be that when circumstances become difficult, social 
objectives provide some “glue” which keeps the group together in hard times.”  
One interesting approach to combining financial and social/environmental 
objectives is illustrated by the example of Heifer International36. Heifer 
International is an NGO that works with small farmers and has successfully 
promoted cooperative formation and the ownership of life stock that support 
both food security and livelihoods. Organizing into cooperatives can help 
smallholders with obtaining access to much needed chillers (without which the 
bacteria count of the milk is unacceptable for most processors and modern value 
chains).  Heifer developed a “chilling hub” based engagement model, 
                                                     
36 Heifer International is a US based NGO with the mission of “working with communities to end 
poverty and hunger and to care for the Earth.” 
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recognizing the importance of chiller access for farmers.  Various income 
enhancing services and value chain partners are all linked to the chilling hub, 
including quality testing, financing, extension and veterinary services, input and 
feed supply, transportation services, etc. along with more socially oriented 
activities such as education regarding improved hygiene, water and sanitation, 
nutrition, environmentally sustainable agricultural services and resource 
management, among others.  
Cooperation among cooperatives.  Bush and Simi (2001) found farmers from 
different countries of the EU were three times more likely to protest against each 
other than they were to work against shared antagonists.  Nonetheless, the few 
examples of cooperation they identified were all framed against a shared 
protagonist, globalization and/or multinational corporations.  McClintock 
observed that farmers considered those outside their own cooperative as 
potential competitors.   
Democratic control.  Democratic control is one of the key cooperative 
principles.  Oxfam’s experience with cooperatives suggests, however, that 
participatory management is feasible only in the case of new or small 
cooperatives. As the cooperative grows and the number of members increases, 
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however, the democratic decision making system become increasingly 
impractical.  In fact many cooperatives end up appointing a board, which in turn 
appoints full time management.  Management in those cases is often professional 
and not from among the membership, for several reasons: first, as the 
cooperative grows, it is increasingly difficult for members to manage the 
cooperative as well as their own private production; second, cooperative 
members often lack the necessary business and management skill; and third, 
membership based committees of elected leaders tend to be slow and 
bureaucratic in their decision making and thus jeopardizes the success of the 
cooperative (Oxfam 2007).  
However, a sense of ownership and trust of the leadership is critical for 
cooperatives to function effectively, which creates a challenging dichotomy for 
cooperatives.  The challenge is especially great since professional leadership 
tends to lead to conflicts over distribution (Oxfam 2007).  Professional 
managements usually tries to retain as much of the cooperative’s earnings as 
possible for investments or reserves, while the membership tend to prefer 
distribution to the members, especially if they do not fully trust the management  
(Oxfam 2007). In return, these conflicts further undermine the membership’s 
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trust in management.  Harper and Roy in fact found that most of the 
cooperatives in their Indian sample did not have participatory management and 
that the more simple the cooperative’s operation was the more likely 
participatory management was used. 
Corporatization.  Rosa Luxemburg pointed out 100 years ago that 
cooperatives are destined to either disappear, in case they do not succeed 
economically, or to otherwise “corporatize” and become like capitalist profit 
oriented entities.  She portrayed cooperatives as conflicted organizations: trying 
to maintain a “socialist” system of production while being subjected to 
economies built on capitalist exchange.  Since, according to Luxemburg, 
exchange dominates production in capitalism due to competition, the 
cooperative will either adopt the capitalist principals also in its production or let 
the social considerations of its members prevail, in the latter case, however, it is 
destined to fail economically.  Szabo’s (2013) recent findings are consistent with 
the above theory as he found that some cooperatives convert to corporate form 
or establish subsidiaries in corporate form as they grow and their operations 
become more complex.  Skurnik and Vihriala asserted that while homogeneity is 
a key determinant of the cost of collective action, cooperative decision makers by 
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nature are less homogeneous than corporate ones, given that sole concern of the 
investors in the latter is the maximization of the value of their investment.  
Maintaining sufficient alignment of owner interest is a key reason for 
cooperatives to constrain their activities to a narrow line of business.  They also 
suggested that cooperatives find it difficult to cope with change as that causes 
tension among members and the risk that preferences might diverge. 
Despite the above challenges with cooperatives, there are some very 
successful examples of agricultural cooperatives that managed to grow to 
significant size and command considerable market shares in their respective 
markets.  Some of the most frequently referenced include the Danish and Dutch 
cooperatives, the dairy cooperatives of India and the Almerian cooperatives in 
Spain. It is important to highlight, however, that most of these success stories, in 
particular the timing of their significant growth, pre-dates the era of 
globalization and the dominance of global value chains.  Furthermore, some of 
the successfully scaled cooperatives benefitted from very specific and unique 
socioeconomic dynamics that encouraged membership and enabled growth.   
The successful growth of Dutch cooperatives was originally organized 
along Catholic-Protestant religious lines and both groups supporting and 
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building organizations of their own in competition with one another (KIT, 2010), 
helping offset the tendency of diluting social cohesion that generally occurs with 
the growth of collective action based organizations.  
The beginnings of the Almerian cooperative37 dates back to Franco’s 
dictatorial regime and its “development” efforts in the 50’s and 60’s and its 
exploitive arrangement aimed at increasing agricultural production in the area. 
Frustrated by lack of transparency and stymied opportunities for growth, 
Almerian farmers formed the credit co-operative Caja Rural Provincial de 
Almería in 1963 (now “Cajamar”).  Cajamar provided financing to farmers as 
well as acted as a catalyst in building organizational strength. This was at least in 
part driven by Cajamar’s initially mainly unsecured lending and thus crucial 
interest in making sure that the co-operatives were doing well and their activities 
were worth financing (Vattamany 2009). 
Amul is the largest Indian dairy company, owned by Gujarat Cooperative 
Milk Marketing Federation, with revenues in excess of US$3 billion.  Amul began 
in 1946 when dairy farmers in India's Kaira district went on strike to protest 
                                                     
37 With 13,500 small farmers of average landholding of 1.5 hectares. 
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middlemen and corrupt bureaucrats.  The Amul brand and its cooperative model 
formed in the years that followed and evolved into a 3 tier federated structure.  
India's federal government eventually rolled out the privatized model in other 
states.   The Indian government was heavily involved with cooperatives and in 
fact in 1947 cooperatives became an integral part of the government’s five year 
plans. The government also played a key role in promoting consolidation in the 
cooperative sector (Munshi, N. 2012).   
Several studies have documented the challenges faced by more recently 
established cooperatives of smallholders in attracting and retaining members in 
order to achieve the necessary growth to do business with modern markets. 
Salifu, et.al. (2010) found that in Ghana the most of the cooperatives are fairly 
homogeneous (including from gender perspective) and remain small with less 
than 70 members.  These authors also found that similarly to other Sub-Saharan 
African countries (Francesconi, et. al. 2008), the primary reason behind the 
creation of the cooperatives and farmers’ decision to participate was to gain 
access to governmental or NGO external support (“invasive external 
governance”).  In a South African study (Van der Walt 2005), the author found 
that 65% of registered cooperatives were not operational and 50% of survey 
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respondents indicated that the services provided to members were inadequate.  
Ortmann et.al. (2007) found that several large cooperatives had converted to 
become “investor owned firms” and conversions were related to the “member-
shareholder conflict”: farmers may receive good service from their cooperative as 
members but poor return on their capital.  Mujawamariya, et. al. (2013) observed 
limited loyalty and commitment to cooperatives among Rwandan coffee farmer 
along with what they refer to as “double side-selling”: coffee farmers selling to 
local traders instead of the cooperatives and cooperatives purchasing from non-
members. 
Therefore it is key to understand what benefits farmers gain from PO 
participation what factors might influence PO participation. 
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2.9 Experience with Producer Participation in Aggregation 
 
While 20-80% of small farmers, depending on the country, participate in 
some form of village or self-help group (IFC 2013), most of these groups operate 
informally trying to address rural communities’ basic needs (Krishna 2002) such 
as health, nutrition, clean water and sanitation.  
Agricultural production oriented producer organizations, especially those 
that operate formally, are less common.  Only about 14% of Asian farmers, 16% 
of European farmers, 19% of Latin American farmers and 7% of African farmers 
are members of producer organizations, including formal and informal, many of 
which are small and have very low capacity (IFC, 2013).  The low level of farmer 
participation in formal producer organizations is a puzzle in the development 
field38, especially given the considerable support for such participation provided 
                                                     
38 As an example, a survey of Hungarian farmers (Horvath, 2010) revealed that over 90% 
of the farmer believed that cooperation among producers was necessary and important, 
especially for better marketing opportunities (80% of respondents), to take advantage of support 
that may be available (39%) and to improve production methods and conditions (31%).  
Nonetheless, only 16% of respondents participated in some form of producer cooperation, which 
included informal clubs in addition to formal producer organizations.   
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by international organizations, governments, and non-governmental 
organizations.  
This puzzle of low participation in producer organizations has been 
getting increasing attention among scholars and practitioners alike.  This appears 
to be especially of concern since farmer aggregation is a key mechanism to enable 
agri-food companies to source from smaller producers, for vendors to market 
their products to them, for technical assistance providers to transfer know-how 
and agricultural best practices to them and for NGOs to reach them with various 
forms of assistance.   
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2.10 PO Formation and Initial Farmer Participation 
 
Markelova et al. (2009) describe three factors necessary for the formation 
and functioning of farmer groups from the perspective of modern market access: 
type of market/product; group characteristics and institutional arrangements.  
The type of market and product determines the extent to which group 
participation can be beneficial. As far as group dynamics are concerned, 
according to Markelova, et al. (2009), smaller groups have stronger cohesion 
since members are easier to monitor but groups’ internal composition also play 
an important role with homogeneous groups (in terms of socioeconomics, values, 
etc.) having been shown to be more stable and effective, while past experience 
working together and experienced leaders further increase the likelihood of 
success.  Finally, in terms of institutional arrangements, simple rules, 
accountability and enforcement mechanism, crafted or adapted by groups 
members themselves, all help contribute to farmer groups’ effectiveness.  
Factors that have been shown to influence farmer willingness to 
participate in POs include up-front fees, transaction costs of dealing with POs 
(including cost of transportation and of transitioning into the formal sector), 
 93 
 
group size, price received and payment terms (Fischer et.al 2011, Bakucs, 
et.al.,2007). 
Dalberg (2012) found based on interviews carried out with global 
commodity buyers that farmers do not participate in POs for one or more of the 
following reasons39: 
• POs provide poor services 
• Insufficient access to resources 
• Smallholders and women are excluded from POs 
• Weak governance and leadership 
• Historically state intervened in POs for political gain 
A large scale survey (Bernard et.al. 2010) of Ethiopian farmers revealed 
that 59% of nonparticipants did not think the effort or fee required for PO 
participation was worth the expected benefits.  Over 30% of respondents were 
interested in PO participation but PO entry rules discriminated against them due 
                                                     
39 Please note that Dahlberg’s interviews focused on the coffee value chain in Peru, cocoa 
in Indonesia, dairy in Colombia, maize in Kenya and rice in Nigeria, and global conclusions were 
extrapolated from those findings.  However, the list of barriers to aggregate is likely to be biased 
by the experiences in those 5 countries. 
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to their small size. PO exclusion of the poorest (which in turn are often the ones 
with smallest production) was also observed in other studies.    
 Dudas (2009) found in a survey of Hungarian farmers that the most 
important motivation in farmers’ decision to join a PO was security of the off-
take followed by a reduction in production risk and collective input purchase.  
Other studies confirmed the same finding showing that the primary motivation 
for PO participation was the desire for risk mitigation, which included primarily 
market risk but can also include others forms of risk mitigations (for example 
weather) via various services that the POs can offer. 
Access to modern markets also requires shifting to the formal sector from 
the informal sector, where most smallholders operate40.  The informal economy 
has been growing and it represents nearly 40% of the GDP of developing 
countries.  The increase of informal economic activities is attributed to increased 
                                                     
40A World Bank study of 162 countries for the period of 1999-2007 (Schneider, Buehn, 
Montenegro, 2010) used the following definition for the informal sector.  “The shadow economy 
includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed 
from public authorities for any of the following reasons:  (1) to avoid payment of income, value 
added or other taxes, (2) to avoid payment of social security contributions, (3) to avoid having to 
meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, 
safety standards, etc., and (4) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as 
completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms.” 
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tax burden, labor market regulations, quality of public goods and services and 
the state of the formal economy (Schneider, Buehn, Montenegro, 2010).  The 
implication for smallholders, most of whom traditionally operate in the informal 
economy, is that the shift from the informal to the formal sector can be a difficult 
one, which was confirmed by the interviews carried out for this study. This can 
represent a serious challenge for smallholders with considerable financial 
implications. The author of this research has not been able to identify any studies 
that quantify the impact of transition from the informal to the formal market. 
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2.11 Farmers’ Continued PO Participation 
Studies about farmers’ continued participation in aggregation 
mechanisms falls into two main strands.  First, those focusing on the collective 
action aspects of farmer participation and the role of trust in enabling collective 
action.  Second, scholarship that emphasizes the costs and benefits of 
participation in farmers’ decision-making process.   
 
2.11.1 Collective action, social capital, trust and collective identity 
 
This section will review the concepts of collective action, social capital, 
trust and collective identity, in particular in how they are applied to farmers’ 
POs.   
There is a wealth of literature on collective action, social capital, collective 
identity and trust and this literature review will not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive review but rather focus on the application of these concepts in 
the existing literature to smallholders and their participation in aggregation 
mechanisms.  
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Collective action is an important strategy for increasing small producer 
participation in modern markets (Vorley et al. 2008). However, very little 
attention has been given to the factors that shape the commitment and 
contribution of farmers towards achieving a shared goal. (Fischer et al. 2011) 
“Collective action occurs when more than one individual is required to 
contribute to an effort in order to achieve an outcome.” (Ostrom 2004).  
Scholarship related to natural resource management has highlighted the 
importance of collective action, “voluntary action by a group to pursue shared 
objectives”, and despite the differences between natural resource management 
and smallholder market access, the collective action framework is applied to the 
latter because of the importance of cooperation for creating sustainable 
livelihood options. In fact scholarship on smallholder market access has been 
increasingly using the collective action framework (Markelova et al. 2009, Smith 
Lourenzani et al. 2009 , Fischer et al. 2011) and the promotion of farmer collective 
action has gained popularity for supporting smallholder market access as a 
response to transformation of the agri-food system and emergence of GVCs. 
(Narrod et al. 2009)   
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 “Social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable collective 
action”.41  According to Putnam (2001), the central idea of social capital is that 
networks and the norms of reciprocity associated with them, have value.  Ostrom 
(2007) goes a step further in articulating not only that social capital consists of 
networks, but also highlighting trustworthiness and institutions leading to trust 
as elements of social capital which together enable collective action.  In other 
words social capital contribute to collective action through enhanced trust, trust 
being the core link.  Krishna (2002) suggests that while social capital may 
predispose individuals to cooperate and social networks can facilitate 
cooperation, certain types of actions, especially those that require the 
engagement of the external environment, also require the mediation of issue 
specific agencies.  According to Krishna (2002) “social capital is an asset that 
remains latent until agents activate this stock and use it to produce a flow of 
benefits.”  Such agency is needed in particular when “middle level institutions”, 
such as unions, interest groups, etc., are weak, a common problem in developing 
                                                     
41 World Bank; 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTTSO
CIALCAPITAL/0,,print:Y~isCURL:Y~contentMDK:20642703~menuPK:401023~pagePK:148956~pi
PK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html 
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countries. (Krishna 2002) In addition, according to Mayer (2014), a fundamental 
obstacle facing those who are trying to move a community to act collectively is 
the construction of a common interest.    
Various forms of social capital contribute to successful collective action by 
increasing trust. Trust increases when the people involved are trustworthy and 
are networked with each other (Ostrom, et.al. 2007).  However it has also been 
shown that cooperation can be sustained in large networks where individuals do 
not have regular face to face contact via the bridging form of social capital, 
especially when it is combined with the bonding form that relies on interpersonal 
relationships. (Krishna 2002)  Furthermore, institutions may create rules that 
incentivizes trustworthy behavior by establishing rewards and punishments and 
thus have the ability to enhance trust.  (Ostrom, et.al. 2007).   
When it comes to agricultural POs, a form of institution, it is through 
collective action, through PO participation and the collective use of facilities, 
equipment and services that farmers can maximize the collective benefits gained 
from small-scale farming.  (Markelova et al, 2009)  But social capital can be fragile 
in POs (Svendsen 2004). Case studies from around the world attribute the 
success of some cooperatives to the presence of trust and social capital.  (Szabo 
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2009, Wambugu 2009, Chloupkova 2003)  For example Fischer et.al. (2011) 
studied the intensity of smallholder banana producers’ PO participation in 
Kenya and found that PO size has a negative influence on the quantity members 
sell to the PO, which they attribute to the weakening of social ties and increasing 
monitoring  challenges (and thus risk of side-selling) as POs grow. 
An FAO policy brief found that decline in social capital hinders farmer 
groups in Africa and agriculture (FAO, 2010).  Some NGOs, such as BRAC and 
Heifer International, has used various techniques to foster social capital when 
promoting the establishment of producer organizations.42  Nilsson et.al. (2012) 
attribute the transformation of many traditional cooperatives over the last 20 
years to the weakening trust of cooperative members in each other and in the 
cooperative with increasing vertical and horizontal integration.   
The existing literature on POs offer several insights on the role of trust.  
First, trust and collective action tends to work better in smaller groups in general 
(Olson 1965, Ostrom 2007), representing an additional challenge when POs 
                                                     
42 An example is Heifer international’s “Passing on the Gift” program.  Heifer helps individuals 
and families by gifting them livestock and agricultural inputs and by providing training on livestock 
management.  Once those Heifer recipients rear the next generation of livestock, they ceremonially gift one 
of the livestocks to another family in need.  Thus the original gift recipient becomes a donor, offering great 
dignity and pride and supporting social capital.  
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attempt to grow, which is essential in most cases for their ability to access 
modern markets.  Trust is key for coordination and control in farmer 
organizations (Borgen 2000) and low farmer organization rate is often attributed 
to the lack of trust and social cohesion among farmers (FAO/CAPRI 2007, Hellin 
et. al. 2009, Markelova 2009, Blandon et. al. 2009, Regoverning Markets 2008, 
Fischer et.al. 2011).43  According to Borgen (2001), in the case of cooperatives, 
conditions for interpersonal trust-building are no longer in place as cooperatives 
grow, especially with increased heterogeneity and information asymmetry.   
Borgen’s study of Norwegian cooperatives highlighted that “trust is demanding 
to build but can easily vanish”. He also emphasized that the “conditions for 
trust-making” are much more demanding in large scale organizations with 
heterogeneous mix of members, locations and preferences. In the meantime 
maintaining farmers’ trust of the organization is increasingly important because 
of the asymmetry between farmers and the organization in terms of access to 
information.  Schulze et. al. (2008) studies small supplier commitment from the 
                                                     
43 For example, low levels of farmer participation in POs in Central Eastern Europe is in 
part attributed to the legacy of forced collectivization during the communist era and the low 
degree of trust and social capital in most farming communities (Regoverning markets 2008, Torok 
2009).   
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perspective of cooperative buyers in the German dairy sector, prompted by 
concern over the large number of farmer contract cancellations and violations.44  
Based  on a farmer survey the authors concluded that trust played the most 
important role in farmer commitment, more important than satisfaction, 
including satisfaction with the  price paid by the buyer.  One of the authors’ key 
recommendations was to invest in trust-building activities even if that will 
involve short term sacrifices in the price offered. 
Collective identity refers to unique group characteristics based on shared 
meanings, experiences and expectations around which group members coalesce 
(Mosimane et al. 2012). Collective identity is a widely used concept especially in 
the social scientific studies of social movements involving gender, 
multiculturalism, sexuality, ethnicity and nationalism, among others.  Polletta 
et.al. (2001) defined collective identity as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and 
emotional connections to the broader community, category, practice or 
institution.  It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be 
imagined rather than experienced directly, and is distinct from personal 
                                                     
44 The examples mentioned in the paper all involved cooperative buyers, including Campina and 
Nordmilch.  The German subsidiary of Campina list 500 of its 2,100 dairy farmer suppliers over the period 
studied. (Schulze 2008) 
 103 
 
identities, although it may form part of a personal identity. The collective 
identity may have been first constructed by outsiders, …, but it depends on some 
acceptance by those to whom it is applied.  Collective identities are expressed in 
cultural materials – names, narratives, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, clothing 
and so on – but not all cultural materials express collective identities… And 
unlike ideology, collective identity carries with it positive feelings for other 
members of the group”.  Mayer (2014) highlights the importance of collective 
identity for collective action.  He suggests that narrative is the essential human 
tool for collective action that helps construct a shared purpose and affirms 
identity. According to Zurcher et.al. (1981), the staying power of collective 
identity depends on members’ commitment, the extent to which individuals’ 
interest and world view becomes linked to the requirements and goals of the 
collective.  According to Blumer (1939), collective identity formulation should 
involve both informal interactions and the organizations of formal ceremonies 
and rituals.  The majority of the collective identity related social movement 
literature has been conceptual rather than empirical and most of the latter have 
been in the form of case studies. (Hunt, et.al. 2004) 
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“Collective identity is considered as both a necessary precursor and 
product of movement collective action”. (Hunt et.al. 2004)  Klandersman, et.al. 
(2002) demonstrated this empirically. Studying Dutch and Spanish farmer 
protest activities they found that a sense of collective identity stimulated a sense 
of preparedness, which led to protest participation, which in turn reinforced the 
collective identity.  A. Desmarais (2010) had consistent findings in a study of Via 
Campesina, the international peasant movement advocating family farm based 
sustainable agriculture and food sovereignty, showing that protest activities 
were driven by strong collective identity. 
 
The application of the “collective identity” concept in other areas have 
been more limited with almost no use of the concept in the literature about 
smallholder aggregation and producer organizations.  
Some studies found the importance of collective identity in the 
management of common pool resources. (Wade 1986, Mosimane et al. 2012)  As 
far as POs are concerned, Bijman, et.al. (2008) suggests that all POs are 
characterized by two principals: utility and identity.  “Utility” refers to 
participation in the PO being useful to farmers.  Identity, according to the 
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authors, refers to PO participants sharing a common history, geographical space 
and vision of the future for “themselves and for the group”, which in turn 
support continued cooperation.  Bijman et.al.’s interpretation of PO identity is 
thus passive, considered a given once a PO is formed.   
 The author of this paper was only able to identify a single study on the 
application of the concept of collective identity to farmer aggregation.  Borgen 
(2001) found in his study of Norwegian cooperatives that identification based 
trust plays an important role in maintaining member commitment in modern, 
large-scale cooperatives, in particular as group cohesion and trust weakens in 
growing organizations. 
 
2.11.2 Costs and Benefits of Aggregation for Farmers 
  
Collective marketing via aggregation improves the likelihood of being 
able to access modern markets otherwise unattainable for individual farmers, 
including in many cases higher value export markets (Markelova, et.al. 2009).  
Aggregation can provide information, knowledge, assets and services that would 
otherwise be unavailable to individual farmers.  However, participation comes at 
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a cost in terms of investments that need to be made, transaction costs of working 
via an aggregator, and the cost of operating in the formal sector rather than in the 
informal sector (Vorley et.al. 2012).   A key determinant as to whether farmers 
decide to participate in POs is whether they expected to receive net benefits from 
their participation.   
There is limited empirical evidence as to whether farmers experience 
income or livelihood improvement as a result of participating in an aggregation 
mechanism and that evidence is rather mixed.  The only large-scale study the 
author of this paper is aware of looked at POs across the EU and found that “On 
average, producers in the regions with very high organization rates have higher 
income than those in regions with low organization rates, but the results are not 
as clear in regions with a medium organization rate. “  (Agrosynergie, 2008). 
A survey of Ethiopian farmers found that PO participants achieved 7-9% 
higher prices for their crop than non-PO participants (Bernard et.al, 2010). 
However farmers raised the cost of participation as a major concern and the 
study did not quantify those costs. Nonetheless, it is probably fair to assume that 
continued participation by the majority of the farmers was evidence that they 
enjoyed net gains.  The authors pointed out, however, that the smallest farmers 
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self-excluded from participating because their returns from membership were 
lower than their costs.   
Nevertheless, there are numerous successful examples of farmer collective 
action and sustainable PO operations. Narrod et.al. (2009) documented the cases 
of successful farmer collective action in the Kenyan green bean industry and in 
the case of the Indian Mahagrapes45, both accessing high value export markets. 
Both cases involved cooperatives with considerable buyer as well as government 
and/or third party (NGO or donor) involvement that helped reduce the cost of 
PO services, consistent with the conclusions of the Monitor study.  Please see 
section 2.8.2 on cooperatives for additional examples of successful POs 
documented in the literature. 
The Monitor Group examined several smallholder farmer aggregation 
models in Sub-Saharan Africa as part of the “Market Based Solutions to Poverty 
in Africa Project (2012)”.46 Monitor found that each of the aggregator models they 
                                                     
45 Maharagrapes is a marketing firm associated with several cooperatives of grape producers. 
46 The models included (i)agro-dealers that purchase smallholder output and/or provide 
transportation services to smallholders; (ii) grain handling and storage operations that offers 
warehousing, trade and marketing services to smallholders; (iii) an NGO owned marketing firm 
that acts as buyer and broker for cash and staple crops and provides market access to 
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analyzed achieved significant income enhancement for participating farmers.  
However no model succeeded without the involvement of or stable access to a 
strong buyer.  Monitor also found that the aggregator models could be 
financially sustainable, albeit their margins were very thin and volatile.  The 
study made a key observation for the field: farmers enjoyed increased net benefit 
from participation with additional value-added services received from the 
aggregators, however such additional services did not improve aggregators’ 
profitability.  This finding suggests that aggregators may have to carefully chose 
the services they offer in order to maintain or grow farmer participation (for 
which services are essential in order to ensure net benefit to farmers) on one 
hand and keep services to a minimum on the other in order to minimize the 
aggregator’s own costs. 
                                                     
 
smallholders; (iv) industrial maze aggregator that provides inputs as well as advisory services to 
small farmers and guarantees a market for their products.   
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2.12 PO Services 
The previous section highlighted the great importance of services 
provided both for the aggregator’s operation as well as for net farmer benefit 
from PO participation as PO services can help smallholders overcome some of 
the barriers of entry to accessing modern markets.  Indicating the importance of 
services, one of three criteria for the EU to grant PO status to an aggregator is 
that it has to “prove its utility by the scope and efficiency of the services offered 
to members.”47  However aggregators’ mixed incentives in providing services to 
farmers, on one hand helping ensure farmer participation, on the other wanting 
to minimize related expenses in a line of business already characterized by very 
thin and volatile margins, highlights the need to better understand what services 
may be most important for POs to provide. 
Because of the primary importance of privately held assets (such as 
livestock, soil quality, productive technologies, etc.) when it comes to barriers to 
modern market access (Barrett 2008, Boughton et al., in press; Cadot et al.,2006; 
Minten and Barrett, submitted for publication), most POs attempt to serve 
                                                     
47 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/fruit-and-vegetables/producer-organisations/index_en.htm 
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farmers with services that primarily support private goods. Table 5 summarizes 
the key types of services identified in the literature that fall into nine categories.  
Production and marketing related services are the most common among POs.  
Production related services help address input purchase and risk management 
related disadvantages faced by small farmers and usually involve input 
provision, often according to the specific needs of buyers, and the coordination 
of production among producers both in terms of crops and timing in order to try 
to best harmonize PO members’ collective production with the expected demand 
in the market.  Marketing services help address the economies of scale related 
smallholder disadvantages through collective transports, storage, market 
analysis, processing, branding and certification, among others, and thus help 
address market knowledge and output markets related small farmer barriers. 
Technology services make engineering and scientific solutions available to 
farmers that help address technical knowledge, risk management, product 
traceability and quality assurance related barriers and improve productivity.  
This may involve the research & development, dissemination and training 
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related to new crop varieties and production and marketing related 
technologies.48  Financial services involve PO financing to participant farmers, 
usually complementing other services offered, in order address the barriers faced 
by smallholders in accessing capital.  For example PO financing alongside 
technology services allow farmer to invest in farm productivity, efficiency or risk 
management improvements.  Educational services can help address smallholder 
barriers in several areas and may include core farm operation related training 
and information provision (such as extension services, business or financial 
literacy training) as well as non-farming specific training and information such as 
those related to health, nutrition, clean water and sanitation.  Welfare services 
include social safety net services usually focused on the most disadvantaged PO 
participants or those suffering some temporary hardship and thus can fulfill a 
role in addressing the risk management related disadvantages faced by 
smallholders.  Resource management services may involve the handling and 
coordination of activities related to common goods like water, pasture, fisheries 
and forests or farm specific resource management such as services related to soil 
                                                     
48 With climate change this technology dissemination is an increasingly important service that POs 
can provide even when they include simple technologies like drip irrigation, green houses, tunnels and hail 
protection. 
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conservation, water and energy use which can also help contribute to improved 
smallholder risk management.  Organizational services are aimed at building 
institutional systems and capacity that supports transparency and thus farmer 
collective action and policy advocacy involves awareness raising and lobbying 
activities. 
                                     Table 5. PO services 
TYPES OF SERVICES EXAMPLES OF PO ACTIVITIES 
Organizational Organizing farmers, supporting collective 
action, internal systems, institutional capacity 
building 
Production Input provision, facilitation and coordination of 
production 
Marketing Transport, storage, marketing, processing, 
market information and analysis, branding, 
certification 
Financial Savings, loans and other forms of credit, 
financial management 
Technology Education, extension, research 
Education Business skills, health, production 
Welfare Social safety nets 
Resource management  Water, pasture, fisheries, forests, soil 
conservation 
Policy advocacy  
Source: Hellin et.al. 2009, Markelova et.al. 2009, Narrod et al 2009, Rondot and 
Collion 2007 
 
 113 
 
The range and types of services vary considerably across POs.  Some POs, 
for example the fairly common marketing cooperatives, focus on a single service 
type sometimes with as few as one or two specific services (for example sorting 
and collective sales activity in case of marketing cooperatives).   At the other end 
of the spectrum there are POs that offer a wide range of different services and 
may even have explicit social and environmental missions in addition to 
economic.   
 The literature on PO services, including several farmer surveys, 
appears to confirm the importance of PO services in farmers’ PO participation 
decisions. Receiving services have been shown to increase farmer loyalty and 
mitigate the side-selling risk (Ecom, 2012). However, the literature is nearly silent 
about whether some services may be more important than others.  The only 
study that the author is aware of that investigated the importance of various 
services is Keystone’s “Voice of the Farmer” survey (2012).  The study is based 
on the survey of approximately 1,000 coffee farmers in Nicaragua that supply 
coffee trader ECOM.  Among others, farmers were asked to rank the top 3 
services they consider most important.  The services highest ranked by farmers 
were financing, farm visits (extension services) and training.  See Table 6 for 
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more detail.  However, it is unclear to what extent these findings can be 
generalized for other forms of aggregators, sectors and countries. 
 
Table 6: Farmer evaluation of services 
 
 
As Monitor’s (2012) findings highlight, however, POs need to choose 
carefully what services to offer that most benefit their members and the collective 
objectives of the organization.   
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2.13 Role of Finance 
Historically smallholders’ finance need was met to a great extent by local 
informal lenders, often input vendors, who were familiar with the farmers.  
(Frederico, 2000)  The decline of such informal financial systems has not been 
accompanied by the emergence of any systematic alternative, contributing to a 
significant market failure in the area of smallholder finance, with only about one 
percent of the market need currently met (Dalberg 2012).   
 
2.13.1 History of Smallholder Finance 
 G. Frederico’s economic history of agriculture about the period between 
1800 and 2000 highlights the importance of access to capital in agriculture 
throughout the past 200 years.  According to Frederico (2000) while capital need 
is common for the entire economy, agriculture is different in its seasonality, in 
the fact that the same party (farmer) needs capital for both production and 
consumption and resorts to the same institutions with those needs.  Unlike in 
other sectors, demand for capital can vary significantly and unpredictably from 
year to year.  Frederico also highlights that since few agricultural businesses can 
raise money through the capital markets, most have to resort to credit.  However, 
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the sources of credit have also differed from other types of enterprises.  Larger 
and richer farmers have had access to formal financial institutions like banks, 
leasing or insurance companies.  The vast majority of farmers, however, have 
had to raise the capital they need through the informal market.  Moneylenders 
and pawnshops have historically been common in areas with independent 
family farms, according to Frederico.  It was also common practice for landlords 
to provide financing to tenants in relation to ongoing expenses. Merchants and 
vendors pre-financed sales and financed machinery, respectively. The basis of 
the informal financial system was familiarity with the borrower.  In fact the 
informal lender was typically an insider in the community and had much better 
information about the “bankability” of the borrower than formal financial 
institutions. In the 19th century financial intermediation mechanisms developed 
whereby landlords or merchants borrowed funds from formal financial 
institutions to onlend the funds at a higher rate to farmers. (Frederico, 2009) 
According to a World Bank survey, in 197049  informal credit represented 
72% of the total credit extended to agriculture in Asia, 63% in the Middle East, 
                                                     
49 More recent data was not available. While outdated, this information illustrates agriculture’s 
high degree of reliance on informal credit markets. 
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72% in Africa and 15% in Latin America (but with a note that this last figure may 
be underestimated (Wai 1977). Concerns about informal financial markets center 
around its high cost and potentially exploitative nature, which is confirmed by 
the limited data available and by anecdotal evidence.   
As a result, governments around the world set up formal, often state-
owned, financial institutions for financing agriculture or created incentives (and 
in some case requirements), for formal private financial institutions to extend 
credit to farmers. (To this day this practice continues in many countries).   The 
results have been mixed at best, with significant leakages, corruption and 
inefficiencies as well as nonperforming assets in some cases, in part because such 
formal financial institutions did not have the insider familiarity with the farmers 
and government involvement in financing created moral hazard.  These results 
led to the withdrawal of the state from providing subsidized financing to small 
farmers in most developing countries which has not been replaced by the private 
sector, leading to a market failure in the area of rural finance (Kherallah, 2001). 
Most commercial financial intermediaries shy away from agricultural 
lending due to a combination of what they consider to be high risk and low 
profitability.    
 118 
 
2.13.2 Forms of Smallholder Finance 
 
KIT/IIRR (2010) differentiated three forms of finance with potential to 
benefit smallholders: 
1. Chain liquidity involves short-term loans to smallholders from buyers 
(advance payment) or suppliers (input purchase on credit).  
2. Agricultural finance involves short or long term financing from formal 
financial intermediaries directly to farmers or producer organizations or 
to a value chain actor that on-lends to farmers.  Agriculture finance relies 
heavily on hard collateral.   
3.   Value chain finance has evolved in response to the lack of available 
financing sources, leveraging business relationships within a value chain, 
building on the value chain’s systemic character.  Value chain finance has 
several advantages over other forms of agriculture finance when it comes 
to smallholders. Value chain actors tend to have better knowledge of 
producers, the risks and profitability of their operations and have the 
opportunity to bundle financing with other activities (commodity flow, 
input supply, extension services, off-take contract, etc.) that can help 
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reduce credit risk and transaction cost.  Despite some of these advantages, 
value chain finance does face limitations, especially in terms of its ability 
to control loan default in the case of side-selling and diversion of the 
proceeds to other farmer needs.  Therefore financial intermediaries are 
generally reluctant to engage in value chain lending and non-financial 
players (such as off-takers and input providers) rarely want to take on the 
role of the financier and prefer to concentrate on their core business.  
(GPFI, et.al. 2011)   The global demand for smallholder agriculture finance 
is estimated at $450 billion, a significant market. (Dalberg 2012).  Value 
chain finance has a strong potential to take advantage of this market 
opportunity but it also has a significant limitation; it requires farmers to be 
aggregated into POs. At current levels of farmer aggregation Dalberg 
(2012) estimated the addressable demand for financing at $22 billion, 
which is expected to increase by another $11 billion if another 5% of 
farmers were to get organized into POs.  In addition, Dalberg (2012) found 
that many of the key barriers to smallholder financing, namely low levels 
of farmer organization, financial literacy, collateral and productivity, 
could be addressed through POs. 
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 In reality, there is very little financing available in most markets 
that benefit smallholders, which is why governments continue to 
implement costly special programs that too often do not accomplish their 
intentions (Federico, 2009).  For example in some rural areas of Mexico as 
little as 2.5% of the population has access to formal credit (World Bank, 
2010).  
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3. Model of GVC Relevant Aggregation 
This chapter proposes a theoretical model of how producer organizations 
can help smallholders achieve access to GVCs and thus provide them an 
opportunity to supply growing modern markets.  The model outlines the 
necessary elements of Global Value Chain Relevant Aggregation (GVCRA): the 
collective action problem faced by smallholders (Section 3.1.1) and collective 
identity considerations (3.1.2), bounded rationality (3.1.3) and farmers’ cost 
benefit analysis (3.1.4) and assessment of aggregator types (3.1.5) when 
considering PO participation.  Figure 6 below outlines the pieces of the model. 
 
Figure 6: Model of GVC Relevant Aggregation 
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There is significant empirical evidence in the form of case studies that 
suggest that participation in both buyer and producer driven value chains can 
benefit smallholders (Lee, et.al. 2012) but that in most cases GVC participation 
requires some form of aggregation.  However, it is also clear from the literature 
that PO participation in and of itself does not guarantee GVC access which, in 
turn, contributes to low farmer interest in joining POs.    While there is 
considerable suggestive evidence, especially from case studies, a theoretical 
model that can articulate the link between farmer aggregation and GVC access 
has been lacking. Hence is this effort to propose a model of  “GVC Relevant 
Aggregation” (GVCRA). 
      
The conditions of GVC and modern market access and the motivations of 
GVC actors for engaging with smallholders have been outlined in section 2.  In 
this section a model of GVC relevant aggregation (“GVCRA”) will be proposed 
that aims to contribute to an improved understanding of the PO characteristics 
that can contribute to smallholders’ GVC access.   
 
 
 123 
 
The model has the following components:  
1. Farmer decision about PO participation is modeled based on the 
combination of two different conceptual frameworks.  First, collective 
action theory and the concepts of trust and collective identity are 
applied.  Second, bounded rationality based cost-benefit analysis is 
applied to farmer decision-making in the context established according 
to the trust and collective identity based framework.  These 
considerations will influence farmers’ evaluation of PO types and the 
value of services and activities carried out by POs and thus the 
ultimate decision of PO participation. 
2. A modification is recommended to the cooperative-IOF dichotomy of 
PO types by introducing the hybrid type of POs that combine both 
cooperative and IOF characteristics.  The GVCRA model suggests that 
PO structures influence the alignment of incentives between farmers 
and POs, farmer decision about participation and farmers’ likelihood 
of behavior that can undermine collective action.   
3.   Based on the conceptual framework outlined, in particular the 
bounded rationality based cost-benefit analysis, the GVCRA model 
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suggests that PO services are important for farmers’ continued PO 
participation and to mitigate the risk of side-selling and thus for POs to 
scale and achieve GVC access. 
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3.1 Farmer Decision about participation 
 
3.1.1 Collective action problem 
 
At the core of this paper’s conceptual framework is the collective action 
problem faced by smallholders.  It is through collective action, through PO 
participation and the collective use of facilities, equipment and services that 
farmers can maximize the collective benefits they gain from small-scale farming.  
However, farmers face a collective action problem.  Their short-term individual 
benefit may be maximized via side-selling and free-riding.   
Side-selling can be considered an assurance game problem. It involves 
farmers side-selling their products to third parties to maximize their income from 
a single transaction in violation of their agreement with the PO and therefore 
undermining the PO’s ability to meet its contractual obligations, which can have 
severe operational and financial consequences for the PO both in the short and 
long term, especially when modern or global value chains are involved.  The 
immediate consequences include financial penalties for not meeting contractual 
obligations and finance costs for borrowing funds to purchase needed crops on 
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the spot market while long term implications include undermining relationships 
with buyers, losing contracts, deteriorating reputation and weakening 
financially, as the case studies will illustrate.  These consequences of side-selling 
also undermine single farmers’ ability to maximize their income in the long run 
via stable collective action.  Key to this assurance game problem is the scale of 
side-selling.  Farmers recognize the positive prospects of stable collective action.  
However if they suspect that other farmers will side-sell in large enough 
numbers that may undermine the return from stable collective action then they 
will side-sell to maximize their individual returns from a given transaction.  
Another form of collective action problem in POs involve free-riding.  One 
form of free-riding involves farmers’ taking advantage of PO services but not 
delivering the crops committed in term of quantity (side-selling) or only 
delivering poor quality crops.  The latter involves farmers selling the poorest 
quality products to the PO and selling their best quality produce at the spot 
market, thus deteriorating the overall product quality of the PO and 
undermining its ability to secure favorable future contracts.    
Monitoring and sanctions are an important mitigation strategy for the 
above collective action problems but often not feasible in case of smallholders.  
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The PO may lack the technical resources for monitoring, the political will for 
sanctions may be weak1 or the problem so widespread that sanctions are no 
longer an option.  
 
3.1.2 Collective Identity 
Borgen (2001) also found, however, that members’ identification with 
their cooperative can be a significant trust-making mechanism (Ole Borgen 2001). 
Collective identity is an “individual’s cognitive, moral and emotional connection 
with a broader community, category, practice or institution. It is a perception of a 
shared status or relation which may be imagined rather than experienced 
directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a 
personal identity.” (Polletta, et.al. 2001).   
Collective identity is mostly discussed in the literature the context of 
social movements.  However, based on the interviews carried out for this 
research, we hypothesize that collective identity may offer some valuable 
insights into the relationship between farmers and POs.  “Agriculture is not just 
                                                     
1 Especially in the case of cooperatives where all participants, including free riders, participate with 
equal vote in the governance. 
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about products, value chains and quantities. It is a way of life”, said Mamadou 
Cissokho2 in a recent speech, stressing the importance of collective identity. 
In contrast with Bijman et.al.’s assertion that POs possess a shared identity 
as a general characteristic and implying that it is a passive PO attribute, 
interviews carried out as part of this research reflected a high degree of variation 
in collective identity among POs.  Nilsson et. al.’s attribution of the success of  
Japanese and Norwegian cooperatives in part to their ability to have the 
cooperative experience influence farmers’ self-identification also suggests that 
collective identity is not a passive characteristic but can be actively influenced. 
Examples of collective identity building activities may include sponsorship of 
local community events and organizations, including support for youth groups 
and sport teams, and projects and activities that elevate the status of food 
production and farming.  
 
An important mechanism for influencing the collective identity and 
farmers’ identification with that is through narratives.3  Shared narratives are not 
                                                     
2 Honorary President of ROPPA (Network of Farmers’ and Agricultural Producers’ 
Organisations of West Africa).  Source: MEETING THE GROWING DEMAND FOR FOOD IN 
AFRICA Summary report, 2013)   
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simply the consequence of being in a community but they help constitute a 
collective identity that supports collective action (Mayer 2014).  Shared narrative 
in case of POs focus on elevating the dignity of farming and the rural lifestyle, 
and manifest itself in PO projects and initiatives which I will collectively refer to 
as “Collective Identity Activities” or “CIA”. 
 
Hypothesis 1: “collective identity narratives”, manifesting themselves in 
Collective Identity Activities, play an important role in facilitating the growth 
and competitiveness of POs. 
 
 
                                                     
 
3 The process of interviewing POs revealed considerable PO efforts in some cases around 
improving the dignity of farming and rural livelihoods, with narrative (on PO websites, in media 
interviews and in the author’s interviews) that supports the creation of a collective identity 
around the values of high quality production, local traditions, commitment to the development of 
the local community (including supporting local athletes/teams and youth sports), and elevating 
the appreciation for and dignity of farming, among others.  
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3.1.3  Bounded rationality  
For purposes of this dissertation it is assumed that farmers are bounded 
rational, that they assess the costs and benefits of PO participation based on 
imperfect information available to them and use heuristics and other processing 
shortcuts to make decisions about their participation in POs.  Farmers’ 
assessments of the probability of the benefits materializing will be influenced by 
their social networks and trust towards other relevant economic actors. 
Bounded rationality as a framework departs from global rationality in that 
bounded rational behavior is compatible with the access to information and 
assessment capacity possessed by the decision maker (Simon, 1955).  According 
to Simon (1956), theories of bounded rationality can be generated by relaxing 
some of the assumptions of utility theory (Savage 1954); namely that choices are 
made (i) among a given, fixed set of alternatives, (ii) with (subjectively) known 
probability distributions, and (iii) to maximize the expected value.   
In recent years the bounded rationality framework has been applied to 
better our understanding of farmer behavior in situations involving change away 
from the status quo.  In particular, the bounded rationality framework has been 
used to explain farmer hesitation to switch to organic production (Brock, et.al. 
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2013) and to change their house bank (Musshoff, et.al 2009), despite seemingly 
attractive financial rewards.   
This approach recognizes both farmer internal constraints (cognitive 
limitations or biases) as well as external constraints (farmers’ lack of access to 
complete information, at least partially unpredictable benefits from PO 
participation, etc).  Accordingly, this work builds on the idea that farmers’ 
choices and decisions about market channels and behaviors (including side-
selling) exhibit bounded rationality with cognitive biases influenced by their 
social networks and limitations of the information available to farmers.    
In particular, I propose that farmers’ cost benefit analysis is carried out 
within the framework of bounded rationality.  
 
3.1.4  Cost-benefit analysis and PO services 
 
When it comes to the farmers’ assessment of potential PO participation, 
the farmer needs to evaluate the likely net benefit of PO participation. This 
involves assessing the costs of participation including entry fees, cost of meeting 
PO requirements, cost of transitioning into the formal sector and possible delay 
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in receiving payment against the expected benefits of participation, including the 
value of services received, savings on inputs and price premium on sales.  While 
most of the costs of participation are reasonably certain at the time of the 
farmer’s decision and many occurs immediately or soon after the farmer decides 
to participate.  The value of benefits, on the other hand, can be more difficult to 
predict.  Where the PO will sell the farmers’ products and any price premium is 
nearly impossible to estimate and farmers’ cannot be certain of those benefits 
until a few days prior, or sometimes even after, the delivery of their harvested 
products. Farmers’ assessment is further complicated by the additional layer of 
uncertainty related to the likelihood of the PO’s participation in modern 
markets/GVCs.  Therefore, based on availability heuristics, farmers are likely to 
put significant weight on the reasonably tangible and predictable benefits of PO 
services in their assessment of PO participation.   
Therefore services offered need to go beyond the basic marketing oriented 
services (sorting, storage, cold storage, packaging, collective marketing) and also 
include one or more of the following: 
• information and knowledge services,  
• collective input acquisition, 
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•  equipment use and other collective services relevant for the aggregator,  
• innovation related services such as developing and testing new crop 
varieties, technologies, branding, etc. 
• access to finance 
These services help reduce farmers’ risk and costs, achieve the quality, quantity 
and attributes required by modern value chains on an ongoing basis, and 
improve both productivity and efficiency and thus the chances that farmers can 
collectively find markets  and favorable terms for their products.   
This leads to hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: Services, including access to financing for farmers, 
provided by POs play an important role in facilitating scaling. 
 
3.1.5 PO Types 
The existing literature differentiates two predominant types of POs, 
cooperatives and IOFs. (See Section 2.8) Cooperatives are organized by 
producers to materialize benefits from some collective activity such as 
production, input sourcing, marketing, value added activities, information and 
know-how acquisition, etc.  Cooperative formation may be assisted, or even 
initiated, by third parties such as NGOs but cooperative members make 
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decisions based on a democratic process (see section 2.8 for more detail) and thus 
by their very structure require significant farmer collective action.   
IOFs are typically initiated by offtakers or investors and the relationship 
with the majority4 of the smallholders involved usually take the form of contract 
farming as buyers of agricultural inputs aggregate smallholder production in 
order to meet their specific supply need usually based on strictly defined 
requirements and standards.  IOFs’ decision-making is motivated by the interest 
of their shareholders, which is usually to maximize shareholders’ wealth.  
Therefore smallholder collective action has more limited importance in IOFs than 
in cooperatives and monitoring and sanctioning of side-selling behavior tends to 
be very strict. 
A third category of PO types, hybrids, will be proposed in this 
dissertation. Hybrid aggregation involves partnership between a group of 
formally organized smallholder producers (often organized as a cooperative but 
not necessarily) and either a larger farmer or medium size processor/buyer 
(organized as an IOF) whereby there is structural alignment of incentives based 
                                                     
4 Smallholders or farmers may also be investors but most smallholders do not have investor 
relationship with the PO in the case of IOFs. 
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on mutual dependence for market access and competitiveness.   Activities and 
decisions are driven by the joint interest of the partners and are less dependent 
on smallholder collective action.  
It is hypothesized that, in line with Borgen’s findings, cooperatives are the 
most vulnerable among PO types when it comes to scaling and GVC access.   
  
Hypothesis 3: Cooperatives are at a disadvantage compared to other PO 
forms in achieving the conditions necessary for GVC access. 
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4. Empirical Evidence 
 
To evaluate the model developed in the previous chapter, both qualitative 
and quantitative methods are used.  Much of the evidence is based on material 
collected in Hungary during multiple visits between 2008 and 2014 including in-
depth interviews with farmers, producer organizations, officials of the 
association of vegetable and fruit producers, interest groups, buyer 
organizations, government officials, the head of agriculture lending and 
agriculture specialists at the primary financier of producer organizations and 
development agency officials. In addition, a database of all Hungarian 
recognized POs was assembled for the quantitative analysis from multiple data 
and government sources, websites and structured interviews which. 
Complementing the quantitative analysis of all Hungarian recognized 
POs are two case-studies which are based on in-depth interviews with the 
general manager of the producer organizations, interviews with various relevant 
stakeholders including PO employees, farmers, financiers and government 
officials and existing literature.   
 137 
 
The hypotheses are also tested on data of aggregators from Honduras, 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Peru, an analysis that is further informed by 
interviews carried out with personnel from cooperative union organization, 
NGOs and financiers.   
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4.1 Hungary 
There are several considerations that led to the selection of Hungary for 
the empirical analysis.  First of all, it is very difficult to obtain data on POs, 
especially in emerging economies, which is why most PO studies focus on case 
studies or sample based approached.   In Hungary the Ministry of Rural 
Development set up an office dedicated to PO matters, in addition to a recent 
change that made the annual reports of all Hungarian economic entities available 
via a searchable database, making it possible to obtain information and collect 
data on every single recognized PO in Hungary to study the entire population of 
recognized POs.  This is also supported by the EU’s classification of fruit and 
vegetable POs which makes it feasible to track recognized POs. 
Second, Hungary’s mix of farm sizes is similar to many of the least 
developed countries: a relatively small number of large producers and a large 
number of small producers. Third, the PO definition used by the EU policy is 
unique in that it is not limited to cooperatives but includes aggregators of 
smallholders regardless of their legal structure.  This provides a unique 
opportunity to study non-cooperative forms of POs and compare their 
performance to that of cooperatives.   
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4.1.1 Background 
Hungary’s land ownership structure, policy support framework and the 
importance of horticulture for the livelihood of the rural poor and for the 
country’s overall economy provides an opportunity to study smallholder 
aggregation and to test the GVC relevant aggregation model . 
Hungary has 158 agricultural producers with land of more than 2,500 
hectares1 and over 500,000 small producers of 10 hectares or less, a structure 
similar to many least developed countries and unlike most of its peers in the 
European Union as illustrated in Figure 7. 
                                                     
1 Source: Agricultural Statistical Yearbook 2012 
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Figure 7. Distribution of farms by land size, 1997.  
(Source: Author prepared) 
 
Hungary has favorable natural conditions and a long tradition in fruit and 
vegetable production.  However, competition from imported fruits and 
vegetables have been intensifying.  Hungarian fruit and vegetable exports have 
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remained stable over the past 15 years but imports have doubled during the 
same period, from imports representing less than half of the export volume in 
1997-2000 to more than three quarters in 2007-2010.  
Approximately half of the national fruit and vegetable consumption is in 
fresh form while the other half is in frozen and processed forms (FruitVeb, 2012).  
EU production amounted to 61.3 million tons of fruits and 65.8 million tons of 
vegetables while Hungary produced a mere 0.8 million tons of fruit and 1.4 
million tons of vegetables2.  Despite its seemingly small size in the global context, 
in Hungary fruit and vegetables is the third most important agricultural sub-
sector in terms of output and the top one in terms of its exports.     
In 2012, fruits were produced on 77,013 hectares while vegetables on 
55,233 hectares.  The fruit and vegetable sector provided approx. 12% of the 
agricultural value produced, on 3% of the land.  Approx. two thirds of this value 
came from vegetable production and the remainder from fruit production. Based 
on 2010 data, ninety nine percent of the 91,731 fruit producers are smallholders, 
with average smallholder farm size of 0.62 hectares in comparison with average 
                                                     
2 According to the FAO, global production of fruits was 637.9 million tons and 1,088 tons 
for vegetables in 2011 
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large holding of 25 hectares.  Similarly, 98% of the 25,671 vegetable farmers were 
smallholders, in their case with average land size of 1.22 hectares in comparison 
with large holding producing on average land size of 51.2 hectares (2012 Report 
to the EU by Euriditio).     
According to the Hungarian Vegetable-Fruit Sector Strategy by the 
Ministry of Rural Development (FruitVeb 2012), the development of the fruit and 
vegetable sector is an important national priority driven by sustainable rural 
development and employment creation objectives.  According to the strategy, the 
fruit and vegetable sector has the potential to become the most competitive 
among agricultural subsectors in Hungary and thus become well positioned to 
take advantage of growing international demand. However, the report also 
highlights that one of the key challenges faced is that despite Hungary’s 
favorable natural endowments, producers do not produce the quality and 
quantity demanded in the international markets. Currently approximately 50% 
of the production is exported. The ratio of fresh vs. processed is 60:40 but 
demand is shifting toward fresh produce.  Modern irrigation is essential for 
market driven horticultural production, not to mention irrigation’s importance as 
risk mitigation especially with changing weather patterns related to climate 
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change.  Only approximately 20% of Hungarian horticultural production is 
irrigated despite the country’s favorable conditions both in terms of surface and 
ground water resources available, making this one of the key focus areas for 
development (FruitVeb 212).  Another key area for development is controlled 
environment horticulture.  Production in green houses and tunnels need to be 
increased to facilitate more year-around production capacity and in order to be 
able to meet the requirements of modern markets as timely production and 
harvest is increasingly difficult with weather related uncertainties.  Currently 
green house and tunnel production is carried out on 3,500 hectares, 85% of which 
are considered outdated. Hungary’s geothermal energy sources offer a cost 
effective and sustainable heat source for green houses and tunnels.  Even though 
Hungary’s conditions for geothermal applications in the fruit and vegetable 
sector is considered one of the best in the world (FruitVeb 2012), only 6-8% of 
green house and tunnel production uses geothermal heat sources currently.  
Access to finance is a key barrier to the expansion of irrigation, controlled 
environment horticulture and the use of geothermal energy.   
The fruit and vegetable market is dominated by modern retail chains, 
accounting for 54% of vegetable and 56% of fruit purchases (Domjan, 2013).  The 
 144 
 
market concentration in the retail sector is significant with the five largest 
retailers representing 69% and the ten largest representing 93% of the market 
(Domjan, 2013).  
A survey of retail chains operating in Hungary (Seres, Kerteszet3 2010a,b), 
found that retailers had three related objectives when it came to sourcing fruits 
and vegetables: first, to cut out middle-men from their supply chains, increase 
margins and reduce the number of suppliers they were sourcing from.  The 
survey also found that retail chains resort to importing fruits and vegetables if 
they cannot source a product domestically in the quantity and quality desired.  
The study revealed that retailers considered domestically sourced fruits and 
vegetables better tasting and more fresh than import sources, however preferred 
imports from the perspectives of easier planning, better reliability and producer 
attitude towards side-selling.  When it comes to volumes, they reported that 
domestic suppliers often struggle to meet larger contracts, especially at times of 
advertised “specials” which can involve as much as up to eight times the regular 
purchase volumes.  In addition, the Hungarian season is relatively short and few 
                                                     
3 The Hungarian horticulture sector’s weekly professional publication. 
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producers have all-year production capacity. Uniformity and high quality on an 
ongoing basis was indicated as another concern with domestic suppliers.  Many 
retailers, especially the foreign owned ones, also highlighted the importance of 
suppliers meeting their cleaning, sorting, packaging and labeling requirements.  
In terms of side-selling, retailers reported that when the spot market price 
exceeds the contractual price, it is not infrequent for domestic suppliers to violate 
their contracts with retailers and sell their products on the spot market.   
Seres et.al (2010a,b) also found that retail chains have 2-6 suppliers for 
each product, driven by the desire to diversify and avoid dependence on any 
single supplier.  The retailers reportedly do not differentiate between large 
producers and POs of smallholders, as long as they are willing and able to meet 
the retailers’ requirements.  Retailers, however, highlighted the disconnect with 
POs in that POs often prefer to trade in multiple fruits and vegetables while 
retailers prefer more specialized suppliers which can supply 3-5 products in 
large quantities.  The survey also highlighted the limited branding undertaken 
by POs to help emphasize their products’ attributes and origin. 
Some small farmers have succeeded in establishing direct relationships 
with buyers in the form of contract farming, in particular in the area of highly 
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perishable and niche products which are sourced in small quantities at a time, 
such as herbs (Seres, 2011).  However that is the exception rather than the rule.  
Beside those few exceptional cases, the only possible opportunity for 
smallholders to supply modern markets is through aggregation (Hanf, et.al.).  
However, studies observed that POs tend to have more problem meeting 
retailers’ quantity requirements in general, which is also influenced by POs’ 
difficulties dealing with side-selling which in turn can lead to the violation of 
their contracts with retailers (Seres et.al 2010a,b). 
As far as POs are concerned, the EU’s and thus Hungary’s policy on POs 
is unique in that in its definition POs4 include all farmer initiated aggregators of 
all legal forms including joint stock companies, limited liability companies and 
cooperatives as long as they fulfill certain requirements. (See Appendix J for 
details).  Fruit and vegetable producers are eligible for some support from the EU 
                                                     
4 POs, are defined by in the European Council regulation (EC) n° 2200/96 and as replaced 
by the Council regulation (EC) n° 1234/2007 (consolidated version. In order to be registered as a 
PO  under these EC rules, the PO has to have at least 15 members,  fruits and vegetables have to 
account for at least 50% of its sales while total annual sales have to amount to at least HUF 250 
million (approx. USD1.1 million). (Sandor et.al. 2011) 
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through their POs, which creates an incentive for participation (Source: Bakucs, 
et.al. 2007).  
Despite such incentive participation has lagged well behind expectations.  
A 2009 study (Nagyne 2009) found that 65% of family farms that do not 
participate in any form of aggregation, formal or informal, despite some strong 
informal networks that could serve as the basis for more formal collaboration.  
Their study also found that 20% of those that participated in POs did not see any 
benefit from doing so. The survey of 200 farmers suggested that the reasons for 
non-participation in POs were not finding participation beneficial (37% of 
respondents), lack of trust (33%), lack of knowledge about POs (26.8%), no POs is 
close proximity (22%) and rejection (6.3%). This study also tried to assess the 
needs of the farmers and found that the benefit that farmers would like to 
achieve from POs are related to joint marketing, professional advice, and 
increased security and predictability of sales and input costs.   
Despite the European Union’s supportive policies of fruit/vegetable POs; 
the market share of POs have not increased over the past several years either in 
Hungary or in the EU (Dudas-Juhasz, 2013).  In 2011 Hungarian POs coordinated 
fewer than 18 thousand producers, representing 42,000 hectares, HUF 32.97 
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billion in sales, representing 18% of the Hungarian fruit and vegetable 
production, compared to the target 40% (FruitVeb 2012) while most POs have 
remained small (Becz 2012). 
It is estimated that approximately a third of the domestic production and 
40% of imports exchange hands in the informal market, creating not only lost 
revenues but also representing concerns for food safety and traceability. The 
value added/consumption tax of 27% is a significant deterrent for producers to 
shift to the formal sector.   
POs offer a range of services to their members.  All POs engage with 
collective marketing.  However, there is great variation in terms of additional 
services provided.   
Despite a strong tradition of agricultural excellence and the legacy of 
world record agricultural productivity levels in certain crops, agricultural 
technical and technological research and development nearly disappeared in 
Hungary over the past twenty years and productivity and quality in the fruit and 
vegetable sector stagnated at its 1980s level (FruitVeb 2012).  A few POs have 
invested in own research activities and foreign expert advisors which they have 
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successfully turned into a competitive advantage especially when it comes to 
selling their products internationally.   
During the past twenty years specialized education and training options 
relevant for fruit and vegetable producers have also declined, along with the 
quality of extension services available.  There are efforts to develop an 
independent extension service network which is envisioned to be one of the core 
activities of TESZ-ESZ, a secondary producer organization of 29 Hungarian POs, 
along with R&D, training, quality assurance and advocacy related activities 
(www.teszesz.hu). 
However for the time being, according to some of the interviewees, in 
order to satisfy the requirements of modern value chains, Hungarian 
horticultural producers need to source all of their inputs, even advisory services, 
from the global marketplace.   
The existing literature on Hungarian POs focuses on the importance of 
trust for farmers to join a marketing cooperative, highlighting both the importance 
of trust among members and members’ trust of management (Bakucs et al., 2007, 
2008).   Some studies suggested that Hungarian farmers have low willingness to 
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cooperate, generally explained by low level of social capital and trust (Szabo 
2012), but the empirical evidence on this this point is limited.  
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 4.1.2 Data collection and methods 
The following sources of data is used for the Hungary related empirical 
analysis: 
1. Two producer organization case studies; Morakert and Delkertesz; 
2.  Data was assembled from various sources on all the 47 Hungarian 
Producer Organizations that were qualified by the Hungarian Ministry of 
Rural Development as such as of April 2013 (see Section 4.1.5.1 for more 
detail on the sources used); 
3. Interviews with experts, practitioners, POs and farmers. 
 
Some general findings about Hungarian POs will be provided in this 
section. Next two cases will be analyzed; that of Morakert PO, the first 
Hungarian PO to earn the official certified PO status and the largest PO until 
2009, and that of Delkertesz PO, the largest PO since 2009.  Last, the data 
collected about Hungarian certified POs will be analyzed. 
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4.1.3 General interview findings 
The purpose of this section is to summarize some of the general interview 
findings to help provide the general context for the more detailed analysis that 
follows.  The findings of the interviews carried out were for the most part 
consistent with the existing literature.  While the existing literature explains the 
low participation rates in POs with lack of trust and weak social capital as a 
result of the collective memory of forced collectivization, the interviewees often 
portrayed a more nuanced picture.  While the interview did confirm concern 
about the trustworthiness of POs, especially PO leadership, they also revealed 
careful farmer cost-benefit calculation regarding PO participation.  In addition, 
the interviews revealed strong social networks and social capital among at work, 
at least on a small and highly socialized scale5, among farmers, in contradiction 
with the assertions of some of the existing literature. 
For example both Morakert and DelKERTESZ, the two subjects of the detailed 
case studies, had their origins in cooperatives founded in the 1960s and have 
                                                     
5 It was not an objective of this study to assess or measure social capital.  Nonetheless, the semi-
structured interviews revealed some strong social network and social capital dynamics that the author feels 
is relevant to point out. 
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successfully motivated producer cooperation even after the political, social and 
economic turmoil of the 1980s and 90s.  However, some expert interviewees 
noted that farmers often do not organize spontaneously, and some form of third 
party facilitation or motivation from respected individual is necessary. Farmer 
interviews revealed high degree of willingness to cooperate among farmers, but 
mostly informally and not in the form of POs despite the significant promotion 
policies.  Examples of farmer barter arrangements are notable, whereby farmers 
specialize within a community both in terms of assets (for example agricultural 
equipment) and expertise and they help each other based on the on the 
expectation of mutuality, without cash payment.  Such willingness to cooperate 
did not translate into general trust, in fact some of the same farmers with 
willingness to cooperate through such barter arrangements expressed high 
degree of suspicion towards 3rd parties from outside their community that 
attempts to engage with them.  There was considerable skepticism expressed 
about POs.  Interviewed farmers highlighted the transaction cost of cooperation 
via POs (“we don’t have time and energy”), the desire to maintain their 
autonomy as opposed to being told what to grow and how (“producers have a 
desire for freedom”) and skepticism about the government support available 
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(“we know people who started 14 POs and received related subsidies while 
others tried to start one for 3 years and did not succeed”) as barriers to starting or 
joining a PO.  Others have indicated prior PO membership but discontinued 
their memberships due to frustration about the cost of compliance and high crop 
rejection rates.  Several farmers expressed comfort with selling via traders in 
their own communities who were usually well known by them (in several cases 
even relatives).  According to the farmers such traders would sell the crops to 
small shops and stands around the Lake Balaton. 
Interviews with PO leaders revealed optimism about the prospects of fruit 
and vegetable production in Hungary due to the favorable natural conditions but 
also revealed considerable challenges in the areas of (i) market dynamics with 
modern market buyers, (ii) coordination of smallholders, especially when it 
comes to persuading them to grow the same, especially new varieties, and (iii) 
with governmental reporting and other red tape and requirements imposed on 
POs. 
Retailers sign framework agreements with POs with contract terms being 
fixed only a week or two prior to delivery.  Even the largest POs have little 
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negotiating power and influence on the terms of the contracts.  Contract terms 
are determined by the retailers almost unilaterally and it is not uncommon for 
retailers to modify even the contractually agreed prices in case products are 
subjected to some special promotion. Retailers only source from the larger POs 
that can guarantee to deliver the expected quantity and quality of products and 
failure to do so results in significant penalties.  
4.1.4 Case Studies 
Case studies were prepared on two Hungarian aggregators, Morakert 
Producer Organization (“Morakert”) and Arpad/Del-Alfoldi Kerteszek Producer 
Organization (“Arpad”/”DelkerTESZ”).  Both of these POs sell a significant 
portion of their production to GVCs, mainly retailers.  
Morakert was the largest and most successful PO in Hungary until its 
sudden downfall in 2009, after which DelkerTESZ became the largest PO.  Both 
POs operated in Csongrad district in South-East Hungary, in the Hungarian 
plains.  They both focused primarily on pepper and tomato production for the 
fresh vegetable market, selling to supermarket chains as their primary marketing 
channel. However, there are some key differences in the two POs’ business 
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models and strategies which, at least in part, may help explain the different 
outcomes.   
The case studies were prepared based on extensive literature review and 
interviews of the general managers of both producer organizations, industry 
experts, representatives of industry membership organizations, peer producer 
organization leaders, farmers, development professionals, and financiers active 
in assessing and funding POs. 
 
4.1.4.1 Morakert 
Morakert Cooperative was the showcase PO for many years, not only in 
Hungary but also internationally. Morakert was founded in 1995 with 52 
members in Morahalom, a small town in the Great Plains region of Hungary, and 
was the first Hungarian cooperative to receive certified PO status in 2002.  
However, its predecessor organizations had been in existence since the 1960s.  
The number of members at one point reached 792, integrating 2428 hectares.  
Morakert operated in an agricultural area of the country where agricultural 
production is “more or less the only” source of livelihood for the population 
(Bakucs. et.al. 2007).  Climate and soil conditions favor vegetable and fruit 
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production and the most important crops cultivated are various types of 
tomatoes and peppers, cabbages, onions and potatoes. 
After the traditional agricultural cooperatives ceased activity in the early 1990s, 
1,500-1,800 smallholders in the Morahalom region (cultivating 3-5 hectares) 
attempted independent production.  A lose network of producers was 
established in 1994 (Common Agricultural and Entrepreneurial Society of 
Morahalom) with government support to help strengthen the producers.  
However, their greatest problems were not addressed and struggled  partly due 
to the oligopolistic and monopolistic situation faced in both the input market and 
when trying to sell their products (Bakucs. et.al. 2007).  As a result, the local 
authorities established various programs and organizations for the support of 
smallholders.  Morakert Purchasing and Service Cooperative was set up in 1995 
in this reasonably supportive local policy environment.  Members owned their 
own land and assets for farming.  The cooperative coordinated purchasing and 
marketing and had cold storage facilities and trucks.  Joint purchasing allowed 
members to reduce their costs by 18-20% (Bakucs. et.al. 2007).  Morakert, and its 
member producers, focused primarily on peppers and tomatoes, while also 
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active in producing and marketing lettuces, carrots, potatoes and parsley.  
Morakert purchased produce from both members and non-members6 and carried 
our sorting, packaging and storage with the aim of selling most of the aggregated 
crops to retail chains.  
Morakert made considerable investment in infrastructure that helped enhance 
the value of members’ products and meet the food safety, environmental and 
hygiene requirements of buyers.  This included a sorting and packaging line, 
cold storage depot and transport vehicles.  The handling, sorting and packaging 
line became operational in late 1999.  Morakert opened its “agri-logistics 
centrum” in 2002 which, among others, included cold storage facilities and was 
further expanded in 2006. These investments were partly aimed at, and were 
critical for meeting, modern value chains’ food safety and quality requirements. 
Similarly to other cooperatives, new members had to purchase ownership 
share in Morakert, the value of which increased steadily over time from HUF 
25,000 in 1995 to HUF 180,000 in 2006. To be able to make the abovementioned 
                                                     
6 Members, however, had preferential treatment: they had a contract with Morakert while non-
members were only called upon when members could not supply the necessary goods. 
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investments, new members also had to make a one time fixed “investment 
contribution” of HUF 330,000, a considerable barrier to smaller producers (Szabo 
2012).  Members also paid 4.6% of their revenues as a membership fee and 
contribution towards the operating costs of Morakert (which was then matched 
by EU subsidies).   
In addition to coordinating joint input purchase and marketing, Morakert 
was also actively involved in providing information and advisory services to its 
members.  Morakert signed framework agreements with its members and 
allowed 10% variation from contracted quantities.  Morakert did not penalize 
contract violations but paid a 2% premium to members who stayed within the 
contracted range.  Nonetheless, Morakert still experienced very poor contracting 
discipline which led to the introduction of pre-financing for those members only 
that delivered at least 80% of the volumes they contracted for, as an additional 
incentive for compliance. 
Purchasing from non-members was key for achieving scale; in fact 
Mezokert sourced from 2,000 non-members.  PO rules state, however, that the 
PO had to source the majority of traded goods from its members, which led to 
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the need to establish a limited liability company in 2005 that was a member of 
the PO and was responsible for purchasing from non-members and even 
importing, as needed.  The retailers Morakert supplied typically require supply 
all year around which Morakert was not always able to satisfy from domestic 
production, especially in the winter months. 
A survey of 44 Morakert members (Bakucs et.al 2007) revealed that 
members were selling 59% of their vegetables and 21% of fruit production 
through Morakert.  34% of producers sold all of their production to Morakert, 
50% to 2-6 buyers and the remainder to more than 6 buyers. The survey also 
revealed that what most influenced members’ choice of PO on average were the 
(1) volumes the PO was trading, (2) existence of contract, (3) flexibility and (4) 
trust.  
Prior studies (Bakucs. et.al, 2007) attributed Morakert’s success to the trust 
the leadership was able to establish. “The issue of trust is the true secret and key 
to the success of the cooperative” (Bakucs, et.al.  2007).  
Morakert supplied most of the major retail chains and their share within 
Morakert’s sales increased over time while Morakert also exported (approx. 20% 
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of its turnover) to over a dozen European countries. The proportion of 
production sold to retailers increased from 5-10% in the earlier years of 
operations to 90% by 2006 (Racz 2006),  While retailers offered a stable market for 
Morakert, even during its years of prosperity the Morakert leadership noted how 
challenging it was to meet the exact requirements of retail chains and to work 
with their terms of trade, especially payment terms.   Morakert used HACCP, 
GLOBALGAP and BCR quality assurance systems to meet legal and market 
requirements (Szabo 2012). 
Morakert put great emphasis on differentiating its products via branding 
and anecdotal evidence suggests considerable consumer awareness of the 
Morakert products.  In particular, Morakert created an image associated with  
Hungarian grown fresh tasty food, something that resonated with many 
domestic consumers.  Morakert also provided basic extension services to its 
members on an “as-needed” basis and occasional training courses. 
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Morakert was considered a PO success story internationally for many years. The 
Regoverning Markets7 project even published an English language case study in 
2007 as an example of successful innovation to connect small producers to 
markets and as the most successful Hungarian PO (Bakucs et.al. 2007).  The 
authors argued that three factors had contributed to Morakert’s success.  First, 
the screening of potential members.  Second, strict rules to enforce the quality 
and quantity requirements of the PO….  Third, the trust that the leaders of 
Morakert were able to establish with members. These elements helped form the 
perspective of a “private contract enforcement mechanism” that played a key 
role in preventing side-selling. 
However Morakert started experiencing problems in the 2nd half of 2008 
which further escalated in 2009.  The financial crisis at the time made it more 
challenging and costly for Morakert to obtain financing, even for working 
capital.  The Southern-Eastern part of Hungary was hit by a particularly poor 
tomato season and Morakert had to import tomatoes from Spain in order to meet 
its contractual obligations with large retailers, which in turn required bank 
                                                     
7 http://www.iied.org/regoverning-markets 
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financing.  The cost of bank financing and tight repayment schedule made it 
difficult for Morakert to pay its members for the products they delivered.  
Morakert’s management called a meeting to explain the situation and asked for 
its members’ understanding, trust and patience.  Some members initially granted 
that trust and continued delivering their crops despite the significant uncertainty 
regarding when they would receive payment, but they were in the minority.  
Fewer and fewer producers brought their products to Morakert and the PO had 
to increasingly rely on purchases from non-members and imports to comply with 
its contractual obligations with retailers. At the same time local newspapers 
published accusations that members of Morakert’s management were personally 
becoming rich from Morakert’s activities.8  Subsequent articles made claims of 
business interests and lavish homes having been built across the Hungarian-
Romanian border in Hungarian speaking Transylvania, further undermining 
producers’ willingness to supply Morakert. (These accusations have not been 
proven to have any foundation according to the author’s research.)   
                                                     
8 I was unable to find written record of those articles; the local newspapers do not have 
comprehensive online archives.  However, these accusations have been mentioned by Morakert 
management as well as farmers interviewed.   
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One cannot help but wonder how the strong social capital and trust that 
Morakert was internationally famous for could so quickly disappear on the basis 
of some empty accusations and temporary financial challenges.  It is important to 
note that the nature and structure of these financial difficulties were not 
unprecedented at the time and there were several POs that successfully managed 
those challenges.  In addition, given Morakert’s stature in the market and it is 
region in particular, public support was also promised (even though it is unclear 
how much, if any, was delivered). 
However, there was another force against Morakert that contributed in 
significant ways to the loss of member trust and to the PO’s ultimate demise. 
Morakert’s products had a strong Hungarian identity.  The packaging reflected 
the national colors, advertising and marketing strategies centered around the 
Hungarian product identity.  Morakert opened two full time stores of its own in 
Morahalom and Szeged (fourth largest city in Hungary) in 2007 with the stated 
mission of making high quality Hungarian products available directly from POs 
to consumers, where in addition to its own products, it was also selling 
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complementary products (eggs, meat, etc.) from several other POs. 9 The success 
of those stores was followed by the very public opening of a third store in 
downtown Budapest in September 2008 and the declaration of the opening of 7 
additional stores in major cities around the country.  The publicity around the 
store openings repeatedly highlighted the mission of making high quality, fresh 
Hungarian food products produced by POs available directly to consumers, 
which was were well received. 10 
Against this backdrop, it caused considerable shock when a reputable 
Hungarian weekly magazine published an article about Jordanian peppers being 
labeled as Morakert products (168 Ora, 2010), which in turn led to numerous 
news reports, local articles and blog posts on consumer websites.  The articles 
remarked not only about the misleading practices but also about the poor taste 
and aroma of the peppers purchased under the misleading label.11 Morakert did 
                                                     
9 http://www.delmagyar.hu/szeged_hirek/betort_szegedre_a_morakert/2016248/ 
10 http://www.elelmiszer.hu/fmcg_szakmai_hirek/cikk/morakert__markabolt_nyilt_budapesten 
11 To fully appreciate the sensitivity involved it is important to consider the importance of 
peppers in Hungarian life.  Peppers is one of the staples and one of the most widely grown 
vegetables.  It is eaten daily by Hungarians in fresh and cooked forms, dried spice form and 
pickled form, just to mention a few.  It became a subject of national pride during the Austrian 
domination of Hungary  (Sasvari, 2005).  Its prominence was further strengthened by its 
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offer an official explanation suggesting that during times of limited domestic 
production it was unavoidable to source from abroad in order to meet its 
contractual obligation with retailers that needed fresh fruit and vegetable 
supplies all-year-around.  The labeling used was not misleading, according to 
Morakert’s explanation, it simply stated that the produce was packaged by 
Morakert while it showed Jordan as the country of origin. 
Nonetheless, such events were not only detrimental in terms of shaking 
public confidence in Morakert that had been successfully tapping the “patriotic 
consumer” market.  One of the blog posts provides a good reflection of the 
change in public sentiment: “I trusted them 100%. It was enough for me to see 
their label and so it [the product] went into the shopping basket. After this I will 
skip them altogether.”   
 Producers, who take a lot of pride in growing their Hungarian peppers, 
also expressed strong resentment. Farmers expressed anger and humiliation and 
                                                     
 
nutritional benefits and other applications that built even more national pride such as Hungarian 
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi’s isolation of vitamin C from peppers which earned him a Noble Prize. 
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rejected the idea of the products they grow with much care and pride under 
Morakert’s brand were being subjected to suspicion and rejection from the 
public.     The fiasco with the Jordanian peppers did not only compromise the 
Morakert brand that was built on a Hungarian identity and shook consumer 
trust, but it also led to the overnight loss of collective identity that existed among 
the producers who had been growing the products sold under the Morakert 
brand with considerable dignity and pride.  
 Morakert went under bankruptcy proceedings in 2011 which has not been 
completed to date.  Morakert had HUF3.6 billion in debt, a third owed to its 
suppliers. Table 7 illustrates the evolution of Morakert’s membership and 
revenues and its quick demise following the above chain of events.  For more 
detailed financial statement and indicators please see Appendix M. 
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Table 7. Evolution of Morakert membership and revenues.  
YEAR MEMBERS NET REVENUES (HUF 
mio) 
1998 59 251 
1999 131 568 
2000 189 1,250 
2001 288 1,587 
2002 289 2,283 
2003 476 3,777 
2004 630 4,641 
2005 699 5,840 
2006 730 8,222 
2007 n/a 5,162 
2008 n/a 4,712 
2009 776 Approx. 2,000 
2010 670 566 
Sources: Bakucs, et.al. 2007 (up to 2005) and author research. 
 The quick and unexpected downfall of Morakert, the showcase of 
smallholder collective action and cooperative success not only in Hungary but 
also internationally, illustrates some of the disadvantages of the cooperative 
structure and governance and the power of collective identity in POs, especially 
in large POs.   
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4.1.4.2  Del-Alfoldi Kerteszek Cooperative (DelkerTESZ) 
DelkerTESZ took over from Morakert as the largest PO in Hungary after 
the latter’s decline. DelkerTESZ was founded in 2002 with 237 members, 
headquartered in Szentes, 79 kilometers from Morahalom, in the Great Plains 
region of Hungary.  It integrates 347 hectares, 136 of which covered with green 
houses and tunnels where participants carry out sustainable intensive 
production in most cases year around. 
Delkertesz’ largest member, Arpad Zrt, formerly Arpad Cooperative, had 
been involved with aggregating smallholders since 196012.  DelkerTESZ achieved 
formal PO status in 2004.  Most of DelkerTESZ’s members are small, with over 
80% of members selling less than 4 million forints (approx. US$18,000) of value 
annually to DelkerTESZ, many selling less than 1 million forints in value.  About 
half of DelkerTESZ’ turnover originates from its largest member, Arpad Zrt13, 
which play an important role in DelkerTESZ ability to plan and manage risks.  
The partnership with Arpad also plays an important role in providing 
                                                     
12 Arpad used to be a cooperative but it is now a joint stock company; a member of DelkerTESZ, a 
cooperative, along with hundreds of small farmers. 
13 Zrt stands for closed joint stock company. 
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DelkerTESZ’s smaller members advisory, technical and innovation support 
leveraging the activities and related research that it would carry out for its own, 
larger scale production regardless. 
At the end of 2012 it had 504 members and its sales amounted to 5,947 
million HUF for 2012 (approx. US$27 million), mostly via member activity.  Non-
member related revenues represented approx. 6% of sales.  Interested producers 
have to deliver products to DelkerTESZ for a one year test period without any 
member benefits before they can be considered for membership (Szabo 2012). 
DelkerTESZ and it members have focused on the production of 
Hungarian peppers 53%, tomatoes 17%, various other types of peppers 17%, 
cucumbers, watermelon, cabbages.  This production profile has been more or less 
consistent with only minor variations over the years, with peppers and tomatoes 
being the primary products, representing over 80% of sales.  Most of 
DelkerTESZ’ members carry out production in glasshouses and plastic tunnels 
(Szabo 2012).  DelkerTESZ provides various services to its members including 
collective input purchases, financing for inputs, extension services and 
agronomist advice and support with quality assurance systems and the 
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development of member farms.  An industry expert interviewed for this study 
highlighted the importance of DelkerTESZ’ relationship with its members as key 
to its success, stating that  “DelkerTESZ’ approach to its members was 
characterized by service and humility”. 
Over 50% of sales involved retailers in 2012.  While the volume sold to 
retailers has been increasing over time (2012 sold 28% more to retailers than year 
before), as a ratio within total sales, retailer chains’ share has been stable at 
slightly above 50% (2005: 51%). Exports have not been growing at pace of the 
cooperative’s growth. Exports represented 18% of sales in 2012 compared to 
24.5% in 2005. The balance was sold to other retail outlets and processors, in 
other words other modern market value chains.  In fact almost 100% of 
DelkerTESZ’ products are sold to modern markets, with only a very small 
negligible fraction sold to the traditional wholesale market.  This is part of a 
diversification strategy for DelkerTESZ. 
A unique feature of DelkerTESZ’ model is the premium paid to farmers at 
the end of the year.  Eligibility is determined, among others, based on quality, 
whether the farmer delivers 100% of the production to the cooperative, 
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participates in extension services and uses the recommended inputs and 
pesticides.  This has proven to be a highly effective incentive scheme that led to 
biological pest control use rising from 16% to 87% of farmers between 2003 and 
2012 (Szabo 2012).  DelkerTESZ also takes sanctions seriously: 11 farmers were 
excluded in 2012 for non-compliance. 
  DelkerTESZ was one of the early adopters of technological innovations 
among Hungarian POs.  In 2007 it introduced a bar code based traceability 
system, in addition to 4000 square meters of cold storage, a 2500 m2 climate 
controlled packaging area, state of the art sorting and packing lines, and 
information management systems. 
Research and development has been integral to DelkerTESZ’ history.  
Arpad built strong collaborations with relevant professional and research 
organizations and universities. It carefully selects the varieties it grows and 
instructs farmers to grow. It has been core to its business model to build a strong 
advisory team to work with farmers, in fact it is mandatory for DelkerTESZ 
members to use the advisory services. In order to comply with the strict 
requirements of the retailers, DelkerTESZ also implemented a monitoring system 
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to supervise members’ use of pesticides.    A key objective of DelkerTESZ is 
ongoing development and accordingly it encourages its members to 
continuously modernize and improve their agricultural practices, in particular in 
the area of integrated crop management, new varieties and the use of biological 
pesticides.  Its focus is on minimizing the environmental burden of agriculture 
while improving quality, productivity and competitiveness.  As part of this effort 
it carries out regular soil and water tests and develops the formula for plant 
protection to ensure minimal and optimal fertilizer use.  It regularly 
communicates these recommendations to members and 3-4 times during the 
winter it offers classes on better farming practices.  The advisory and training 
activities also include helping members comply with GlobalGAP. 
DelkerTESZ trademarked “Peppers from Szentes” which is added as a 
label to the packaging.  Over the past decade DelkerTESZ moved from selling 
only 10-15% of its products in packaged format to over 75% in 2012.  Packaging is 
an important value added service that DelkerTESZ provides to its members but 
the brand developed helps build pride among members.  While DelkerTESZ’s 
fixed asset investments are only about a third of what Morakert had in its prime 
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days, it does maintain a community building for member activities.  Arpad and 
Morakert also support local community events such as sport games.  This was in 
fact also reinforced by Dr. Miklos Csikai, President of Arpad, in an interview 
with a local TV station, where he explained that their priorities were to support 
local community events as opposed to national ones. 
DelkerTESZ is regularly represented at domestic and international 
agricultural and food fairs to stay abreast of the latest market developments and 
to promote awareness of its products. It has also been winning awards and 
gaining recognition for its products at such events, enhancing the recognition 
and reputation of its brand and producers.  It also partners with retailers for 
special initiatives such as “Tradition and Taste” and others showcasing 
traditional Hungarian varieties (Szabo 2012). 
DelkerTESZ has its own store where it sells inputs needed by its members.  
It also extends interest-free credit for input purchases to all of its members (100 
days term).   
DelkerTESZ uses contracts with its members.  Producers commit to a 
minimum amount that they have to supply.  Violation of that can lead to the 
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exclusion of a member (a right that DelkerTESZ has been exercising in contrast 
with other POs).  Other forms of risk mitigation that DelkerTESZ can leverage in 
its ability to meet its own obligations to retailers and processors are the 
significant production volume from Arpad that is exclusively sold via 
DelkerTESZ and the high proportion of intensive and greenhouse/tunnel based 
production. 
DelkerTESZ’ bookkeeping is very transparent with the intention of 
making it easy for members to understand the cooperative’s finances. 
DelkerTESZ initiated the establishment of Hortico-Regio Ltd., a secondary 
PO, in 2009 in partnership with 3 other POs as well one jointly with Morakert for 
export activities.  DelkerTESZ was also a founding member of TESZ-ESZ 
Nonprofit Ltd, a secondary PO focused on training and research. 
DelkerTESZ maintains good relationship with two commercial banks. A sign of 
its bankability is the fact that neither bank cut DelkerTESZ credit limits during 
the economic crisis which enabled DelkerTESZ to maintain its revenues during 
those years (Szabo 2012).  Nonetheless, the lack of financing is the most serious 
obstacle faced by DelkerTESZ when it comes to its further development, 
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including the ongoing access to value chain finance necessary to pay its members 
well before the PO gets paid from its buyers (Szabo 2012).   (Please see Appendix 
N for Delkertesz’ financial indicators). 
 The DelkerTESZ case illustrates some of the advantages of non-
cooperative PO structure and governance, in particular from the perspective of 
sanctioning free-riding and mitigating market risks.  The case further highlights 
the importance of services offered by POs, the importance of access to finance 
and the power of collective identity supporting PO activities (“Collective identity 
activities” or “CIA”). 
 
4.1.4.3 Comparative Analysis of Morakert and DelkerTESZ 
Both of the POs covered in the case study analysis had access to GVC, 
including retailers and processors.  For both POs retailers represented the largest 
market channel.  Despite the fact that the two POs analyzed are the largest in 
Hungary, they nonetheless have little influence on the terms of the contracts.  
Retailers sign framework agreements with POs with contract terms being fixed 
only a week or two prior to delivery.  While Morakert nonetheless sold the 
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majority of its products via retailers, DelkerTESZ had a more careful 
diversification strategy which involved various market channels and sales of to 
retailers kept at approx. 50%. 
Morakert was a cooperative with limited market certainty and strong 
alignment of incentives among PO participants.  DelkerTESZ is a symbiotic 
hybrid with medium degree of market certainty and medium alignment of 
incentives since Arpad, a mid size producer, is a producing member of the 
cooperative (i.e. nucleus model with one large and many small producers) while 
the Arpad group also serves as a partner to the DelkerTESZ cooperative. 
Morakert’s heavy reliance on retail contracts that required significant 
contract size and on-time delivery, in combination with its cooperative 
governance, made it difficult to sanction the side-selling activities that were so 
prevalent among Morakert members, especially given the cooperative’s practice 
of significant sourcing from non-members (threatening sanctions would have 
risked member exit while still able to sell to PO as non-members, an issue several 
Hungarian POs are struggling with).   
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DelkerTESZ, jointly with Arpad, provides the full range of PO services to 
its members and is selective about taking new members (testing period with no 
member benefits), helping to not only ensure the quality and quantity of 
production but also reinforcing farmer discipline and minimize opportunistic 
behavior and side-selling.  Morakert, on the other hand, offered somewhat more 
limited services to its members and the significant ongoing sourcing activity 
from non-members undermined the value associated with membership. (In fact 
based on farmer interviews, farmers considered Morakert as a market option 
whereby they would make weekly decisions on whether to sell some of their 
crops to Morakert, similar to how they regarded the local traders.)  In the case of 
DelkerTESZ, in contrast, membership resembles more of a “club good” which is 
made possible by its hybrid character and comprehensive sophisticated services 
provided.   
The combination of DelkerTESZ’s branding, commitment to 
environmentally sustainable and high quality production as well as ongoing 
innovation, sponsorship of local community events and “club good” approach to 
membership created a collective identity that DelkerTESZ and Arpad leaderships 
 179 
 
reinforce on an ongoing basis through website communication, international 
exhibitions, awards, interviews, etc.  Morakert, on the other hand, also fostered a 
collective identity as the “Hungarian producer” which very much resonated with 
both producers and consumers.  However this one-prong identity strategy did 
not build well on the true strengths of the PO given that it had limited year-
around production capacity and relied on significant imports in its operations.  
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4.1.5 Study of the 47 Hungarian Producer Organizations 
 
The purpose of this section is to test the hypothesis outlined using mixed 
methods on the population of Hungarian POs. 
 
4.1.5.1 Data on the 47 Hungarian POs 
The list of all Producer Organizations (“POs”) that were qualified by the 
Hungarian Ministry of Rural Development as such as of April 2013 was obtained 
from the Hungarian government’s website.  Information about each of these POs 
was obtained via interviews and a database that includes financial information 
on most POs.  Additional interviews were carried out with government officials, 
development professionals, NGO representatives, farmers, traders and lead 
firms. 
 
4.1.5.2 Background on Hungarian Producer Organizations 
Under a supportive policy framework, producer groups have been formed in 
Hungary since the late 1990.  Those that meet the criteria outlined in Appendix J 
are recognized officially as a “producer organization” or PO.  Table 8 
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summarizes the evolution of the number of recognized POs in Hungary.  The 
number of POs have remained relatively stable over the last few years with 42-43 
recognized POs in the country. 
 
Table 8. Key statistics of PO formation 
 
Source: Author prepared and updated based on Dudas et.al. 2013 and governmental 
sources 
 
After early challenges, the EU accession and resulting financial incentives 
provided a boost to the formation of POs.  A 2008 EU legislation imposed a five 
year limit on temporary “producer groups,” farmer groups that were working 
towards achieving PO recognition, starting April 2009.  This resulted in a wave 
of mergers among those smaller producer groups in 2008 and 2009 leading to the 
formation of 37 new POs (Dudas et.al. 2013).   The number of producers involved 
in POs have remained low ranging between the low 4,000s and 14,000s over the 
years and have been declining since 2009 even though the number of POs have 
slightly increased.  According to interviews carried out for this study, this 
Approved EOPs 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 0 0 0 1 1 8 7 7 9 11 33 48 42 43 42
New approval 0 0 1 0 7 0 0 2 3 22 15 1 1 2 n/a
Cancelled approvals 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 0 2 n/a
EARLY CHALLENGES JOINING EU CONSOLIDATION STAGNATION
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reduction is widely attributed to the smallest producers withdrawing from POs.  
This trend is well reflected in both the average membership declining from its 
high of 1,348 member per PO to 285 in 2012 and in the average land size 
cultivated by PO members steadily increasing from its low of 0.71 hectares (1.8 
acre) per producer in 2005 to 2.34 hectares (5.78 acre) in 2012. Nonetheless, the 
average land area per PO has declined considerably from its high of 1,552 
hectares in 2004 to 667 in 2012 due to move towards higher intensity production. 
These figures underestimate cultivated land size because they do not capture the 
non-PO land cultivated alongside the growing number of hybrid POs and non-
member producers that POs purchase from. Nonetheless, the trend is clear that 
the average size of PO members is increasing, a fact also highlighted by several 
interviews. 
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Table 9. Evolution of PO membership in Hungary 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
NUMBER OF 
RECOGNIZED 
POs 
4 4 4 6 8 40 40 42 44 
TOTAL 
MEMBERS 
4,513 5,394 4,313 4,191 4,178 14,253 12,984 13,091 12,531 
AVERAGE 
MEMBER 
1,128 1,348 1,078 698 522 356 324 312 285 
TOTAL LAND 
AREA 
6,208 3,856 3,933 6,242 5,538 33,418 27,279 29,634 29,354 
AVERAGE LAND 
AREA 
1,552 964 983 1,040 692 835 682 706 667 
TOTAL AREA / 
MEMBER 
1.38 0.71 0.91 1.49 1.33 2.34 2.10 2.26 2.34 
 
The data collected on the Hungarian aggregators include 20 cooperatives, 
14 investor-owned firms (IOFs) and 8 hybrids.  32 of them are certified, i.e. their 
compliance with lead firm required food safety and other standards is third 
party verified. 14  17 of the POs export at least 10% of their products and 31 sell to 
modern value chains.  
A database was developed with information about all of the 42 approved 
POs with an attempt to collect as much information as possible to enable the 
                                                     
14 As described in more detail in Section ?, certification is costly for producers, especially 
smallholders due to the fixed cost involved, but it reduces the transaction cost of doing business with 
smallholders for other value chain actors and thus may enhance smallholders’ ability to access modern 
markets.  
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analysis of different PO types and their ability to scale and do business with 
modern markets and GVCs.   The variables available are summarized below. 
Age: age of organization, in years 
Sector: Subsectors within fruits and vegetables that the PO is operating in 
Members09 (number of members in 2009) and members12 (number of 
members in 2012) 
Corpdummy: dummy variable with value of 1 if organization is IOF 
Hybriddummy: dummy variable with value of 1 if hybrid organization 
Hectarvfm: land area under cultivation by the members of the 
organization 
Collective identity: dummy variable for collective identity activities (CIA) 
provided.   
Rdinnov: dummy variable for research & development and innovation 
related services. 
Collective services: dummy variable for collective services offered such as 
collective input purchase for improved negotiating power, collective equipment 
and machinery use, etc.. 
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Educinfoext: dummy variable for educational, information or extension 
services provided 
Valueadded: dummy variable for value added services provided 
Finance: dummy variable for financial services provided 
Export: dummy for export of more than 10% of revenues 
Certification: dummy for PO trading in certified products 
Std: short term liabilities of the organization (lnstd: natural log of std) 
GVC: dummy variable with value 1 if organization has modern market 
access (either exporting or supplying international retail chain 
domestically) 
Sales: 2012 sales revenues (lnsales: natural log of sales); also available for 
2009-12 
Salespermember: 2012 sales revenues divided by number of member 
(lnsalespermember: natural log of salespermember) 
Assets: total assets (available for 2009-12) 
Std: current liabilities (available for 2009-12) 
Ltd: long term liabilities (available for 2009-12) 
FixedAssets: Value of fixed assets net of amortization  
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(available for 2009-12) 
Member: number of members 
Memberch: percentage change in the number of members between 2009 
and 2012. 
Those used in the analysis are the following: 
Highservice: Dummy variable for POs that offer services in 4 or more of 
the service categories. 
In addition, various ratios were calculated based on the above variables 
and tested in the models.   For the sources of information and more detail, 
please see Appendix O. 
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4.1.5.3 Analysis and discussion.  
 
Hypothesis 1: “collective identity narratives”, manifesting themselves in 
Collective Identity Activities, play an important role in facilitating the growth 
and competitiveness of POs. 
 
Copy of the GVCRA model proposed in section 3, with the component under 
discussion (“Collective Identity Activities”) highlighted 
 
Ten of the Hungarian POs have been found to offer collective identity 
activities or CIA’ (see 4.1.4.2).   CIAs include activities that foster the PO’s 
collective identity and/or members identification with the collective identity.  
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!
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Examples of collective identity building activities may include sponsorship of 
local community events and organizations, including support for youth groups 
and sport teams, projects and activities (including demonstration projects and 
awareness raising) that elevate the status of food production and farming and 
participation in or organization of professional events that highlight the benefits 
of certain production methods practiced by the PO (for example sustainable or 
organic, sustainable intensification, use of renewable energy, etc.).  PO activities 
that help foster members’ identification with the collective identity include 
activities and events organized for member such as lectures, study tours and PO 
celebrations (harvest, awards, etc).   
Table 7 summarizes the key statistics for POs with and without such 
services.  POs not offering CIA don’t differ considerably from their CIA offering 
counterparts in terms of long term financing.  Every other indicator, however, is 
more favorable for POs with CIA from the perspective of scale.   
CIA POs on average have 419 members (median of 317), cultivate on 
average 956 hectares, have average sales of $6.5 million (median of $4.8 million), 
with average sales per member of $35,000 and sales per hectare of $15,000 and 
average fixed asset of $2.3 million.  Their sales grew on average by 100% between 
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2008 and 2012 and their assets by 145%.  They offer on average 4 services to their 
members (median of 5), 90% have certification and 70% export. 
This is in contrast with non-CIA POs that have on average 251 members 
(median of 90), cultivate on average 615 hectares with average sales of $3.2 
million (median of $2.0 million), with average per member sale of $32,000, sales 
per hectare of $6,000 and average fixed asset of $1.9 million. Their sales grew on 
average by 37% between 2008 and 2012 and their assets by 5%.  They offer on 
average 3 services to their members (median of 3), 72% have certification and 
31% export. 
This is despite the fact that the average (and median) size of CIOS POs’ 
members was slightly smaller than their non-CIOS counterparts’.   
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Table 10. Summary statistics based on collective identity activities offered 
 
 
To further analyze the role of CIA on scaling, change in the POs’ membership 
between 2009 and 2012 was used as independent variable.  While the core model 
illustrated the importance of high PO services for membership growth while 
R&D / innovation related services and collective identity activities (CIA) were 
significant in the full model, CIA loses considerably from its significance when 
“collective services” are introduced at least in part due to the correlation of these 
variables (correlation coefficient of 0.4258).   It is not surprising that POs with 
emphasis on collective identity also are more likely to provide collective services 
COUNT AGE MEMBERS SERVICES
HEKTAR/ 
MEMBER
TOTAL 
HEKTAR EXPORT
CERTIFI- 
CATION SALES
SALES 
PER 
MEMBER
SALES 
PER 
HECTAR
ASSET 
GROWTH
SALES 
GROWTH
LONG 
TERM 
DEBT
SHORT 
TERM 
DEBT
FIXED 
ASSETS
POs WITHOUT COLLECTIVE IDENTITY ENHANCING SERVICES
total 32 8,039 186.95 19,672 10 23
average 11 251 3 5.84 615 31% 72% 3,151 32 6 0.05 0.37 491 1,301 1,878
min 4 20 1 0.21 86 621 2 2 -0.37 -0.72 0 8 5
max 15 2,900 6 16.82 2,592 14,470 151 16 0.86 3.81 1,850 6,861 11,180
median 11 90 3 4.76 520 1,962 26 4 -0.02 0.21 319 796 984
POs WITHOUT COLLECTIVE IDENTITY ENHANCING SERVICES
total 10 16,380 277.26 35,774 7 9
average 11 419 4 4.90 956 70% 90% 6,516 35 15 1.45 1.00 471 2,162 2,318
min 6 23 2 0.17 155 970 2 1 -0.26 -0.72 0 507 0
max 15 1,480 7 11.09 3,271 26,972 84 57 7.60 8.56 1,756 4,585 9,403
median 12 317 5 4.34 601 4,779 30 10 0.26 0.28 324 2,133 1,454
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to their members, or that POs that provide collective services are more likely to 
have CIA.  Therefore another model was devised to study CIA.  Salesperhectar, 
the amount of sales generated by a PO on average for each hectare of land under 
its coordination, is being used as an indicator of the PO’s productivity and 
competitiveness. 
     
DV: SALESPERHECTAR Coefficient (P>|t|) Coefficient 
 (P>|t|) 
Coefficient 
(P>|t|) 
High_service 6.277479 (0.02)   
Rdinnov  3.010025 (0.106) 4.264453 (0.064) 
Valueadded   2.699485 (0.222) 
Collective identity (CIA)  7.804794 (0.001) 8.644008 (0.004) 
Collective   -2.676224 ((0.326) 
Educinfoext   0.8878115 (0.747) 
Finance  16.74853 (0.000) 16.29008 (0.000) 
Members   0.0013813 (0.67) 
Lnhectarmember -3.176881 (0.010) -2.088662 (0.014) -1.937501 (0.16) 
Hectarvfm -0.0043848 (0.049) -0.0081959 (0.000) -0.0075671 (0.001) 
Coopdummy   -1.483663 (0.514) 
Lnstd 1.759846 (0.114)  -0.8748759 (0.59) 
Ltd11   -0.0045728 (0.106) 
Lnfixa11   1.880414 (0.287) 
    
Constant 0.7896838 (0.918) 11.38897 (0.000) 4.750888 (0.569) 
R-squared  
(Adjusted R-squared) 
0.4020 (0.3374) 0.7419 (0.7060) 0.7805 (0.6748) 
 
The core model reflects a significant positive relationship between PO 
services and competitiveness.  It also shows a reasonably strong relationship 
between short term financing available to the PO and it competitiveness.  
Somewhat counterintuitive is the significantly negative relationship between PO 
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competitiveness and the total land area coordinated by the PO and the average 
land area cultivated per member.  The same variables had significant positive 
relationship with level of PO sales but not with modern market access.  This 
finding suggests that smaller farms and smaller POs have higher productivity.  
This may be the case since many of the smaller size producers, and smaller size 
POs, that managed to stay in business and maintain their EU PO certification are 
engaged in intensive agricultural production involving irrigation and green 
houses/tunnels that help both improve productivity and manage risks. 
Moving to the full model it becomes clear that once again some PO 
services are more closely associated than others with the 
productivity/competitiveness of POs.  The significant ones are R&D and 
innovation, CIA and finance.  With PO finance to producers entering the model, 
short term debt loses significance since it is short term borrowing at the PO level 
that permits the PO’s lending to its members.  A similar relationship cannot be 
observed in the case of long term finance because it is only one out of the 42 POs 
that reported long term lending to its members for the installation of green 
houses.  PO members need to secure the long term financing necessary for such 
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investment outside the PO and therefore the effect of that won’t be visible in our 
data. 
CIA has a highly statistically significant relationship with 
productivity/competitiveness and in this case continues to be highly significant 
even in the full model after the introduction of collective services and other 
theoretically relevant variables.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Services, including access to financing for farmers, 
provided by POs play an important role in facilitating scaling. 
 
 
!
!
!
!
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Copy of the GVCRA model proposed in Section 3, with the component under 
discussion (“PO Services”) highlighted. 
 
In this section Hypothesis 2 will be tested; to study the relationship 
between the scale of POs and the services they offer using an OLS regression.   
Sales revenues of POs are used as a measure of their scale. The model 
below illustrates that PO provision of four or more services (Highservice), 
coordination of larger production area as a function of farmers aggregated 
(members12) and average farm size cultivated by members (hectarmember), 
provision of financing to PO members (finance) and PO type (whether it is a 
cooperative or not) explain more than half of the variation in POs’ sales.  Services 
are key to helping farmers improve their productivity, manage their risk and 
therefore reduce their losses and meet the standards and other requirements of 
modern value chains and achieving relevant certifications.  Both high_services 
and finance are highly statistically significant in the model with positive 
coefficients.  In addition, the dummy variable for cooperative PO form is also 
significant in the model (at p<=0.1) suggesting that the cooperative form is 
associated with lower sales volume. 
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OLS  Regression   
DV: LN(SALES)  
 
Coefficient 
 (P>|t|) 
Coefficient 
(P>|t|) 
Highservice 0.4350156 
(0.028) 
0.3765647 
(0.06) 
Lnmembers12 0.3229318 
(0.007) 
0.2739208 
(0.03) 
Age  0.058754 
(0.148) 
finance 0.9021322 
(0.003) 
0.8909062 
(0.003) 
Lnstd (short term debt)  0.0691608 
(0.410) 
hectarmember 0.068057 
(0.040) 
0.0579677  
(0.088) 
Coopdummy -0.322989 
(0.090) 
-0.277841  
(0.179) 
Constant 5.791782  
(0.000) 
4.961812 
(0.000) 
R-squared  
(Adjusted R-squared) 
0.5749  
(0.5159) 
0.6068 
(0.5259) 
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Hypothesis 3: Cooperatives are at a disadvantage compared to other PO 
forms in achieving the conditions necessary for GVC access. 
 
 
 
Copy of the GVCRA model proposed in Section 3, with the component under 
discussion (“Aggregator Type”) highlighted. 
 
Over a half of Hungarian POs operate as cooperatives.  This ratio has been 
declining. A few years ago most POs were established and operated as pure 
cooperatives but in recent years several new POs were established as investor-
owned firms (IOFs) or converted from cooperative to IOF form. In addition, 
hybrid POs have been emerging that combine the cooperative and IOF forms 
!
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!
!
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!
!
!
!
!
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(often one owning the other or the two operating in close partnership).  When 
POs that converted from cooperative to IOFs are excluded, IOFs tend to be 
younger in terms of their operational history than cooperatives and hybrids.   
Table 8 summarizes some of the key statistics for the three PO types. On 
average IOFs engage with the least number of farmers while cooperatives with 
the largest number.  However, this is due to two outliers.  The median number of 
participants is 90 for cooperatives, compared to 131 for hybrids and 106 for IOFs.  
While average farmer size does not differ much by PO type (6 hectares for 
cooperatives, 5.3 for IOF and 5 for hybrids), median participant farm size was 
largest in the case of cooperatives (6 hectares), followed by hybrids (4.8) and 
IOFs (4.5).  IOFs, however, did not engage with farmers cultivating less than two 
hectares while farmers cultivating as little as 0.17 hectares were members of 
some of the cooperatives.  In the case of hybrids, the smallest farm size was 
around one hectare. 
Income and efficiency indicators were the weakest for cooperatives both 
in terms of median sales as well as sales per farmer and sales per hectare and 
hybrids’ were the strongest among the three groups.   
 198 
 
Working with larger and more sophisticated producers, IOFs offer fewer 
services than their counterparts.   IOFs have the highest fixed assets and debt, 
both short term and long term, among the 3 PO forms, followed by hybrids.  
Cooperatives have the least assets and financing among the three groups. 
Table 11. Characteristics of Hungarian POs by PO type 
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Average 397 12 3,161 29 994 964 325 3.45 674 6.07 
Minimum 27 6 621 2 5 8 0 1 86 0.17 
Maximum 2,900 15 9,493 130 3,333 2,955 1,341 5 3,271 16.82 
Median 90 11 2,101 18 818 653 156 3.5 479 6 
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Average 204 12 7,592 49 1,537 1,299 389 3.75 740 5.01 
Minimum 20 4 1,216 10 564 161 76 1 146 0.94 
Maximum 560 15 26,97
2 
151 4,056 4,178 948 7 2,592 9.21 
Median 131 12 3,558 35 933 791 330 4 492 4.76 
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Average 190 11 3,002 30 3,650 2,399 772 2.86 703 5.31 
Minimum 23 6 825 2 718 481 0 1 155 2.08 
Maximum 617 15 6,640 84 11,180 6,1 1850 6 1,715 9.84 
Median 106 11 2,447 26 2,829 1,504 652 3 598 4.5 
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The univariate analysis of variance (Anova) confirms the statistical 
significance of these relationships, as summarized in the table below.  
 
Table 12. Summary of statistically significant ANOVA results  
(statistical significance level of 0.1)  
Independent 
Variable in 
ANOVA test 
against PO 
form 
 
 
Prob>F 
Pairwise comparison of means: 
Contrast (Tukey P>|t|) 
Interpretation 
Sales 0.0609 hybrid vs. coop:  3,917.6 (0.074) 
IOE vs. coop:         -156.9 (0.994) 
IOE vs. hybrid:  -4,074.5 (0.088) 
 
Hybrids have 
significantly higher 
sales than either 
cooperatives or IOEs.  
There is no statistically 
significant difference 
between the sales of 
cooperatives and IOEs. 
Long term 
debt 
0.0298 hybrid vs. coop:  91.2154 (0.880) 
IOE vs. coop     457.2053 (0.025) 
IOE vs. hybrid:  365.9899 (0.185) 
 
Cooperatives have 
significantly less long 
term financing than 
IOEs 
Short term 
debt  
0.0087 hybrid vs. coop:   272.319 (0.874) 
IOE vs. coop       1,563. 3 (0.007) 
IOE vs. hybrid:  1,290.98 (0.088) 
 
Cooperatives and 
hybrids have 
significantly less short 
term financing than 
IOEs 
Fixed Assets 0.0007 hybrid vs. coop:   511.44 (0.790) 
IOE vs. coop       2,840.71 (0.001) 
IOE vs. hybrid:  2,329.27 (0.023) 
IOEs have significantly 
more fixed assets than 
either cooperatives or 
hybrids 
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As Table 12 illustrates, hybrids offer the most services to their farmers.  
All hybrids have modern value chain access in contrast with 60% of coops, which 
is the lowest rate among the PO types, and 79% of IOFs.  Coops also have the 
lowest rate of certification.  This is despite the high rate of services among coops 
which is comparable to hybrids, in contrast with IOFs which on average offer 
fewer services.   Among the services the biggest difference is in financing offered 
to farmers; 38% of the hybrids offer such services in contrast with 7% of IOFs and 
none of the cooperatives. 
Table 13. Additional Characteristics of Hungarian POs by PO type 
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COOPs 35% 35% 100% 55% 85% 35% 40% 30% 0% 40% 60% 70% 
HYBRIDs 50% 88% 100% 63% 88% 25% 38% 25% 38% 38% 100% 88% 
IOFs 36% 21% 100% 29% 43% 36% 57% 14% 7% 43% 79% 79% 
 
It is very hard to tell to what extent the characteristics of Hungarian PO 
types are universal as opposed to Hungary specific as the author is not aware of 
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similar analysis in the existing literature nor data to permit such analysis.15   
However, some of the patterns observed for the Hungarian POs are similar to 
those observed for the Central American and Peruvian POs in Section 4. 
Statistical testing was applied on this data to compare the three PO types 
in the form of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) since MANOVA can 
be used to compare multivariate population means of multiple groups.  
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) results in an outcome 
consistent with the findings of the previous section: PO form (i.e. cooperative, 
Hybrid and IOE) have a significant impact on the key variables used in this 
analysis (sales, sales per member, size of membership, change in membership 
between 2009 and 2012, total number of services offered, total hectares cultivated 
by PO, average hectares per member, exports, modern value chain access, 
certification, sales growth between 2009 and 2012, long term debt, short term 
debt and value of fixed assets); with  Pr > F values of 0.0906 (Wilks’ Lambda), 
                                                     
15 Even creating a database similar to what was done for Hungary is impossible in most countries 
in the absence of the policy framework that helps to ensure the identification of IOF and hybrid POs.  For 
example in most databases or countries IOF that source from smallholders are impossible to identify, and 
would be grouped together with small and medium enterprises (SMEs).  Furthermore, for the time being the 
World Bank enterprise survey, which is one of the few databases that collects information in SMEs, excludes 
agricultural SMEs.  However, the author of this paper has been advised (source: phone discussion with 
relevant World Bank staff) that a separate database of agricultural SMEs may be planned for the future, in 
which case it would be highly advisable to include smallholder specific variables.   
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0.0801 (Pillai’s Trace), 0.1110 (Hotelling-Lawley Trace) and 0.0425 (Roy’s Greatest 
Root). The statistical significance improves further when comparing only 
cooperatives and IOEs with regards to the above key variables, to Pr > F of 
0.0546.  Comparing cooperatives with the combined groups of hybrids and IOEs  
result in Pr>F of 0.1085.   
 
Overall, we can conclude that the form of a PO, and in particular whether 
the PO is a cooperatives, have an effect on key variables that directly or indirectly 
influence modern market access.  
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4.2 Central America and Peru 
 
4.2.1 Background 
The intention of this section is to investigate whether patterns and 
relationships observed in the Hungarian empirical analysis, and thus ultimately 
the model of GVC relevant aggregation, also holds in other countries.  However 
data is scarce at best about POs, especially non-cooperative POs.  (In fact it was 
not possible to identify any systematic data collection about smallholders’ POs).  
This section will utilize the best non-EU data on smallholders’ aggregators 
available to the author.  However, the data has considerable limitations that will 
be discussed. 
 The data analyzed in this chapter involves aggregators of coffee and 
horticultural producers in Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Peru.  This 
region is particularly appealing for this analysis because of the stronger tradition 
of POs than in Hungary. Coffee is the top export crop in these countries and 
smallholders are responsible for a significant portion of the production; thus the 
majority of the aggregators are coffee producers but with horticulture rising in 
importance and also represented in the data.   
 204 
 
4.2.2 Data collection and method 
Data was provided by the Finance Alliance for Sustainable Trade, an NGO 
based in Montreal, Canada that serves as the membership organization for 
lenders that extend financing to aggregators of smallholder farmers. FAST’s 
members provide financing to aggregators that source from smallholder farmers 
in less developed countries.  The uniqueness of FAST’s approach that it is not 
limited to cooperatives but rather supports all forms of aggregators that source 
from smallholder farmers.  This is consistent with the aggregator definition used 
in the case of the Hungary empirical section.  
Data was provided on 60 first level aggregators in Honduras, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua and Peru that attended FAST organized financial marketplaces with 
the aim of obtaining financing from FAST members.  The data was collected by 
FAST staff prior to the marketplaces.  Interested aggregators of smallholders fill 
out FAST’s form (see Appendix P) based on which FAST invites those to the 
marketplace that meet a set of criteria.  The criteria includes that the (i) 
aggregator has to be formally registered (as opposed to operating informally); (ii) 
needs to be willing to have financial statements and able to provide a reasonable 
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amount of background information and (iii) needs to have some minimal level of 
operation.   
The forms for several of the 60 aggregators lacked some of the basic 
information necessary for my analysis (they were only partially filled out), such 
as sales, number of members, short term borrowing, and form of aggregator 
(company or cooperative) and whether it exports or has contracts with buyers. 
As a result, observations with less than 2 of the necessary variables for this 
analysis were eliminated, leaving 39 observations. 
Similarly to the Hungarian data, this information is unique in that it 
includes aggregators based on the primary criteria whether they source from 
smallholder farmers and includes different forms of aggregators including 
cooperatives and investor owned firms (IOFs).   
While this data has serious shortcomings in terms of completeness, the 
rationale to nonetheless use this data is to investigate whether it exhibits patterns 
similar to aggregators in Hungary and whether the model of GVCRA remains 
applicable.   
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Variables available in the dataset: 
Members: number of members at the time the form was filled out 
Age: Year of establishment 
Certification: whether PO is certified and through which certification 
scheme 
Corpdummy: dummy variable with value of 1 if IOF 
Loanhistory: if aggregator has credit history 
Sales; available for 3 years. (lnsales: natural log of sales) 
Export: dummy to reflect whether the aggregator exports and where. 
Contracts: dummy to reflect whether the aggregator has a contract with 
any buyer. 
Export: dummy for export 
clt: short term liabilities of the organization (lnclt: natural log of clt) 
Assets: total assets (lnassets: natural log of assets) 
Ltl (lnltl): long term liabilities (natural log long term liabilities) 
fixassets: fixed assets (lnfixassets: natural log of fixed assets) 
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4.2.3 Analysis and discussion 
The Central America/Peru data includes 9 IOFs and 30 cooperatives.  33 of 
these organizations are certified and twenty of them export its products. The POs 
in the sample have 573 members on average with a median of 200 (in the 
Hungarian data these figures are 266 and 93, respectively).  The average PO in 
the sample is 17 years old with a median age of 15 years (average and median 
age of 11 years in the Hungarian sample), has average sales of $3.7 million and 
median of $1.5 million (in Hungary, average of $3.7 million and median of $2.1 
million), average fixed assets of $2.6 million and median of $0. 5 million (in 
Hungary, $2.3 and $1.4 respectively).  Please refer to Table 12 for more detail 
about the Central America/Peru sample.                           
Table 14. Summary statistics of aggregators in the Central America / Peru 
sample 
  
US$ members age sales fixed assets assets
short term 
liabilities
long term 
liabilities
average 573 17 3,709,646 2,567,134 5,101,770 1,525,088 812,865
min 3 4 72,439 770 1,933 14,938 0
max 9,000 71 36,740,386 21,198,927 34,195,943 11,336,306 5,715,257
median 200 15 1,555,998 495,128 1,624,230 483,887 230,571
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This analysis will test hypothesis as close to identical as possible with the 
hypothesis tested in the case of Hungary, unless the data is not adequate for a 
particular hypothesis test. 
 
Hypothesis 1: “collective identity narratives”, manifesting themselves in 
Collective Identity Activities, play an important role in facilitating the growth 
and competitiveness of POs. 
 
The Central America/Peru data does not provide enough information to directly 
statistically test this hypothesis.  However, interviews with PO officials and third 
party experts confirmed the importance of PO collective identity, in particular for 
fair trade POs.  The interviewees indicated that farmers have high commitment 
to the ideals of fair trade and due to its origins and history.  The fair trade POs in 
the Central America / Peru sample have on average nearly five times as many 
members as their non fair trade counterparts, significantly higher production, 
fixed assets and better net results.   Overall, fair trade POs are considerably 
larger and have stronger performance than their non fair trade counterparts in 
the Central America/Peru sample.  While there can be various reasons for that 
difference and unfortunately we don’t have sufficient data to statistically test the 
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reasons, according to the interviewees the difference may be at least in part 
attributed to the high collective identity of fair trade POs. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Services, including access to financing for farmers, 
provided by POs play an important role in facilitating scaling. 
 
 
Copy of the GVCRA model proposed in Section 3, with the component under 
discussion (“PO Services”) highlighted. 
 
In case of the Central America/Peru, we have no information about the services 
the POs provide to their members, therefore the focus will be on access to finance 
in this analysis.   
!
!
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OLS  Regression   
DV: LN(SALES)  
 
Coefficient 
 (P>|t|) 
Coefficient 
(P>|t|) 
lnclt (short term 
funding)* 
0.461092 
(0.003) 
0.7081106 (0.000) 
Llnltl (long term 
funding) 
0.4180409 
(0.015) 
0.4070858 (0.020) 
Age*  -0.0235334 (0.159) 
Lnmembers*  -0.2506824 (0.134) 
Certification*  -0.1065295 (0.852) 
Corpdummy*  -0.0315659  (0.96) 
Constant 2.717658 
(0.205) 
1.692153 (0.471) 
R-squared  
(Adjusted R-squared) 
0.6559  
(0.6177) 
0.789 (0.6916) 
*variables in common with Hungarian Lnsales model. 
 
The results show strong statistical significance and positive relationship between 
sales and both short term and long term financing; and variation in short term 
and long term financing together explain over 60% of the variation in sales.  
However, causality cannot be derived from these results and the data does not 
facilitate longitudinal analysis or the use of lagged variables.  Social lenders, 
however, who are frequently the first ever lenders to POs, attest that such access 
to financing is crucial for the growth of POs.16 
 
   
                                                     
16 Interview evidence with former CEO of Verde Ventures, a social lender very active in financing 
coffee and horticulture POs in the sample countries. 
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Hypothesis 3: Cooperatives are at a disadvantage compared to other PO 
forms in achieving the conditions of global value chain access. 
 
 
                 
 
 
Copy of the GVCRA model proposed in Section 3, with the component under 
discussion (“Aggregator Type”) highlighted. 
 
Investor owned firms (IOFs) are younger in the sample and tend to have 
fewer farmers than cooperatives, just like in the case of the Hungarian POs.    
83% of the cooperatives are involved in coffee production while only 22% of 
IOFs.  The majority of IOFs are fruit and vegetable producers. While the average 
sale of IOFs is $2.2 million compared to $4.2 for cooperatives, once we control for 
!
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the sector difference it becomes clear that coffee producer IOFs have higher sales 
than coffee cooperatives just as fruit and vegetable IOF producers have higher 
sales than their cooperative counterparts.  Furthermore, both IOF’s median sales 
and average sale per member are more than twice that of cooperatives.  (This 
may be due to the average cooperative member being smaller, something 
suggested by interviewees, but unfortunately we don’t have sufficient data to 
verify.)  IOFs in the Central American and Peruvian data also have higher 
average net income and assets.  Cooperatives, just like in Hungary, may be at a 
disadvantage when it comes to generating scale in turnover, despite their larger 
membership and longer operating history.   
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Table 15. Summary statistics of cooperative and IOF POs in the Central 
America / Peru sample 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on raw data from FAST 
members age sales Netincome fixassets Assets Cash clt ltl SE
COOPs
average 691 19 4,186,066 138,225 2,144,884 4,447,359 580,075 1,556,379 943,880 331,187
min 5 4 72,439 -1,268,470 770 0 -10,040 14,938 0 1,106
max 9,000 71 36,740,386 3,465,623 21,198,927 34,195,943 11,559,933 11,336,306 5,715,257 1,996,500
coffee 773 19 4,005,247 208,630 2,075,248 4,282,502 559,814 1,351,470 871,944 277,126
non-coffee 380 13 359,628 -37,632 149,320 383,649 42,408 200,686 196,655 68,641
IOFs
average 145 13 2,161,280 1,813,210 3,886,662 7,146,802 1,607,730 1,422,274 382,390 11,700,192
min 3 4 93,295 -7,045,873 172,235 228,365 104,972 66,334 0 10,000
max 433 21 4,397,320 13,587,950 17,318,000 28,617,130 8,120,177 5,198,827 1,019,753 47,089,532
coffee 240 26 4,624,221 7,259,327 3,341,764 7,908,434 1,825,740 3,434,631 1,151,618 29,836,226
non-coffee 118 12 1,237,775 1,075,870 3,823,052 6,470,609 1,792,636 470,018 169,207 8,472,386
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4.3 Additional considerations and remarks related to the 
empirical analysis 
 
4.3.1 Observations about POs with the smallest average member 
size.   
There are 6 POs in the Hungarian population where the average member 
size is below 1 hectares.17  They have all successfully scaled in terms of 
membership size with memberships ranging between 304 and 2900.  The average 
land size cultivated by farmers ranges between 0.17 and 0.94 hectares.  The total 
number of participants in these six POs represents over 50% of all farmers who 
participate in the 43 qualifying Hungarian POs while only 6.7% of the land area 
cultivated by POs.  Five of the six POs have GVC access even though only 3 
exports directly.  The number of services offered ranges between 3 and 7 with 
both average of 4.5, compared to the average of 3.3 for the pool of 42 POs. 
The size of this group is too small to study statistically in order to try to 
gather some insight into the factors that might be associated with their success 
                                                     
17 One additional PO satisfies the criteria on  the governmental list which was excluded from the 
empirical analysis because it is under liquidation.  Further investigation revealed that the PO ran into 
problems very similar to that of Morakert: it was unable to satisfy its contracts with retailers and therefore 
had to rely on imports from Ukraine which in turn also made the news and may have contributed to the 
ultimate downfall of the PO. 
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despite the very small average size of their participating farmers.  However, we 
can observe some interesting pattern among these POs.   
Four of the six POs above carry out sustainable intensive farming at least 
on part of the land cultivated.  Intensive farming in this context represents 
greenhouse, tunnels, drip irrigation and in some cases heated green houses for 
year-around production using geothermal energy.  Interesting to note that one of 
these POs highlighted in the interviews that they work with smaller participants 
to carry out intensive production, including through the provision of inputs and 
know-how, and in fact all the farmers with less than 1 hectare have intensive 
production in that case, cultivating a vertically growing cucumber under thin foil 
that is very labor intensive but has high productivity rate per hectare. 
Four of the six POs above also have collective identity activities (CIA) 
which might explain their ability to overcome the collective action problem to 
attract and maintain a large number of participants farmers and coordinate their 
production in a predictable way (i.e. mitigate or manage side selling risk) so that 
most of them accomplished GVC access. 
Important to note that five of the six POs above are cooperatives.  The 
sixth one is a hybrid, Del-Kertesz. This finding is a critical one for this paper: 
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while cooperatives on average lack behind in performance behind their IOF and 
hybrid counterparts, under certain conditions their performance can exceed 
others’ on some important counts: their ability to successfully aggregate the 
smallest farmers, helping them achieve productivity improvement and access 
modern markets.  The in-depth study of these six POs will be the subject of 
further research.   
Unfortunately similar details were not available in the dataset concerning 
Central America and Peru to investigate whether similar patterns may also be 
observed there. Interview evidence suggests, however, strong collective identity 
effect among fair trade POs in Central America and Peru, which have been found 
to outperform their non fair trade counterparts based on membership size, sales 
and net income.  Unfortunately due to the large number of missing observation 
on production volume, farmer size related analysis would not be reliable.  
Recommendation will be made to FAST to encourage their collection of relevant 
data in the future considering the significant implications for smallholder value 
chain inclusion and livelihoods.  
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4.3.2 Importance of Access to Finance for Competitiveness, 
Productivity and Global Value Chain Access   
 
4.3.2.1 Empirical evidence 
Existing academic literature dedicates considerable attention to the 
quantity and quality/attribute requirements of GVCs with less emphasis on the 
importance of financing. Several non-academic papers make reference to the 
importance of financing but without providing empirical evidence.  As described 
in Section 4.2, the results of this research have empirically demonstrated that  
both POs’ access to finance as well as POs’ provision of financing to farmers are 
closely associated with POs’ sales per hectar, and indicator of productivity and 
competitiveness and key to achieving the production volume required to be able 
to do business in the modern markets.   
The importance of volume and quality/attribute requirements is widely 
documented in the literature. The relationship between GVC participation and 
access to finance is often suggested by practitioners, including those interviewed 
for this work, but with this study wanted to test whether I can empirically 
confirm the importance of access to finance as a key condition of GVC access.   
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    Copy of the GVCRA model proposed in Section 3, with the component 
under discussion (“Finance for POs”) highlighted. 
 
Short-term debt (“std”), obtained from POs’ balance sheets, is used as an 
indicator of POs’ ability to access financing.  Using the dummy variable GVC, 
reflecting whether PO participates in GVC related trade, as dependent variable, 
we use a logit model to analyze the relationship between financing and GVC 
access, by keeping constant sales of POs (capturing their quantity of production) 
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and certification18  (as an indicator of compliance with quality and attribute 
requirements of modern value chains).    
 
Table 16. Conditions of market access logistic regression results for Hungary 
Logistic Regression   
DV: GVC  
 
Coefficient (P>|z|) Odds Ratio (P>|z|) 
Lnsales 1.788322 (0.078) 5.979413 (0.078) 
Std 0.0007071 (0.054) 1.000707 (0.054) 
Certification 4.26536 (0.002) 71.19057 ((0.002) 
Constant -15.78381  (0.053) 1.40e-07 (0.053) 
Log Likelihood -11.99444  
LR Chi2 (Prob > chi2) 24.31 (0.0000)  
Pseudo R-squared 0.5034  
 
Access to short term financing, in addition to the size of a PO’s sales and 
certification19 all have positive relationship with the likelihood of GVC access 
and are all statistically significant at 90% confidence level.  Together they explain 
more than 50% of the variation in POs’ GVC access. 
 
                                                     
18 In the Hungarian example the most common certifications are GlobalGAP for good 
agricultural practices, and HAACP for food safety, two certifications widely required by 
European retailers. 
19 Certification is an imperfect proxy for “quality and attributes” and includes a more narrow set 
of requirements than those that apply reality, introducing some bias in the model. 
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In the Central America/Peru data we have information about the contracts the 
POs have which we use as proxy for modern market access.  Otherwise the same 
modern market access model is being applied as the one used in Hungary, 
consisting of sales, certification and short term debt as measures of scale, 
quality/attributes and access to finance, respectively. The results are summarized 
in the table below. 
 
 
Table 17. Conditions of market access: logistic regression results for Central America 
and Peru 
Logistic 
Regression 
     
DV: contracts 
 
Coefficient 
(P>|z|) 
Coefficient 
(P>|z|) 
Coefficient 
(P>|z|) 
Coefficient 
(P>|z|) 
Coefficient 
(P>|z|) 
Lnclt (short term 
debt) 
1.015272 
(0.074) 
  0.2192531 
(0.797) 
0.8135334 
(0.133) 
Certification  2.233592 
(0.087) 
 5.95698 
(0.153) 
1.939249 
(0.198) 
Sales   4.38e-07 
(0.433) 
2.033-06 
(0.402) 
 
Constant 0.0033103  
(0.12) 
1.098612  
(0.178) 
1.559732 
(0.064) 
-7.129  
(0.414) 
-8.993352 
(0.153) 
Log Likelihood -10.1492 -8.8485339 -9.1759858  -4.5687136  -6.2971542 
LR Chi2  
(Prob > chi2) 
5.24 (0.0221) 3.13 (0.0770) 1.75 (0.1854) 10.15 
(0.0173) 
6.91 (0.0316) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2686 0.1501 0.0872 0.5263 0.3543 
 
Short-term debt and certification are statistically significant explanatory 
variables, just as in Hungary.  But unlike in Hungary, the relationship is not 
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statistically significant in the case of sales.  The reason is likely to be the fact that 
many of the POs in the sample are involved with coffee production.  Many coffee 
POs (15 out of the 27 in the sample) are fair trade certified and sell via fair trade 
second and third level POs; thus production and sales volume is less critical for 
in those cases for modern market access due to Fair Trade’s dedicated market 
channels that aggregate production at several levels in a federated structure. 
However, the weakness of the model may be the result of data limitations as the 
analysis finds that Fair Trade certified producers have higher sales than their non 
Fair Trade peers.   
 Despite some of the weaknesses of the Central America/Peru empirical 
analysis, the importance of financing for GVC and modern market access has 
been clearly demonstrated in both the Hungarian and Central America/Peru 
datasets. 
 
4.3.2.2 Reflections Based on Qualitative Evidence  
 
The basis of the informal financial system was familiarity with the 
borrower.  In fact the informal lender was typically an insider in the community 
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and had much better information about the “bankability” of the borrower than 
formal financial institutions (Frederico, 2009).  Financial intermediation evolved 
in the 19th century when landlords and merchants borrowed from FIs and on-lent 
to farmers.  Such financial solutions had two important merits: first, they built on 
the landord’s and merchant’s insider knowledge of the farmers, and it reduced 
transaction cost through interlinked transactions (merchant and landlord are in 
contact with the farmers and carrying out transactions.)  The spread charged 
reflected the risk premium and information cost.   
Such linkages are especially important when considering the problem of 
collateral in agriculture.  Land valuation is challenging and land is often illiquid, 
not to mention problem with land titles in many countries.  Movable assets like 
machinery or equipment tend to be very unreliable collateral.  Thus conventional 
types of formal financing are seldom applicable to farmers, creating considerable 
discomfort for most financial intermediaries when it comes to engaging in PO or 
farmer finance. 
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Regarding the core forms of farmer finance (KIT/IIRR, 2010), this study found 
the following: 
1. Chain liquidity:  Chain liquidity provided by buyers or input suppliers is 
scarce not only in Hungary but in general internationally, and is only 
provided by buyers and input suppliers if they have strong business 
incentive to do so and if there is stable and ongoing relationship with the 
farmers.  In addition, even when chain liquidity is offered, it usually comes at 
high cost and the finance costs are not transparent as they are packaged into 
the pricing of the bought/sold product.  This may be in part because due to 
increased concentration, TNC input providers and buyers, unlike their 
predecessors, do not have insider knowledge of farmers and their 
communities.  Most interviews carried out as part of this work emphasized 
both the scarcity and high cost of chain liquidity financing.  The exception 
was one interview with a capacity building provider to coffee farmers in 
Central America, who felt that some coffee traders who value long terms 
relationships with suppliers develop familiarity with the farmers, offer 
financing at reasonable cost and in return earn farmer loyalty which helps 
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mitigate the side-selling risk which has both quality and quantity 
implications as discussed earlier in this paper (“double side selling”). 
2. Agriculture finance: Most financial institutions shy away from financing 
agriculture in general given the risks of the sector, lack of collateral and high 
transaction cost.  Agriculture finance relies heavily on hard collateral and 
therefore it is rarely an option for smallholders.  The exception is 
microfinance, where the group lending structure provides collateral.20   
However microfinance institutions (“MFIs”) tend to avoid both less densely 
populated areas and long term or seasonal financing and therefore for the 
most part have played limited role in smallholder finance.  In particular rural 
areas that are not densely populated or dependent on a few principal crop or 
lifestock activity (as opposed to a local economy with more diversified 
sources of income) tend to be avoided by MFIs due to higher transaction cost 
and risk (including seasonality and collateral constraints)21.  In addition, 
driven again by low transaction size and high transaction cost, MFIs lend at 
                                                     
20 In other words if borrower is unable to repay the loans, others in the group are also liable. 
21 Most MFIs focus on short-term loans with frequent and regular repayments, a business 
model that does not fit well with the needs of seasonal crop or livestock producers. (World Bank 
MFI website) 
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considerably higher rates than other financial intermediaries (See Annex F for 
comparison in Peru where MFI rates for farmers can be as high as 75%22).  
Therefore microfinance in its current form is unlikely to offer a systemic 
solution to farmers’ finance need.   Some interviewees offered optimism that 
mobile phone based lending or microfinance, considerably reducing the 
transaction cost of rural finance, may offer a solution in the future.   
3. Value chain finance.  Value chain finance helps overcome some of the 
collateral constraints discussed earlier while also reducing transaction costs, 
thus using the bankability of some value chain actors for the benefit of 
smallholders.   It involves a triangulated approach that, at minimum, involves 
a PO, the buyer and the financial intermediary.  In the basic form of value 
chain finance, the financial intermediary lends to the PO, secured by a 
contract, whereby the buyer agrees to make the payment directly to the 
lender which, in turn, will deduct the amount needed to service the debt and 
make the remainder available to the borrower. Contract with a financially 
solid buyer, not to mention a TNC, is a strong collateral for the loan and helps 
                                                     
22  Interviews carried out for this research indicated that MFI rates were not affordable for 
farmers, even when they were available. 
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mitigate the credit risk.  In addition, the buyer’s engagement with suppliers 
may be leveraged for reducing the transaction cost of financing.  Nonetheless, 
agriculture remains a sector that most commercial banks perceive to be very 
risky to finance and therefore financial intermediaries are generally reluctant 
to engage in value chain lending.  In addition agriculture, including value 
chain, finance does require some industry specific technical skills that most 
financial intermediaries lack.  The Hungarian bank most active in agriculture 
lending has both a technical expert for evaluating potential borrowers 
(agronomist who himself used to head up a large PO and has strong 
familiarity with the sector) as well as a director in charge of agri-finance who 
himself has decades of experience and strong ties in the sector.  The 
agriculture portfolio, a considerable part of which is related to value chain 
finance, has outperformed most other sectors in the bank’s overall portfolio 
both in terms of repayment rates and profitability. 
 
Given the reluctance of most commercial banks when it comes to lending 
to POs, over the last decade several international social enterprise financial 
intermediaries (SEFIs) have emerged trying to serve this market segment for the 
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benefit of smallholders, including Root Capital, Oikocredit, Triodos and 
ResponsAbility, to mention some of the more significant ones.  These SEFIs, 
some of them operating as nonprofit organizations, mostly provide value chain 
finance, sometimes in combination with technical assistance.  
While value chain finance is still in its early stages, SEFIs have proven the 
triangulated structure to be a viable way of financing smallholders in the era of 
GVCs despite the lack of hard collateral and thanks to the structure’s ability to 
help reduce transaction costs. As illustrated in figure 8, the vast majority of value 
chain finance for smallholders is financing coffee and mostly in Latin-America, 
which is where farmers are reasonably well organized into POs, partly due to the 
influence of Fair Trade on coffee cooperative formation. 
 
  
                          Figure 8. 
                                    
 
In the ideal situation GVC lead firms take an active role in value chain 
finance which can help both mitigate risks and reduce transaction costs, not 
unlike in the historical examples of village merchants and traders. Lead firms 
increasingly keep computeri
become valuable data for a financier’s risk assessment.  
228 
Structure of global value chain lending to POs
Source: Dalberg 2012 
zed information about their suppliers, which can 
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While value chain finance offers a promising solution for the short term 
financing of POs that participate in modern markets, smallholder agriculture also 
requires capital to finance household expenditures, investments in land and 
machinery and production related expenditures (such as inputs) at the farm 
level.  POs may on-lend the proceeds of value chain finance to farmers to help 
address those needs, an important service that POs may provide but also one 
that requires prudent systems and careful procedures. 23  
As Oxfam points out (2009), many of the promising efforts that target 
aggregator and farmer finance involve a combination of actors, each contributing 
in their areas of strengths, with the goal of improving the balance between risk, 
                                                     
23 There are also some rare examples of value chain financing that benefit farmers 
directly (as opposed to their POs).  One example is Starbucks which provided $70 million of 
financing over 40 years to coffee farmers to promote sustainable practices, mainly through social 
lenders.  Another example is related to Pepsico’s effort to address its growing need for high oleic 
sunflower oil, whereby PepsiCo partnered with a local financial intermediary to make available 
$40.4 million for microloans for Mexican sunflower farmers.  Pepsico committed to purchase 100 
percent of the crop, for an estimated $52 million over seven years. Additionally, PepsiCo is 
investing $2.6 million to support management of the Mexican sunflower crop and will provide 
technical training to the small farmers. While these efforts are admirable, they are rare, due to the 
transaction cost involved in financing farmers directly.  Therefore even in the case of Starbucks 
and Pepsico, the farmers involved in these financing schemes represent a tiny fraction of these 
firms’ suppliers.  Technology based innovations may one day help address the transaction cost 
problem related to value chain finance that directly benefit farmers.  Opportunity International, 
in partnership with the Gates Foundation and MasterCard Foundation are experimenting with 
mobile phone based finance for smallholders (Sinha, 2014).   
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cost and return.  Value chain finance, leveraging farmer-buyer relationships as 
collateral, is offering a still nascent but promising solution.  
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5. Limitations of this Research 
 
Collection of data on POs poses a challenge due to the various legal forms 
they can take and to the best knowledge of the author no systematic PO data is 
being collected by any of the international development organizations. This 
research involved primary data collection of original data in the case of Hungary 
and the use of secondary data in the case of Peru and Central America, both of 
these having their unique set of the limitations.   
While the Hungarian data covers the entire population of accredited POs 
and the data collected from various sources is believed to be robust, findings 
drawn from the Hungarian data may have limited applicability in other 
countries.  High level of literacy and good physical infrastructure, in particular, 
are characteristics that many less developed countries do not share and may 
affect the applicability of the results.  Hungary’s historical heritage, especially 
forced collectivization and the resulting skepticism about farmer collective 
action, may further limit the applicability of the findings. 
In addition, as discussed in section 2.3, moderns market retail outlets have 
been disseminating in waves and at different speed around the world.  
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Smallholders in some of the third wave countries, for example India, for the most 
part do not yet face modern market requirement.  However, even in those 
markets modern food retail outlets are fast increasing market share, albeit from a 
very small base, and the findings of this paper may be helpful to policymakers as 
they are preparing for the possible consequences of those changes. 
As a result of the above limitation of the Hungarian empirical work, many 
of the interviews carried out for this work were of global focus, to identify cross-
regional issues and patters.  Furthermore, the Peruvian and Central American 
data was sought in order to empirically test the applicability of the model and 
the consistency of the key findings.  While some of the Hungarian findings were 
found to also hold in Peru and Central America, the secondary data that was 
available is more limited than the data collected in Hungary and there are a 
significant number of missing observations.  This weakness in the data limits the 
author’s ability to reach definite conclusions about the results. 
However, the weaknesses of the quantitative data has at least in part been 
compensated for by the richness of contextual information from interviews.   
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6. Policy Recommendations  
 
These policy recommendations cover all actors that may play a role in 
promoting development, including development organizations, NGOs and even 
private sector organizations, and are not limited to government policy 
intervention opportunities.  The fast dissemination of modern food retail outlets 
in most of the world and the shift toward food production being organized along 
global value chains and production networks governed in part through the use 
of standards have increased the need for farmers to be organized into POs.  This 
paper shed some light on aspects of POs that support their modern market access 
and therefore might deserve highlighted attention from policymakers.  
  
1. How to target policy support.  This study found that cooperatives are not 
the panacea for development and policymakers should also consider other 
forms of POs, including cooperative-hybrids, for support.  In fact the 
current bias towards cooperatives carry the risk of creating market 
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distortions by giving artificial advantage to one PO form.1 Nonetheless, 
under certain conditions cooperatives performed better than their non-
cooperative peers. Specifically, cooperatives were found to be more likely 
to include farmers with less than one hectar land and achieve high 
productivity levels and modern market access.  Considering the nuanced 
picture in terms of the performance of various PO types, PO type should 
be less of the selection criteria for policy support but rather the activities 
of the PO and the services it offers to smallholders.  Policymakers may 
want to consider supporting more comprehensive POs as opposed to 
marketing or “income only” organizations as the former may be more 
likely to achieve modern market access. Policymakers should also 
consider linking their support to certain aggregator characteristics, in 
particular services.  While in general this study found that POs with more 
than 4 services offered to their members are significantly more likely to 
scale, some services had stronger relationships than others with POs’ 
                                                     
1 The United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees has been one of the organizations to 
support cooperatives as a preferred aggregator type.  However, they have experienced very high failure 
rates among the cooperatives supported. (Source: Oxford University Humanitarian Innovation Conference 
lecture, August 2014.) 
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ability to scale and achieve modern market access. Therefore different 
service criteria is likely to be justified when supporting the scaling of 
aggregators as opposed to their formation.  Most PO services frequently 
supported by policy were not found to have significant role in enabling 
modern market access.  The services that were found to have played a role 
across various models were finance and innovation. Differentiated 
support and/or capacity building for the provision of access to finance and 
for the promotion of innovation may be justified.  Finally, the collection of 
data about aggregators around the world would be critical to facilitate 
analysis that can further inform the design of the policy intervention. 
2. Access to finance.  Finance plays the most important role among the PO 
services not only when it comes to achieving scale and modern market 
access but also smallholder productivity.  Furthermore, it is primarily PO 
financing available to the farmers, as opposed to financing available to the 
PO, is what makes a difference for scale, market access and productivity.  
However, the limited financing available to POs is mostly short term in 
nature backed by contracts to provide liquidity to POs while awaiting 
payment from buyers so that they can pay the producers.  While such 
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value chain trade financing is essential, it should be a policy priority to 
support PO access to finance that can be on-lent to farmers, especially 
since direct financing to farmers have traditionally been challenging due 
to transaction cost and risk perception concerns.  In addition, while value 
chain finance has been used successfully in multiple countries for 
nonperishable cash crops, its application to perishable and non-cash crops 
have been very limited.  Therefore the scaling and dissemination of tested 
value chain finance business models needs policy support, especially for 
perishable goods.  A global risk mitigation mechanism that combines a 
large number of relatively small exposures with geographic diversification 
can be a promising intervention and one that has not been tried.  
Therefore enabling policies need to address those concerns via risk 
mitigation (risk sharing or guarantees, insurance, etc.) and facilitation to 
help reduce transaction cost.  Policymakers need to be aware of three sets 
of constraints in this regard.  First, many POs have limited credit track 
record and financial intermediaries are reluctant to lend to them or do so 
pricing in the great deal of uncertainty regarding the probability of 
default.  Therefore policy intervention is desirable to help create such 
 237 
 
track record via risk mitigation tools for financial intermediaries, so that 
their risk becomes more predictable when lending to POs.   Second, when 
a PO on-lends the proceeds of a loan to member farmers, in effect it 
becomes the financial intermediary.  The PO therefore becomes the lender 
to its members and will need to manage those member loans carefully in 
order to fulfill its own obligations to its lenders.  Most POs do not have the 
capacity to fulfill that role and manage the related risks and thus 
considerable policy attention is needed to support the development of 
related PO capacity.  PO financing to farmers is likely to also contribute to 
increased member loyalty and help mitigate the risk of side selling. Third, 
many financial intermediaries lack the expertise needed to understand 
and assess POs’ operations and its risks.  Policymakers can have a strong 
role to play in relevant capacity building and in the central provision of 
relevant information and expertise.  Finally, PO provision of financing to 
its members alone is not likely to address the market failure of rural 
finance.  Therefore policy support is also essential for innovations in the 
area of rural access to finance that help address the issues of high 
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perceived risk and the high transaction cost, such as mobile banking and 
other technology based solutions. 
3. Inclusion of small producers.  In general this study found that there can be 
a trade-off between sustainability and inclusion.  Buyers and therefore 
POs tend to prefer fewer and larger producers in order to achieve the 
desired production volume, putting small farmers at a disadvantage. 
However several exceptions became apparent.  This study found that 
smaller producers and POs can be considerably more productive (in terms 
of sales per hectare) than their larger counterparts.  Beyond the classic 
family labor productivity dynamics, important drivers of this productivity 
differential in the Hungarian empirical analysis are related to intensive 
agricultural methods involving green houses/tunnels, irrigation, 
renewable energy based heating of greenhouses, etc.  These techniques do 
not only help ensure year around production but also help manage 
agricultural production related risks and improve the predictability of 
production.  In other words several POs of very small farmers, in many 
cases cultivating on considerably smaller total land area than their 
counterparts, achieved and maintained EU recognition.  Those farmers 
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and POs had significantly higher productivity than their larger 
counterparts which, in most cases, was achieved via sustainable 
intensification.  However, sustainable intensification solutions require 
considerable investment that most small farmers cannot afford and have 
challenges accessing the necessary long term financing for.  Long term 
financing to small farmers is nearly nonexistent and is likely to once again 
require considerable policy innovation that involves various actors along 
the value chain and leveraging the public sector’s ability to overcome 
transaction cost concerns by organizing the market and generating a large 
pool of diversified smallholder loans that becomes more attractive for 
private financial intermediaries.  
 
The collective action problem faced by small farmers is not limited to 
agriculture.  Other sectors with great importance for the global poor, for 
examples the handicraft sector and artisanal fisheries2, face very similar 
situations in terms of small scale, highly dispersed and often remote production, 
                                                     
2 Artisanal fisheries employ, directly and indirectly, nearly 150 million people globally.  FAO actively 
promotes the formation of cooperatives in the sector. 
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facing a market dominated by global value chains and having to meet their 
standards and other requirements.  Aggregation best practices in the agrifood 
sector may be replicable in those other sectors. 
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7. Conclusions  
Smallholders do not only play a central role when it comes to poverty 
alleviation efforts but are also key to production expansion.  Improved 
production methods and productivity improvements by smallholders can 
become an important source of food production while also benefitting poverty 
alleviation, climate change adaptation and biodiversity conservation efforts.  The 
shift towards food production being organized based on global value chains and 
production networks and the fast dissemination of supermarkets and other 
modern food retail outlets around the world increased the need for smallholders 
to partake in some form of aggregation mechanism in order to become 
contributors to the global food system. 
This research attempted to shed some light to the paradox of aggregation: 
few smallholders participating in seemingly beneficial collective efforts with the 
potential to connect smallholders to modern markets.  We proposed a theory of 
GVC relevant aggregation that was empirically tested to identify the key 
elements that may help ensure POs’ modern market access.  It was found that 
cooperatives, traditionally supported by policymakers, may be at a disadvantage 
when it comes to modern market access.  Nonetheless, under certain conditions 
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some of them performed better than their non-cooperative peers. Specifically, 
cooperatives were found to be more likely to include farmers with less than one 
hectar land and achieve high productivity levels.  It was found that some PO 
services play more important role than others for modern market access in the 
case of already established POs.  Access to finance and innovation has been 
found to be of great importance as well as innovation.  Collective identity 
activities also appear to be associated with the more successful POs. These 
findings have important policy implications for the development field.  
  
Appendix A: Regional 
(Source: FAO’s Investing in 
243 
Distribution of Farm Size
Smallholder Agriculture) 
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Appendix B: Farmer Characteristics According to Size 
Source: IFC: Innovative Agricultural SME Finance Models (2012) 
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Appendix C: Rural Poverty Trends 
(Source: IFAD 2011 Rural Poverty Report 2011 
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Appendix D: Inequality Indicators by Region 
(Source: World Bank Monitoring inequality) 
 
 
 
  
Appendix E: Oxfam’s Rating of Top Brands
 
Source: Author prepared based on Oxfam 2013 report and Oxfam’s behindthebrands.org website.
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Appendix F: History of Cooperatives and Distinct 
Regional Characteristics 
 
United Kingdom.  The history of organized cooperatives dates back to the 
agricultural and industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19th century in 
England.  Established in 1844, the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers is 
widely considered to be the first successful cooperative and a model for 
modern cooperatives. The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers was a 
group of 28 weavers and other artisans in Rochdale, England. As the 
mechanization of the industrial revolution was forcing more and more skilled 
workers into poverty, these tradesmen decided to band together to open their 
own store selling food items they could not otherwise afford. With lessons 
from prior failed attempts at co-operation in mind, they designed the 
Rochdale Principles which served as guidelines for modern cooperatives.  
Cooperatives have played an important role in the UK economy since then 
and retain a significant market share in a number of industries.  Late 19th and 
early 20th century farmers’ movements created organizations (such as 
National Farmers’ Union) which became incorporated into the policy process 
and got considerably de-radicalized (Woods, 2008).  Co-operatives formed the 
 249 
 
Co-operative Party in the early 20th century to represent members of 
cooperatives in Parliament. The Co-operative Party now has a permanent 
electoral pact with the Labour Party, and some Labour MPs are Co-operative 
Party members. (wikipedia.org)    
 
Continental Europe.  The Continental European roots of agricultural 
cooperatives also go back to the 19th century.  Unlike in the UK, the 
cooperative movement in Continental Europe initially centered on 
cooperative finance, in particular for agriculture.1  Subsequently, decline in 
wheat prices driven by less expensive North American wheat led farmers to 
forming agricultural cooperatives in order to increase scale and efficiency and 
thus reduce cost.2  Denmark is one of the most successful cases of adaptation 
to the new circumstances, where many farmers, aided by their cooperatives, 
switched to animals husbandry during this period, where the threat of North 
                                                     
1 Cooperative finance was started by the German F.W. Raiffeisen.  Cooperative finance was much 
less expensive than conventional financing but the latter was usually not available at all.  Part of the net 
income at the end of the year was allocated for the social needs of the community: to help orphans, to create 
employment for the previously incarcerated and to promote cultural preservation, just to mention a few.  
(Hunyadi based on Raiffeisen F.W: Cooperative Credit as a Tool for Addressing the Ailments of the Rural 
Population (1885)) 
2 Interesting to note that North American wheat was considerable less expensive partly because of 
the organization of North American farmers into cooperatives. 
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American competition was less severe.  This transformation from grains to 
animal husbandry and the development of the related food industry (in 
particular dairy) could not have happened without cooperative organizations 
given that the small farmers involved did have neither the know-how nor the 
resources to manage this transition.3  As a result, Denmark alone had over 
1,500 animal husbandry related cooperatives in 1900.   
 
In the post WWII period cooperatives played an important role in rebuilding.  
The Marshall plan limited assistance and required cooperation and sharing of 
productive equipment in particular among farmers and producers.  
Regulations favorable for cooperatives were adopted and in many cases 
cooperatives were eligible for considerable public co-financing.  
Simultaneously, the cooperative sector gained considerable policy influence 
through institutional arrangements such as the General Committee for 
Agricultural Cooperation (established in 1957), which was soon followed by 
eight other umbrella institutions representing different cooperative branches.  
                                                     
3 An important part of the Danish transformation was the provision of education, mostly technical 
but to some extent also cultural, especially to the rural population.   
 251 
 
In addition, the Coordinating Committee of EEC Co-operative Associations 
was formed to, as its name suggests, coordinate among the nine umbrella 
organizations and liaise with the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. (Hunyadi).   
 
United States.  The lifestyle of the settlers required a great deal of cooperation 
and collective effort.  The first farmer cooperative-like organization was 
formed in 1810 but it was not until 1875 that different farmer organizations 
started adopting the Rochdale system in carrying out collective activities.  By 
1900, the United States government began to pass laws that provided a 
favorable environment for cooperative development.  According to the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the largest number of 
agricultural cooperatives existed in 1929-30, about 12,000.  The number of 
agricultural cooperatives has been decreasing since then, they were estimated 
around 3,000 in 2005, reflecting consolidation, often accompanied by 
corporatization.   
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China, Cuba, Vietnam, former Soviet Block countries.  After some initial influence 
from the early European cooperative movement, most cooperatives were 
turned into agricultural collectives and became heavily state controlled in 
these countries during their communist/socialist rule.  Nonetheless, 
incorrectly, they continued to be called “cooperatives”.  To the best 
knowledge of the author of this paper, Cuba remains the only one of these 
countries which maintains collectivist farming practices.  The other countries 
have re-distributed land and have tried to reinstitute cooperatives.  However, 
“cooperatives” have lost credibility and often continue to be associated with 
the old regimes (Valdez 2005, Gorlach, Lotak, Mooney 2007).   As a result, 
with the exception of Poland, there are few cooperatives operating and they 
are poorly organized, though there are ongoing efforts to strengthen the 
sector (Szabo 2008).   
 
Former colonies in Asia and Africa.  The extensive literature covering India in 
particular but also other former British colonies show that the Brits 
introduced cooperatives on their colonies early on.  Many African countries 
have a long history of collective activities and the newfound political 
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assertiveness of farmers was associated with the formation of cooperatives in 
Ghana and Uganda (Young, Sherman, Rose 1981).  Cooperatives had heavy 
government involvement during colonial times and active government 
participation in the cooperative sector continues to this day.   
 
Latin America.  Mc Clintock (1981) shows that in Latin America the 
abolishment of the haciendas and thus the traditional patron/client system 
gave rise to cooperatives and often evolved as the organizations to deal with 
broader concerns of the farmers and several successful examples of social 
movements and protests have been directly linked to cooperatives in Latin 
America (Mc Clintock 1981).  It is important to highlight that in contrast with 
the Asian and African colonies, Latin American cooperatives evolved from 
bottom-up, rather than introduced from top-down. This process facilitated by 
the emerging cooperatives created new political capacity which now 
suddenly represented a threat to the state and led to differing degrees of 
government involvement in the sector.  However the peasantry’s new 
political assertiveness was often accompanied by weak regimes which did not 
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impose such heavy handed involvement in the cooperative sector as did the 
Chinese, Tanzanian and Cuban regimes. 
  
Appendix G: Hypothetical Case of Peruvian Coffee 
Farmer Profit and Loss Statement with and without 
Financing 
 
(source: Dalberg 2012) 
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Appendix H: Agromantaro 
Agromantaro, a mid-size Peruvian company that sources artichokes and 
jalapenos from Peruvian smallholders and processes and packages them for 
European and the US markets, one of them being General Mills.  Agromantaro, 
General Mills and CARE partnered to provide small farmers with training on 
crop management and post-harvest practices, microloans to purchase artichoke 
shoots and seeds for farmers who lack collateral or a verifiable credit history, 
training on how to form farmer cooperatives and financial planning education 
and related information.  Agromantaro needs to secure a growing supply of 
artichokes and jalapenos that meets the standards and requirements imposed by 
General Mills4, creating strong incentive to facilitate aggregation and capacity 
building and to develop long term relationship with producers.  General Mills is 
similarly interested in securing a stable dependable supply but that alone may 
not be a sufficient justification for engaging in Agromantaro’s program with 
smallholders.  However, as an international brand targeting socially conscious 
                                                     
4 Minneapolis based General Mills is one of the world’s leading food companies with 
annual sales of $17.8 billion in 2013, with brands including Cheerios, Fiber One, Häagen-Dazs, 
Nature Valley, Yoplait, Betty Crocker, Pillsbury, Green Giant, among others, and operating in over 100 
countries. 
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European customers (General Mills’ Le Géant Vert is France’s top selling brand 
in canned artichokes), the publicity around such smallholder programs can help 
enhance General Mills’ brand value and can help meet sustainable sourcing 
commitments more generally as illustrated by the mention of the above initiative 
in the 2013 press release about General Mills’ sustainable sourcing commitment.  
CARE International, an international humanitarian organization, will be 
providing community development and community governance related support.   
 
(http://www.generalmills.com/ChannelG/NewsReleases/Library/2013/Sep
tember/peru_sourcing.aspx,  
http://www.generalmills.com/Home/ChannelG/NewsReleases/Library/20
13/September/sourcing_10 
  
Appendix I: Financing Sources for Agriculture in Peru
(Source: Dalberg 2012) 
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Appendix J: Hungarian Producer Organization 
Requirements
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Appendix K: Map of Hungary 
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Appendix L. Hungary Vegetable Statistics 
 
Statistics on the most important vegetables in Hungarian agriculture
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012
Land Area (hectars) 67,835 75,534 76,802 1,695 2,318 2,076 602 1,048 1,055 1,693 1,885 1,963 2,023 2,031 1,896 1,874 1,975 1,280
Total production (tons) 1,144,363 1,475,291 1,363,075 40,895 57,592 57,183 4,171 6,466 6,392 58,532 65,149 74,721 27,641 32,256 32,151 134,274 163,349 108,799
Sold to
trader or processor 397,072 586,323 587,012 6,867 9,079 8,664 1,067 1,261 1,903 9,925 13,458 18,697 5,065 7,658 3,851 39,732 59,277 27,280
traditional market 136,511 174,002 144,615 4,314 6,946 7,529 829 2,029 1,843 11,353 12,506 11,821 6,693 7,351 8,201 10,243 25,218 21,531
direct export 12,131 11,882 9,318 0 0 0 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 518 1,333 836
processed or used by producer 20,857 29,048 35,283 5,952 6,493 5,766 16 89 138 1,851 1,914 2,921 68 95 72 1,821 1,916 1,990
own consumption 95,378 95,254 87,146 6,885 6,947 7,121 1,259 1,194 1,053 14,354 13,757 13,075 6,209 5,938 5,427 11,761 11,622 8,860
wastage 5,887 8,621 12,568 650 997 1,589 69 40 149 677 1,099 1,685 366 464 429 138 352 328
change in inventory 7,350 27,449 19,665 -685 2,132 2,677 71 113 260 761 2,217 1,985 1,313 1,365 2,257 6 0 -14
TOTAL 1,147,349 1,480,245 1,371,963 41,842 58,468 59,118 4,171 6,471 6,527 58,725 65,308 74,912 27,642 32,297 32,151 134,288 163,399 108,826
Imports
tons x x x 14,125 12,447 9,230 1,026 997 1,485 12,453 11,569 7,787 .. .. .. 18,996 14,921 9,853
million Ft 21,924 20,476 16,811 1,312 1,053 604 637 569 421 1,140 1,078 828 .. .. .. 6,088 4,555 3,424
Exports
tons x x x 1,733 2,189 2,511 417 437 256 1,518 2,398 2,180 .. .. .. 4,355 3,768 2,298
million Ft 25,476 28,478 29,741 210 314 284 297 322 131 103 241 269 .. .. .. 1,481 1,777 1,201
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012
Land Area (hectars) 980 765 798 5,800 6,392 6,083 622 687 665 14,377 15,523 15,607 2,199 1,915 1,925 2,386 2,786 2,587
Total production (tons) 37,989 35,909 33,932 141,086 202,920 182,709 8,593 9,030 11,748 61,075 99,118 92,361 17,034 16,897 17,874 57,127 80,798 65,294
Productivity (ton/hectar) 24,610 31,360 29,460 22,490 30,420 29,350 11,640 11,550 16,150 3,970 6,100 5,620 5,790 6,980 7,380 21,600 26,730 23,010
Sold to
trader or processor 22,317 22,221 19,157 54,661 53,606 62,982 943 787 2,169 37,853 56,246 60,234 7,266 7,302 12,190 10,520 13,610 10,151
traditional market 5,223 3,032 2,602 21,429 25,358 20,678 3,085 2,994 3,347 1,770 3,485 2,877 482 546 857 9,161 10,577 11,779
direct export 170 164 154 2,051 1,831 1,756 0 0 0 0 0 154 0 0 0 514 486 285
processed or used by producer 262 361 329 1,018 853 600 25 35 24 227 811 397 46 71 159 3,449 6,732 5,923
own consumption 9,627 8,600 7,251 4,066 7,191 5,186 649 773 789 2,955 3,113 2,946 2,093 1,659 1,691 7,070 7,739 7,185
wastage 74 232 243 502 785 858 85 103 81 125 140 247 64 174 222 1,146 1,251 1,150
change in inventory 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 11 -12 0 1 0 1 6,249 19,776 11,314
TOTAL 37,989 35,909 33,961 141,086 202,920 182,709 8,593 9,030 11,748 61,231 99,180 92,361 17,068 16,911 17,874 57,157 81,003 65,436
Imports
tons 14,867 13,560 11,573 12,994 7,023 5,245 3,974 1,341 830 219 72 24 18 85 379 5,583 5,247 3,886
million Ft 2,191 1,777 1,710 1,016 569 479 574 227 158 41 13 10 14 24 75 421 406 261
Exports
tons 10,531 9,915 11,079 58,768 45,788 54,014 56 107 1,433 128 79 312 8 12 99 3,671 3,939 4,040
million Ft 1,623 1,453 2,019 3,947 2,475 3,470 11 26 111 25 9 44 3 2 21 896 848 886
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012
Land Area (hectars) 243 288 351 302 228 245 2,451 2,105 1,999 700 499 595 21,837 26,532 29,366 1,609 2,400 2398
Total production (tons) 7,873 7,627 8,278 7,099 7,397 6,910 109,533 117,511 79,125 11,923 9,741 12,833 302,757 427,290 433,613 14,460 20,792 21864
Productivity (ton/hectar) 18,250 13,950 13,200 14,120 19,350 16,820 33,860 44,780 33,270 15,830 16,970 19,420 13,610 15,860 14,580 8,650 8,450 7,950
Sold to
trader or processor 2,880 3,109 3,581 1,156 1,361 2,632 26,757 30,938 33,121 3,434 4,831 5,904 142,610 268,780 284,403 12,980 15,430 10,934
traditional market 907 935 1,211 983 1,101 1,207 33,441 36,948 21,478 2,106 1,879 1,898 7,938 12,914 7,079 425 1,142 1,091
direct export 283 190 0 0 0 0 3,156 3,082 3,128 174 144 0 0 0 12 0 0 0
processed or used by producer 19 20 18 145 262 243 255 780 699 122 1,180 1,307 969 1,114 6,059 601 542 1,912
own consumption 1,350 1,217 1,251 1,927 1,692 1,538 7,582 7,249 6,410 879 790 785 3,028 3,626 4,566 536 486 487
wastage 27 27 26 39 34 103 226 228 307 33 44 300 737 1,305 3,886 20 24 9
change in inventory 1 -1 -1 0 0 0 32 0 -31 -7 391 0 -1,063 517 -1,033 -102 -45 -19
TOTAL 7,873 7,627 8,278 7,099 7,397 6,910 109,555 117,628 79,220 11,945 10,130 13,830 303,002 427,475 436,812 14,460 20,792 21,864
Imports
tons 2,159 2,711 2,765 .. .. .. 10,490 8,008 4,476 .. .. .. 1 1,157 1,750 1,506 2,389 1,717
million Ft 503 533 595 .. .. .. 3,133 2,487 1,372 .. .. .. 1 32 49 957 1,700 1,099
Exports
tons 1,081 916 1,549 .. .. .. 21,703 23,033 24,739 .. .. .. 919 1,620 1,591 2,388 2,336 1,957
million Ft 267 313 345 .. .. .. 7,223 6,262 6,979 .. .. .. 224 252 283 2,206 2,273 1,968
SPICE PEPPERSSALAD SPAGETTI SQUASH GREEN PEPPERS TOMATO PEPPERS SWEET CORN
TOMATOES
CUCUMBER WATERMELON CANTELOUPE GREEN PEAS GREEN BEANS CABBAGE
TOTAL VEGETABLES ONIONS GARLIC CARROTS PARSLEY ROOT
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Appendix M. Morakert Financial Indicators 
 
 
source: author  prepared based on various statistical and government sources 
HUF mio 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Sales 8223 5162 4713 2004 566
Results from operations 116 25 -1400 -599 -697
Financial results -68 -16 -206 36 -160
   financial income 56 60 50 349 188
   financial expenses 124 76 256 314 348
Net Income 48 6 -1606 -563 -857
Current Assets 1778 1458 1357 1170 99
   inventory 588 680 192 123 25
   receivables 1173 763 1163 1039 73
Fixed Assets 1917 2069 2150 1949 1758
TOTAL ASSETS 3898 3937 3860 3753 1858
Current Liabilities 2112 2206 3105 3574 3207
   owed to suppliers/members 872 1197 1223 758
Long Term Liabilities 397 344 998 864 728
Equity 1024 1268 -1606 -1219 -2077
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 3898 3937 3860 3753 1858
Fixed Assets / Total Assets 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.95
Current Assets/ Total Assets 0.46 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.05
Equity / Total Assets 0.26 0.32 -0.42 -0.32 -1.12
Liabilities / Equity 2.81 2.10 -3.40 -4.08 -1.89
Current Assets / Current Liabilities 0.84 0.66 0.44 0.33 0.03
Net Income / Net Sales 0.006 0.001 -0.341 -0.281 -1.514
Net Income / Total Assets 0.012 0.002 -0.416 -0.150 -0.461
Net Income / Equity 0.047 0.005 1.000 0.462 0.413
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Appendix N. DelkerTESZ Financial Indicators 
 
 
source: author  prepared based on various statistical and government sources 
 
 
HUF mio 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Net Sales 4468 4601 5340 5020 5853 5198 5947
Results from operations 180 108 29 77 85 -18 42
Financial results -71 -10 -3 -48 -31 71 20
   financial income 18 51 57 25 20 42 56
   financial expenses 89 61 60 73 51 29 -36
Net Income 99 90 25 30 51 11 7
Current Assets 714 503 562 708 732 653 836
   inventory 69 80 85 136 127 113 157
   receivables 295 303 431 427 572 431 633
Fixed Assets 600 619 652 774 778 778 797
TOTAL ASSETS 1317 1130 1217 1483 1648 1591 1724
Current Liabilities 560 345 390 329 468 500 572
   owed to suppliers/members 164 168 243 253 276 310 294
Long Term Liabilities 146 40 40 313 259 171 216
Equity 584 687 731 822 885 904 920
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 1317 1130 1217 1483 1648 1591 1724
Fixed Assets / Total Assets 0.46 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.47 0.49 0.46
Current Assets/ Total Assets 0.54 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.48
Equity / Total Assets 0.44 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.53
Liabilities / Equity 1.26 0.64 0.66 0.80 0.86 0.76 0.87
Current Assets / Current Liabilities 1.28 1.46 1.44 2.15 1.56 1.31 1.46
Net Income / Net Sales 0.022 0.020 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.001
Net Income / Total Assets 0.075 0.080 0.021 0.020 0.031 0.007 0.004
Net Income / Equity 0.170 0.131 0.034 0.036 0.058 0.012 0.008
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Appendix O: Data Sources Used on Hungarian POs 
TESZ number (order in which POs were established): Ministry of Rural 
Development  
Location: Ministry of Rural Development 
Main activity: Ministry of Rural Development 
Legal form: Ministry of Rural Development 
Year registered: Hungarian Department of Justice records 
Number of members aggregated: from ministry of Rural Development official in 
charge of overseeing POs 
Main products: interviews, PO website, other public information sources (press 
releases, etc.) and notes to the financial statements 
Value added activities: PO website, other public information sources (press 
releases, etc.) and notes to the financial statements 
Production area aggregated: PO website, other public information sources (press 
releases, etc.) and notes to the financial statements 
Contract with supermarket chains: PO website, other public information sources 
(press releases, etc.) and notes to the financial statements Export: PO website, 
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other public information sources (press releases, etc.) and notes to the financial 
statements 
Certification: PO website, other public information sources (press releases, etc.), 
notes to the financial statements and interviews 
Financial indicators:  Hungarian Justice Department database of over 100 
different forms have been mined to obtain financial indicators for 2009-2012.  
Ratios and composite financial variables were calculated by the author. 
Interviews with government officials and market participants were used to 
confirm and verify key pieces of information.  
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Appendix P: FAST Information Sheet 
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